Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS - Organization for the Liberation of the Levant) was a coalition of northern Syria-based Sunni Islamist insurgent groups that evolved from Jabhat al-Nusrah, or “Nusrah Front,” al-Qa‘ida’s former branch in Syria. HTS is largely self-funded. In an interview in 2021, Former US Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey described HTS as “an asset” to American strategy in Syria, saying that supporting the jihadist commander was “the least bad option” for keeping Idlib out of Syrian government control. While the US officially considers al-Jolani a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ and has implicated his group in a litany of human rights abuses, al-Jolani insists that HTS “does not represent a threat” to Western interests.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham means "Levant Liberation Organization" in Arabic. Before the era of colonialism, the Levant encompassed the territories of Syria and Lebanon. When a group talks about the Levant, it means that it does not recognize national borders. The very name "Levant Liberation Organization" suggests that it is not a national movement for, say, regime change in Syria.
By 2024 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham included more than 60 organizations, such as the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, the Ansar al-Din Front, and the Army of the Sunna, and its orientation is Islamic, similar to the Taliban. Their number reached 50,000 fighters. The current military commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, who was previously in Jabhat al-Nusra, is Abu Muhammad al-Julani. Some claim his real name is Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa, others say his real name is Osama al-Wahdi. Reports of his life are contradictory in various sources, and he is a somewhat mysterious figure.
Given that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is an extension of Jabhat al-Nusra, is the largest faction in the military operation, understanding the organizational and rhetorical transformations that this faction has undergone may help in understanding this moment that has redrawn the map in Syria and shuffled the cards once again. The organisational transformation of the Authority over the years was accompanied by a change in political discourse, which ultimately led to its abandonment of much of its traditional literature and its adoption of a national discourse.
In the first video attributed to Abu Muhammad al-Julani, he announced in January 2012 the establishment of the “Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant,” and indicated that it was affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Al-Jolani stated that the goal of establishing the front was to “re-establish God’s authority on earth,” denouncing calls for foreign intervention in Syria, as it was common at that time for the revolutionary demonstrations to chant slogans demanding the imposition of a no-fly zone over Syria to protect them from the army’s aircraft, and to support the Free Syrian Army factions with weapons.
During the initial years of Syria’s insurgency, in-fighting among Nusrah Front, ISIS, and factions aligned with these groups for territory, revenue, and resistance to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime led some leaders to shift allegiances. Formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, then Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, it is a group of allied factions, including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Sunna. Most notably, Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani broke with al-Qa‘ida in 2016 because of strategic disagreements. In 2017 the Nusrah Front merged with other anti-regime groups in northwestern Syria to form HTS. HTS later established the Syrian Salvation Government, with 10 ministries to govern its territory.
HTS has undergone several name and purported identity changes since its origins in 2011 as Jabhat al-Nusra, originally a Syrian front for the Islamic State in Iraq, which at the time was itself an Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda. HTS’s successive renamings and “rebrandings” appear to echo al-Qaeda’s own strategy in Syria of establishing branches and presenting them as locally-grown organizations arising in response to Syrians’ needs. This practice was especially notable for purposes of evaluating HTS’s religious freedom progress: the organization’s 2016 advertised break with al-Qaeda and a 2021 campaign to rehabilitate its militant image follow an established trajectory of repackaging and marketing anew the same core values of a Salafi-jihadism fiercely intolerant of perceived or actual dissent.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was announced in January 2017, as a merger of several factions, including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, in the areas that remained outside the regime’s control in northwestern Syria, less than a month after the forced displacement from the city of Aleppo at the end of 2016, which means that the areas under the control of the opposition factions have diminished, and they have even lost their most important negotiating points, which is the city of Aleppo.
At that time, the newly formed body acted with a pragmatic logic of utilitarianism, as it began - with the aim of extending its full control over the region - by attacking factions that were not under its banner. Less than a month after announcing its formation, it attacked the positions of the Mujahideen Army in the western Aleppo countryside, and expanded to attack the Falcons of the Levant in Jabal al-Zawiya, south of Idlib, and the Mujahideen Army stationed near the town of Babsqa, close to the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, and was able to dismantle these factions and seize control of their areas, weapons and ammunition.
In 2018, HTS defectors who remained loyal to al-Qa‘ida formed the al-Qa‘ida branch in Syria, known as Hurras al-Din.
Jolani reduced the influence of his former supporters who refused to sever ties with al-Qaeda, and obliged other armed factions to remain under the umbrella of what his organization decided. This included several factions; among them are extremist groups from outside Syria, such as the fighters of the Turkestan Islamic Party; they are Chinese Uyghurs who came to Syria with the start of the revolution in 2011 and have today, according to some reports, become part of the demographic composition in the northwest of the country as a result of their marriage to Syrian women. Al-Jolani’s move also included fighters from Uzbeks, Russians, and Chechens, among other regions.
Reports suggest that HTS used new weapons, including Ukrainian drones. “It is likely that drone operators are somehow involved in the operation from Idlib, as HTS has limited experience with FPV drones. Ukrainian government representatives met with members of Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) extremist group to discuss a drones-for-fighters deal, Turkish newspaper Aydinlik reported on 09 September 2024.
