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Project 31 Stremitel'nyi ELINT Destroyer

As is well known, intelligence is one of the most important tools of strategy and tactics, allowing to know in advance the plans of an adversary and, accordingly, to develop in advance appropriate countermeasures. With the advent of radio electronic equipment on ships, naval intelligence acquired special importance. Interception and decoding of the transmissions of various radio engineering systems became the most important sources of intelligence information. The motivation for the creation of radio reconnaissance ships in the USSR was the emergence of them in the late 1950s in NATO countries. And the first ships of the Soviet Navy equipped with radio intelligence stations were the destroyers of Project 31, which were converted from the ships of the 30bis project in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In September 1955, Admiral S.G.Gorshkov approved alterations to pr.30bis ships for electronic intelligence (RTR). According to the task, the new appointment of the ship was to:

• conduct radio and radar reconnaissance;
• definition TTD radar, radio communications and navigation systems of the enemy;
• interference with radio stations and enemy radar;
• conducting operational and tactical intelligence.

Sketch study of the project, received a number 31 at CDB-57, which in June 1956 submitted to the conversion options that satisfy the condition placed a predetermined set of special radio equipment. Project 31 was an improved Skoryy class destroyer.

The 1st version retained the main fire artillery and anti-aircraft replaced with two quad 57mm AU ZIF-75 remote guidance from the radar "Foot-B". However, despite the removal of both the TA, the overload reached an unacceptable value, with the speed was significantly decreased, deteriorating stability and habitability conditions. Already the Project 30bis Smelyy design had higher freeboard than the earlier Projects 7-U and 30, but not enough to avoid taking water. For example, on trials flooding through the boiler air intakes limited Smelyy to 28kts in rough weather (she exceeded 36kts in smooth water). Many guns could not be operated.

In the 2nd embodiment, the main guns were removed, and replaced with two ZIF-75. Travel speed with decreased only 0.5 kt, stability remained within normal limits, and the ship, according to chief engineer TU Navy Rear Admiral A.I.Napituhina, completely satisfied the primary purpose. Finally, the third option , different from the 2nd replacement of the main boiler, allow all to avoid congestion. The EM pr.30 bis ship had improved shipbuilding elements and more convenient location posts.

As a result of the consideration of preliminary design study for further design was recommended option 2 - cheaper and effective enough. The TTZ on engineering design included armament complement of one RBU-2500 in the bow with SS fire "Smerch" and guided by the CEO "Pegasus-2M" (HS-572). Number of quad 57-mm machine guns was reduced to two. The design provides a significant reinforcement of the hull and superstructure to achieve the safe radius in the explosion of "the atomic bomb of medium caliber" of 2000 meters on the case, and 3000 m by add-ins, sealing the outer contour, installation of stationary degassing and decontamination systems and water curtain systems .

In this form the TTZ was approved by deputy Navy Commander Admiral N.E.Basistym on 30 July 1956. At the last minute artillery armament seemed still weak, and Nicholas Efremovich in his hand added: "With the installation of the 3rd 57-mm machine". Decree of the USSR on August 25, 1956 for conversion by pr.31. There were planned eight destroyers. After considering TEHPROEKT 31 central departments and institutes of the Navy in March of the following year was made an unexpected conclusion: the anti-aircraft armament was deemed insufficient, the lack of major caliber artillery made ship defenseless against any enemy surface and special equipment either had not yet been put into service, or existed only in the onshore version, and reliable operation of all signals intelligence complex in the marine environment, and even to create interference, caused serious doubts. After a long and thorough discussion of the creation of such highly specialized ship was recognized as inexpedient.

Work on pr.31, which was now called "comprehensive modernization project EM pr.30 bis" was decided to continue on the adjusted reference, combining in it as the task of strengthening anti-submarine weapons, and requirements for ship self defense. The job was approved in two days after notification of the SME management on the outcome of TEHPROEKT 31. It provided for the preservation of the main guns and replaced three 57mm AU ZIF-71, and two twin ZIF-31. Antisubmarine armament was provided in accordance with the joint decision of 28 January 1956 - two RBU-2500 and the two CGS. Complex RTR echoed by two ships, which were supposed to be used together. Nomenclature of the pr.31 was now defined as "anti-submarine, anti-aircraft defense and antiboat connections ships at sea, as well as a patrol and maintenance of electronic intelligence." Later, the TTZ had significant changes. First, the defense was unified on the basis of the AU ZIF-71, which was at a lower weight and twice the rate of fire than ZIF-31. As a result, while maintaining the density of anti-aircraft fire, there was a reduction of 28 tons of weapons of mass. Second, by the time the trial ended in anti-submarine homing torpedoes SET-53, which is recognized as much more effective weapon than the RSL. Indeed, it is estimated that the probability of hitting one such submarine torpedo was equal to the probability of its defeat two volleys at RBU full expenditure of ammunition. This led to the decision to retain a five-tube torpedo launcher, upgraded to fire anti-submarine torpedoes. Somewhat later it was also decided to abandon the CGS, as the views on the use of anti-submarine weapons Stern Group had changed, and the possibility of their use is questionable.

