Targets and Targeting
All the terrorist organizations of Communist inspiration were extremely selective in their choice of targets. A given target was chosen because of its representativeness or symbolic value as well as on account of its comparative accessibility and vulnerability. Typical human targets included executives, managers, foremen, and representatives in the fields of industry, commerce, and finance; political figures associated with the relative-majority Christian Democratic Party; conservative spokesmen and activists; members of the judiciary and law enforcement. agencies; and journalists and professors regarded as part of the establishment.
Typical material targets included real and personal property belonging to the state and public entities, private enterprises, and individual citizens. Actions against property were usually regarded as complementary to attacks on individuals. At the same time, less sophisticated operations against human targets were intended to be complementary to the more sophisticated or complex ones.
As a rule, the leftist component adopted three standard targeting techniques: the placement of one or more explosive devices, the classical ambush attack, and the raid. Less frequent was the political abduction, which required greater organizational assets as well as operational sophistication.
The most rudimentary form of targeting was all too dearly the detonation of explosives. One or more devices were affixed against the selected material target, most frequently during hours of darkness, in order to do damage to property and possibly to given individuals, although there is always the accepted risk that bystanders will be hurt.
Besides accounting for the largest number of terrorist crimes, this type of action is usually the work of minor organizations or of militants being trained or tested for membership in the major ones. For its execution, limited assets are required beyond the acquisition or manufacture of the device. In point of fact, one or two militants can simply deposit such ordnance in various areas of the same municipality within a matter of hours if not minutes. The so-called nights of fire entail this technique. Responsibility for this type of action is not always claimed, but its political coloration is often made manifest by the circumstances surrounding its perpetration.
Passage from rudimentary actions of this nature to the more sophisticated ones can be indicative of operational and/or structural enhancement. The BR, the NAP, and PL passed through this stage of bombing and arson attacks before graduating to a more advanced operational status.
The classical ambush attack is obviously conducted against human targets and is predicated upon the element of surprise. It also falls within the concept of hit-and-run operations, speed being essential.
The victim of this targeting technique is usually singular. Occasionally there may be two or more victims, principally when the attack is conducted against motorized human targets. Before attacking the victim, his habits are closely scrutinized and, where possible, intelligence is acquired from planted informants such as the irregulars and points of contact. The ambush itself was conducted at a well surveyed location and at a pre-established time. The size of the commando unit varied from two tc five members, a number that roughly corresponded to the typical brigade of the BR or to an otherwise named cell of kindred organizations. One female member frequently participated in the action. The attackers were nearly always unmasked, but disguised. Some of them are responsible for covering the avenue of escape.
The attacking party closes in on the victim preferably on foot or, if the situation warrants it, by car or motor scooter. The ambush mission entails in most cases woundings or murders, in that statistical order. However, victims have also been subjected to minor forms of punishment such as chaining in place, with or without a poster around the neck, and haircuts. A secondary purpose of the ambush may be to disarm a law enforcement agent for procurement purposes. Once the mission was accomplished, responsibility is claimed by means of a leaflet left in place or subsequently made available to a' newspaper or press agency or by a telephone call to the media.
The written responsibility claim may relate to a single attack or combine a number of them. For example, the Rome column of the BR issued a single communique in December of 1979 disclosing its paternity in the attacks on policemen Romiti, Granato, and Tedesco; however, in May of 1980, the Veneto column devoted an entire communique exclusively to its action against Albanese, a police official, The difference in procedure may be related to the importance of the target or to internal organizational contingencies. Moreover, the communique usually offers an explanation for the selection of the victim and often provided a resume of the victim's career.
In still other cases, a paternity claim will make reference to previously perpetrated actions and link the latter one to the explanation given for the former. This was the case with the communique of the Rome column of July 1982 taking responsibility for the attack on police official Ammaturo, while referring to the Delcogliano and Cirillo incidents.
Communiques were issued either by individual columns or by the organization as a whole. Responsibility claims made by the organization rather than a single column can be indicutive of mulli-column effurt. It might be noted that the columns usually possess a name in addition to a geographical indicator. The name they adopt was that of a fallen comrade. E.g.: Turin column: Maru Cagol; Milan column: Walter Alasia; Genoa column: Francesco Berardi; Veneto column: Anna Marin Ludman; Naples column: Fabrizio Pelli.
Raids were direded against human targets, material targets, or both. Depending upon the mission of the raid, the numerical composition of a raiding party usually ranged from 4 to 12 people. Raids frequntly entailled forcible entry into offices or dwellings and servee various purposes which can easily be merged into a single terrorist action.
In the course of the same raid one or more representative individuals might be murdered or wounded, the walls of the premises might be spray-painted with ideological slogans and the name of the perpetrating organization, and documents of intelligence value andlor material of logistical use might be stolen. The raid produced its inherent demonstrative effect if just one or all of these objectives were accomplished.
Moreover, when a selected victim cannot be targeted by means of the classical ambush attack in the street, in an automobile, on a bus, or in any other place easily accessible to the public, the raid afforded an alternative solution through an invasion of the victims office or residence. At the same time, while the ambush attack limited the attackers to the use of firearms (generally pistols and revolvers, less frequently submachine guns and shotguns), the raid allowed the added use of explosives.
The only time when raids appear to have been planned in the form of a cluster was in 1982. Three such raids were conducted by the BR against army and air force installations in the Rome and Caserta areas. All three involved silent penetration of the military perimeter, overpowering of elements of the guard force, and the theft of weapons, while no casualties were suffered by either side. This cluster also seems to have been coordinated with attacks on military vehicles. Unless intended as mere self-financing ventures, such as armed robberies lacking proletarian significance, the responsibility for a raid was always claimed by the perpetrating organization. For example, even though the main purpose of the above-mentioned attacks upon military installations was to acquire weapons, the very fact that the army and air force were being targeted was sufficient reason to claim responsibility for the action and publicize it.
Twenty-four known kidnapings had been perpetrated by the terrorist left by 1983. They were usually classifiable as either for political or ransom reasons. The less sophisticated political ones are substantially symbolic. Of this total, 18 were attributable to the BR (15 political, 2 for ransom, and 1 to procure medical assistance); 3 to the NAP (1 political and 2for ransom); 1 to the October XXII Circle (ransom); 1 to the DCC (political, although it entailed a demand for below-market-price distribution of meat in Rome's proletarian neighborhoods); and 1 to Autonomy-connected elements (ransom).
The abductions of Christian Democratic Party President, member of Parliament, and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, in 1978, and that of Supreme Court Judge Giovanni D'Urso, detailed to the Ministry of Justice as chief of the Third Division of the General Directorate for Penitentiaries, in 1980 - were linked to each other with respect to substance, notwithstanding the time differential. They both represented a deep thrust at the very heart of the state. Just as in the targeting of Aldo Moro, whereby the BR symbolically merged in one victim their attack against a plurality of institutions - the national executive, the Parliament, and the relative-majority Christian Democratic Party - the targeting of D'Urso was a simultaneous attack against the judiciary and the prison system.
In both instances, as in the 1974 kidnaping of Assistant State Attorney Mario Sossi, the BR presented themselves as coequals of the state at the bargaining level. For Moro's freedom, they asked that 13 jailed terrorists be released. The request was denied. The liberation of D'Urso was at long last left to the decision of the imprisoned terrorists. The outcome is well known: Moro was executed and D'Urso was freed. Of the 24 victims, 17 were released by their captors, 3 were freed by the police, and four were murdered (3 executions and 1 accidental death because of improper gagging).
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