HTS - 2023 - Security Event
In July 2023 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham acknowledged the arrest of a number of its members, and members working in its "Salvation Government," on charges of involvement in espionage activities on behalf of intelligence services affiliated with the Syrian regime, Russia, and other international agencies. What seemed at the time in the eyes of the HTS and its supporters to be a major security achievement, and a preemptive strike that thwarted a plan to infiltrate the largest “jihadist” faction in Syria, quickly turned into a dangerous impasse and a confusing maze in which the HTS was stuck for many months, and it was trying to get out of it with the least losses and consequences.
The discussion initially revolved around what an official statement issued by the General Security Service described as “the seizure of a spy cell working for hostile parties,” and that investigations revealed “the presence of about 54 people suspected of espionage, of whom 29 people have had the charges against them confirmed.”
But what happened next cast a heavy shadow of doubt about this initial account. The arrest campaigns then extended to include dozens of prominent leaders in the military wing and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham since it was active under the name "Al-Nusra Front." Interpretations at the time suggested that there was a conflict between wings within the group, and this hypothesis was reinforced by the arrest of the leader, Abu Maria Al-Qahtani, and the attempt to arrest his companion and confidant, Jihad Issa Al-Sheikh. They were affiliated with the “Al-Sharqiya” movement on charges that ranged between quasi-communication with external parties, financial violations, blackmail, and others.
With the arrest of Al-Qahtani, Issa Al-Sheikh, and other figures close to them, there was a belief that the purge campaigns supervised by the security forces aimed to “thwart a coup plot” that seeks to overthrow the leader of the group, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, and those close to him, and install a new leader who was not listed on international terrorism lists.
The continuation of the arrest campaigns, and their focus on the leaders of the military wing, fueled feelings of discontent and suspicion about the reality of what was happening, and things began to get out of control little by little, with the voices of tribes and families rising in parallel, demanding a convincing explanation for the events, and the release of detainees against whom charges have not been proven.
To reassure its supporters, the Commission announced through its security apparatus on January 15, that it was “about to end the security work related to thwarting a security plan behind which hostile parties stand, and which seeks to recruit some individuals and work through them to spread discord, divide ranks, and destabilize security and stability in the liberated areas.”
The security apparatus’s celebration of thwarting what it called “a security plan to spread discord and divide ranks,” and its promise that the case file would soon be closed, did not ease the pressure on the leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and calls for the release of detainees, who now numbered in the hundreds, expanded.
There was also news on social media that prominent leaders in the “military wing” have had enough and will not accept further throwing of the wing’s members and cadres into “security” prisons, especially with what was said about their exposure to torture and ill-treatment, and that no action on their part will It will be delayed if things continue as they are. It was necessary to bring the whole issue into the spotlight.
The conviction of the necessity of revealing the details of what was happening was translated into a statement issued by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on January 26, which stated that the General Command, after the end of the investigations into the security cell cases, “expressed its desire to increase the investigation and scrutiny related to the case in order to achieve justice and due rights.”
Accordingly, a committee was formed to follow up on the circumstances of the case, headed by Al-Julani himself, “to evaluate the evidence and facts,” by interviewing dozens of detainees, listening to their statements, reviewing the evidence, and “ensuring the integrity of the confessions and reviewing the environment and conditions of detention,” according to the statement.
The committee issued its recommendations to release a number of detainees because nothing was proven against them, and others for which the evidence was not sufficient to convict them, and referred others to the judiciary. In return, the committee ordered the arrest of a number of security personnel involved in torture.
Immediately after the statement was published, waves of detainees began to leave. Their processions and reception parties indicated their social status and leadership roles. Among them were Abu Muslim Afes, Abu Osama Munir, Abu Abdo, Abu Al-Qaqaa Ta’oum and others. Al-Julani was keen to meet dozens of those released, apologize to them, comfort their thoughts, and take memorial photos with them, especially the cadres of the military wing and officials of the military brigades.
In one of his sessions with members of the Shura Council and the Reconciliation Council, Al-Julani provided clarifications about what happened, and said that doubts arose in him when the circle of arrests expanded to include those he described as names that “have weight, history, and value.” Al-Julani claimed that when he personally reviewed the case files and met the detainees, he discovered that many of the confessions had been extracted under torture, and that some security personnel had “violated internal regulations and laws.” He also described the torture to which detainees were subjected to as a "heinous crime," and promised to tighten oversight of the security apparatus.
Al-Julani gave for the first time an overview of the nature of the “major security event” that the Commission dealt with in the past months, and said that they received information about a multi-level plan aimed at “purchasing the liabilities” of military leaders, facilitating the entry of regime forces deep into the city of Idlib, and coordinating assassination operations. It affects the prominent “princes” and cadres of the organization, and the supposed plan culminates in the regime forces taking control of northwestern Syria.
The Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's senior leadership was aware of the extent of the predicament it was stuck in due to the horrific violations of the security apparatus officials, and what was most disturbing to it was that what happened will perpetuate an atmosphere of apprehension and mistrust between the security forces and the military, and may lead to cracks in the structure of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and its division into a movement that supports the military and " “Princes of the brigades” and another who follows the security forces.
It was unlikely that Al-Julani will make fundamental changes in the tasks and powers of his security apparatus other than what he promised to impose oversight and punish those involved in torture. He was still convinced of the agency's vital roles in fighting ISIS cells and the Syrian regime, and controlling security in a governorate full of armed groups and looting and plundering gangs. Without forgetting that the head of this agency, “Abu Ahmed Hudoud,” was in fact one of Al-Julani’s most loyal men, and he appointed him as his deputy, and he was considered the second man in the body in terms of influence and powers.
Syrian activists, as well as some of those released, speak of a fundamental role played by “Abu Ubaida Organizations” in this case. Abu Ubaida was one of the controversial security personnel. He was responsible for the “Coalition” file in the “General Security Service,” and was charged with “counter-espionage” and monitoring Hacking operations. Digital accounts circulated names that they said were investigators who practiced torture in the Commission’s prisons, such as “Abdul Malik Manbij,” “Abu Zakaria al-Masry,” “Abu Jassim 105,” “Hussein al-Lubani,” and “Abu Osama 38.”
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