After adjusting job S.G.Gorshkov Admiral addressed to the Minister of Defence of the USSR Zhukov with the report about the planned re-EM pr.30 bis as "does not meet modern requirements" and to approve the TTZ on pr.31 and allow alterations on it is not eight, as previously thought, but immediately order 24 vessels (eight for SF and PF and four for CF and CHB). The rest of the ships of the series scheduled for upgrade under pr.31 only had part of the anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons, without complex installation tools RTR ( draft 31-P ). June 3, 1957 Zhukov approved the proposals of the Civil Code of the Navy.

In November 1957 the development TEHPROEKT 31, for which the chief designer was D.S.Barbarash, was finally over. The standard ship tonnage increased by 284 tons (including about 100 tons of solid ballast) and reached 2600 tons. Therefore the calculated full speed was reduced from 36 to 33 kt, cruising range and economic range from 3600 to 3050 miles. Due to congestion and reduced freeboard somewhat deteriorated seaworthy ship quality. The artillery of the main fire remained unchanged, but because of add-ons developed fire sectors decreased. Instead, 85-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft SU placed on the ship five single-barreled 57-mm automatic ZIF-71 with remote guidance from radar shooting SU "Foot-B". For detection of air and surface targets designed a new radar "Foot-H" with the antenna on the main mast. TA bow shot, but the stern was modernized for firing anti-submarine torpedoes. Management torpedo firing was carried out by the new system putts "Sound 31". On the bow superstructure, extending up the sides, installed two RBU-2500 PUSB "Smerch" system. Preserved and traditional fodder release gear. To ensure the targeting complexes antisubmarine weapons SAS "Tamir-5H" to be replaced on the GS-572. In addition, the ship form was changed with the superstructure and chimneys dismantled as unnecessary command post rangefinder.

The equipment of radio reconnaissance, consisting of a special army receivers had to provide interception of the most common types of radio analysis gear, direction finding in KB and VHF bands. "Mizzen-8" established research stations to detect enemy radar working. The precise definition of the nature of radiation and TTD radar was assigned to the three "Havel" stations operating in narrow frequency sub-bands. At the same stations on different ships ( 2 embodiment pr.31 ) , working on different frequencies, so that the opening for a full picture of the situation required them to work together. However, in this case, the short-range 0.8-1.8 cm, is actively used by foreign navies, it turned out to be not covered by means of search and exploration. PAZ ensure as far as possible without major alterations: supported by the doors and hatches are designed closed circuits placed with independent ventilation systems equipped with degassing and decontamination systems, as well as washing exterior surfaces. To protect against acoustic torpedoes intended towed guardian "BOKA".

In general, by the findings of the central departments and institutions of the Navy, pr.31 met modern requirements only in part of the ASW weapons. Anti-aircraft artillery, despite significantly increase the possibility (control shooting from the radar, high rate of fire and increased the reach adjustment), still did not provide sufficient protection against modern aircraft. A serious drawback of the ship remained non-universality of the artillery major caliber. But most importantly, the complex RTR, which in fact had been modernized, remained imperfect, and it was noted even when considering the first option pr.31. Military receivers designed to be installed on the ship had a weak antenna devices and input circuits were not protected from the induced voltages when operating their own means of communication and radar. Processing devices and analysis of information, which existed only in the onshore version, did not have stabilizing devices, and safe operation on the shipboard conditions was in doubt. Samples of DF "Top" and "compartment" were not brought industry to mass production and put into service, so the project reserved for them only the weight and space stations. Radar reconnaissance left open frequency band, actively used in the foreign fleets. Exploding equipment RTR two ships created additional difficulties associated with their use, caused the need for a third ship - a staff that can process and analyze incoming information. Due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons ships pr. 31 could not be used for air defense formations and to conduct exploration in wartime conditions to counter the enemy.

