Left Wing Subversive Organizations
The PCI faced the pressure of Red Brigades, backed by Czechoslovak secret services ( StB ). Members of the largest and most active Italian group, the Red Brigades, had been and still were in contact with the Czech Intelligence Service. The Communist Party of Italy was in a very difficult position when the Red Brigades abducted former Christian Democrat Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Members of the Communist Party went to Czechoslovakia to meet with the leaders of the Red Brigades to persuade them to release Aldo Moro, but Czechoslovaks got rid of them. Several among the first generation of Red Brigades were actually trained in Czechoslovakia by Soviet military intelligence.
Terrorism schools in Soviet puppet states educated terrorist soldiers who created havoc all over the Western world. Czechoslovakia had such a terrorist school. It was under the direct supervision of the KGB, and according to a senior Czech defector, at least 13 of the senior members of Italy's Red Brigade were trained there -- including the men who murdered Aldo Moro.
A plurality of assets accounted for making this component the most menacing of the entire terrorist spectrum. The Communist or leftist component consistently displayed an unwaivering commitment to clear-cut principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, despite internal debate, dissent, and schism over the methodology of its armed struggle. Moreover, from the very outset, it has developed viable clandestine structures and efficient operational techniques, while enjoying at the same time notable support from active and passive sympathizers. Traditionally, it is also the largest component from both the standpoint of numerical strength and the number of individual organizations present within its ranks. Not least, it has produced a major organization, known as the Red Brigades, endowed with an exceptional degree of resiliency in the face of cyclic setbacks and with the capability of absorbing less viable terrorist groups of kindred aspirations.
The numerical strength of the leftist sector was frequently the object of conflicting assessments; however, none of them had proven to be conclusive. In March of 1980, Francesco Mazzola, then acting chairman of the Intelljgence and Security Executive Committee (CESIS), warned that any attempt to assess the numerical composition of the terrorist groups of the left was haphazard because "the destructive array of the left if vast, uneven, and composite."
An indirect indication of' its numerical strength was reflected that as of October 31, 1982, the Italian prison population included 1,357 terrorists of the left, and 274 additional individuals had been identified and placed on the wanted list. A further classification of those figures affords more significant details. A total of 713 inmates belonged to the BR, 305 to PL, 337 to other organizations; and 97 wanted terrorists belonged to the BR, 61 to PL, ll6 to other organizations. In this connection it is also worth noting that approximately 200 BR bases, 100 PL bases, and 39 NAP bases had been dismantled by the police forces as of the same date.
Brigate Rosse probably consisted of about 50 militants when organized; 1,000 at the point of maximum expansion in 1978-79, plus some 2,000 external supporters; 100 at the end of 1982/beginning of 1988, plus 200 external supporters. Front Line (Prima Linea, PL) may have had 20 militants when organized, plus as many as 1,500 to 2,000 potential supporters; 2,500 at the point or maximum expansion in 1979; 100 at the end of 1982/beginning of 1983. Other formutions and terrorist prone elements of extraparliametary organizations numbered about 6,000 militants by 1978-79; 700 to 800 militants by the end of 1982 / beginning of 1983, plus 4,000 supporters/ sympathizers.
None of the organizations present in the Communist-inspired component of the Italian terrorist spectrum were able to graduate from the stage of coordinated terrorist actions to the more advanced stages of insurgency or civil war, their declared aim. Terrorist groups of the left and, indeed, of other persuasions active in Italy, carefully avoided any type of fire exchange with the police or the military, regardless of unit size. In point of fact, known fire engagements pertain exclusively to rare attempts on the part of individual terrorists to resist arrest.
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