“A delegation from Ukraine went to Idlib in recent months and met with the leaders of the terrorist organization,” the newspaper said. According to the report, the meeting took place on 18 June. The report said Kiev requested the release of a number of Chechen and Georgian militants being held in HTS prisons. In recent years, HTS began rooting out foreign fighters from its ranks, as well as those belonging to other armed opposition groups in northern Syria. The newspaper added that in exchange for the release of the fighters – who Kiev plans to enlist in the fight against Russian forces – Ukraine offered 75 drones to HTS.
Idlib Province, whose population had grown to more than 3 million people during the civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic, was dominated by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) organization, and the “Salvation Government” it controlled, the de facto administrative authority in Idlib. The northwestern province bordering Turkey was one of the four “de-escalation zones” agreed by Ankara, Moscow and Tehran in May 2017 during the fourth round of the Astana talks, which had been launched earlier that year to pursue a political solution to Syria’s conflict. One by one, the three other de-escalation zones – Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and Deraa and Quneitra – were captured by Syrian government forces and their allies. As Damascus clawed back opposition-held territory, thousands of civilians and rebel fighters from those areas were bussed to Idlib, dubbed a “dumping ground” for evacuees.
As of late 2022 HTS had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters, while as of early 2020 it ws reported that HTS had 12,000 to 15,000 fighters and concentrated on combating Syrian government forces. Al-Jazeera reported in December 2024 that HTS in effect controls Idlib and is estimated to have up to 30,000 fighters. HTS controlled everything in Idlib, border crossings, courts, fuel supplies and so on. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the largest faction in northwestern Syria, began in 2023 to expand eastward towards the areas controlled by the National Army in the “Olive Branch,” “Euphrates Shield,” and “Peace Spring.”
The Salvation Government’s "HTS-rehabilitation experiment" remained in its early stages; any change in the geopolitical calculus of Syria could trigger HTS’s escalation of brutality. For example, if the Assad regime reclaims territory in the northwest, HTS’s resulting loss of “state-building” as a legitimate platform could prompt its return to large-scale acts of insurgency 732 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite #A714 Washington, DC 20401 202-523-3240and terrorism, with severe consequences for religious freedom. Moreover, the group has accompanied its claims to additional territory with assertive and sometimes violent expressions of religious ideology. In October 2022, HTS—along with its Turkish-backed Syrian rebel allies—advanced on the strategically important city of Afrin and other parts of the Aleppo governorate, mounting a lethal campaign against rival Turkish-backed militias and gaining partial control of the area.
The SSG replicated the conventional acts of a sovereign government -- running a census, issuing ID cards, running & regulating banks, issuing numbered addresses & etce. Syrian rebel group Ahrar al-Sham’s deputy, Ahmed al-Dalati, spoke 30 November 2024 at Aleppo’s al-Rawdah Mosque, advocating inclusivity and respect for all Syrians, including Christians and Armenians. "It is forbidden to harm anyone, or encroach on their property. Whether Christians or Armenians, or any sect present in Aleppo. They are the people of Syria and they are our people."
The organization, whose names have varied throughout its stages of activity over the past thirteen years, witnessed a shift from one extreme with a transnational international discourse to the other extreme with a local national discourse, which was reflected in the results of the "deterrence of aggression" battle. It seems that the goal of this transition is to gain local and international legitimacy, which reflects a new strategy through which the organization seeks to redraw its role in the Syrian scene. Despite the obstacles, these shifts indicate a serious attempt to rearrange the balance of power, by changing the maps and the distribution of areas of control, to open a new horizon for the course of events in Syria.
British intelligence MI6 reported in 2000 "Hay'at Tahrir al Sham's (HTS) gradual surge of influence across north west Syria has allowed it to consolidate its position, neutralise opponents, and position itself as a key actor in northern Syria. In Idlib, HTS has dramatically grown its influence and territorial control across the governorate. To secure its domination, HTS has been willing to work with a collection of more moderate groups, leading HTS hardliners to splinter and resurrect an AQ affiliate which now co-exists with HTS in north west Syria, Hurras al-Din. While HTS continues to focus primarily on consolidating control in north Syria, AQ remains an explicitly Salafi-Jihadist transnational group with objectives and targets which extend outside Syria's borders. AQ's priority is to maintain an instability- fuelled safe haven in Syria, from which they are able to train and prepare for future expansion. HTS domination of north west Syria provides space for AQ-S aligned groups and individuals to exist."
British-backed governance structures and opposition elements operated under its watch with near-total freedom, safe from violent reprisals. A particularly striking leaked MI6 file noted that “HTS and other extremist armed groups are significantly less likely to attack opposition entities that are receiving support” from the British government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).
A lobbying campaign began in 2018 to allow HTS to receive aid, but “indirectly,” through other groups operating in Idlib. James Jeffrey, a Trump administration diplomat who emerged as one of the top boosters of HTS, claimed to US media at the time that Jolani had pleaded to him, “We want to be your friend. We’re not terrorists. We’re just fighting Assad.”
The UK’s embrace of HTS represented the culmination of a long and secretive process which began when the group’s leadership was still closely aligned with Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch, Jabhat Al Nusra, and even the Islamic State. While British intelligence once embarked on a campaign to undermine HTS in opposition-controlled areas of Syria, while cultivating supposedly “moderate” factions, leaked files reviewed by The Grayzone reveal the clandestine efforts wound up strengthening Jolani’s organization, helping pave its path to power.
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