Navy Technical service general spoke out against the project approval. In an extreme case, it would be possible to carry out such work on one or two ships to gain experience and refine requirements for ships of this class. These considerations did not shake the confidence of the Navy for the need for ship-based EM RTR pr.30 bis, but made sure to only upgrade eight ships. In February 1958 TEHPROEKT 31 was approved, and specific ships identified and included in the production plants plans. Three months after the approval pr.31 at a meeting led by the Navy Commander was considered and TEHPROEKT 31-P (without tools RTR). As a result, at the project discussion, the meeting recognized the project provided anti-aircraft armament, consisting of five AU ZIF-71, not enough to solve the problem of a single air defense ship, and the more connections. The composition of the anti-arms was found quite acceptable for ships pr.30 bis , but its installation without a corresponding strengthening of defense again, it seemed inappropriate, since "With the existing anti-aircraft weapons EM pr.30 bis to go to sea to carry out combat operations can not." Alternatively, it was proposed to remove the artillery GK setting instead of three quad AU ZIF-75, ie, return to already once rejected an embodiment of two years ago.

As a result, only there were only eight ships modernized EM pr.30 bis of the Soviet Navy, converted in 1957-1962. under pr.31 : "fearless", "Silent", "True", "Vortex", "Fire", "Dangerous", "protect", "Rush". All the more surprising is the fact that four ships ( "Vortex", "protect", "True" and "Information") immediately after test completion were put in "conservation" and did not enter into operation. These were written off for scrap in the 1980s. Apparently, despite the beginning of military service, the fleet did not feel the urgent need for these ships. Besides expressed when considering pr.31 fears were confirmed, and among the shortcomings mentioned in the conclusion of the Office of State for acceptance of ships foster act lead ship of this project - EM "Silent", state tests held in June 1960 in the Black Sea, and observed strong interference from signals intelligence onshore own radio equipment, and inconvenience associated with the need to use a pair of ships (worth noting that during the service destroyers pr.31 twin never used). Nevertheless, the "Silent" was the first ship of Russian navy, were armed with standard tools RTR, and entered as such in history.

The others were on duty on the following fleets: "Rush" - in the CBF, "Silent" and "fearless" committed joint move by the Northern sea route to the Far East in 1961 (at the same time they were part of the Pacific Fleet until 1976, so that the possibility of their use of the pair had theoretically), and the most violent fate went to "Fire", which managed to get a part of all three fleets of the European part of the USSR, and in 1971 was in a combat zone, providing support to the Armed forces of Egypt. It is possible that this support was precisely to provide data signals intelligence, so that at least one ship of this project lived up to its original purpose.

The head destroyer pr.31 "Silent" remained the longest in the ranks, serving until 1994.

Because of the weak air defense, the "thirty-first" under the conditions of the war could not act independently and conduct reconnaissance without the support of other fleet forces (by the way, even the air defense of the modernized, at about the same time, more modern destroyers under the 56FLO project, consisting of four quadruple 45mm artillery mounts and two paired universal 130-mm artillery systems of the main caliber, recognized as a result of a weak, and therefore the "fifty-sixth" received instead of the stern artillery installation of the main caliber one anti-aircraft missile complex ks - so the destroyers of project 56A appeared). It makes no sense to repeat the well-known, repeatedly published constructive shortcomings of the "thirty" - most of them are preserved and "the thirty-first." Among them - a small autonomy, restrictions on the use of weapons in the storm due to thorough splashing and filling the decks of a half tank, etc. One of the significant shortcomings of the "thirty-first" was the electric power industry, based on DC power sources - three turbo-generators of the TD-7 type with a total capacity of 450 kW and three diesel generators of the DG-75 type (one of which was parking) with a total capacity of 225 kW. In the leading fleets of the world before the war switched to the use of alternating current, which allowed to increase the power capacity of the ships (for example, on the German serial destroyers of the 1936-A type it reached 550 kW). In our country, too, attempts were made to switch to alternating current. In particular, in 1934 a project of an experimental destroyer was developed, and in August 1941 the destroyer "Scary" of the project 7-UE, which was a serial "improved seven" with electric power on alternating current, was put into operation. Despite this, as well as the experience of war and the study of the situation in foreign fleets, the introduction of alternating current on Soviet ships has stalled. Even on the serial destroyers of Project 30, massively laid before the war, they retained electric power at a constant current. And with the efforts of an industry not interested in restructuring the cooperative system that was established before the war, electric power at a constant current "migrated" to the post-war ships of the 30bis project, and from there to the destroyers of the project. As a result, ships with such energy did not make sense to modernize and replace them with separate types of weapons and radio technical reconnaissance (RTR) means with more modern models. Finally, the forcedly accepted concept of the separation of RTR equipment from two carrier ships created known difficulties and inconveniences of operational order. It is for this reason that the destroyers of Project 31 were transferred to other theaters in pairs, with the presence of variants No. 1 and No. 2 in the pair of ships.