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Military


Merkava Tank - History

General Yisrael Tal was one of the Jews who volunteered with the British Army and participated in the Jewish Battalion in Italy during World War II. In 1945 he participated in the battles of the second battalion of the Jewish Brigade on the Italian front. After the war he took part in rescue and procurement operations. He was a member of the 'Avenger' group, which operated in northern Italy, near the border with Austria, against Nazis and their collaborators. He then joined the Zionist Haganah group in 1946 and then the army after 1948. In November 1964 he was appointed commander of the Armored Brigade and was promoted to the rank of Major General. Tal saw from his experience in battles that tanks would be central in resolving the battles with the Arabs, and his vision was actually fulfilled in the 1967 war, in which tanks played a pivotal role and led to the worst Arab military defeat in the twentieth century.

As a result, in 1970, Tal presented a study on the economic and military feasibility of developing and producing a completely home-made tank. But fate did not give him enough time for his ideas to appear on the battlefield before the October War of 1973. After that year, Tal left the service following disagreements with his leaders, and then devoted himself again to a project to develop an Israeli tank inside the corridors of the Ministry of Defense in Israel, taking into account the shortcomings of the tanks used in 1973.

The "Chieftan" affair finally made it clear to Israel that it was alone in the battle. For the first time, the possibility of developing and producing tanks in Israel was considered, and it was decided to conduct a study led by Major General Israel Tal and with the participation of Defense Ministry experts and Armed Forces engineers.

The purpose of the study was to answer two main questions:

  1. In terms of technological knowledge and industrial infrastructure, does Israel have the power to design, develop and produce a tank? Is economic viability guaranteed in an overall view of Israel's economy?
The practical alternatives at the time were:
  1. Purchasing obsolete tanks ("Paton" or "Centurion") and refining them in Israel.
  2. Development and production of an Israeli tank.

The research was led by Prof. Pinchas Sussman, who was at the time the economic advisor to the defense establishment, and his conclusions were positive: it is possible and even economically worthwhile to establish a tank industry. At the same time as conducting the study on the technological feasibility and economic viability of tank production in Israel, the team of engineers and planners at the Chief Armament Officer's Headquarters, led by Lt. Col. Israel Tilan, head of the tank branch at the Chief Armament Officer's Headquarters, continued to study the designs related to the shape and character of the Israeli tank.

The research dealt with testing the technological and industrial capacity of the State of Israel at that time, with regard to the development and production of tanks. The inspection included an industrial survey of dozens of factories destined to participate in development and production, as well as an assessment of the investments needed to acquire knowledge, expand factories and establish production lines.

It also examined the alternatives from the aspects of meeting quality needs, quantitative needs and reducing political dependence. An economic examination, which included an examination of the budgetary burden of an Israeli tank production plan, compared to purchasing tanks in another way. Also, an examination of the overall economic viability for the economy, of Israeli tank production, compared to the aforementioned alternative and an economic comparison, only theoretical, to the purchase of modern and innovative tanks (which, as mentioned, were not within Israel's reach at the time).

The main findings of the conducted analysis indicated, first and foremost, that the solution of developing and manufacturing an Israeli tank would provide a comprehensive answer to the problems of quantity, quality and independence. It has been proven that based on the industries that exist in Israel, and on the technological knowledge and accumulated experience of the Armed Forces, and with the addition of additional investment in acquiring knowledge and expanding existing infrastructure in certain factories, it is possible to establish a tank industry in Israel that will provide an adequate response to Israel's military needs. Additional economic aspects were examined in relation to added value, workers and employment in the economy, the budgetary burden and more.

In a series of discussions that took place in the IDF, and especially in the Armed Forces, the purpose of which was to determine which tank the IDF needed, two basic concepts were examined. One version, because a copied tank should be built, not an original development, with an emphasis on mobility and agility, and produced in large quantities. The second version is that an Israeli tank with an IDF character should be produced with an emphasis on survivability and tactical mobility. General Tal believed that the tank to be built represents an overall strategic concept, and has a solution for several aspects of Israel's security:

  • Israel suffers from a quantitative disadvantage, especially in manpower. The tank allows maximum quality utilization of manpower and its translation into great firepower.
  • Due to Israel's conditions, a quick decision on land must be achieved. The tank is a central component of the ground force, and it enables a quick transfer of the battle to the enemy's territory and defeating him there.
  • Israel is surrounded by enemies, and the possibility that it will be forced to fight on several fronts at the same time is very real. The composition of forces that Israel needs is one that is not "enslaved" to one front and can be moved from front to front. Armor is the most mobile and versatile force.

At the end of three months of study, in August 1970, the Minister of Finance convened the fateful discussion where it was decided to go ahead with the first Israeli tank project. The discussion was attended by Defense Minister Dayan, Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev, members of the Ministry of Defense management, members of the General Staff and the management and experts of the Ministry of Finance - and they all supported the plan. At the end of the discussion, the news came out: the State of Israel will develop a tank and establish a tank industry, which will produce tanks for the IDF And most of the days it will also be produced for export purposes.

As soon as the decision to establish a tank industry was made, a basic directive was published by the management of the Ministry of Defense, which has been used ever since as the basis on which the Merkava program was conducted. The Administration of the Tank Program (Mantak) was established, subordinate to the Assistant Minister of Defense. Mantak bears overall responsibility for the development, creation of the tank and the establishment and expansion of industries. In addition, the Tank Development Authority (RAPT) was established, which deals with the engineering design of the tank and is operated by the Assistant Minister and the National Defense Agency. The project was led from the beginning by General Israel Tal, long known as the "Father of the Chariot" and twice won the Israel Security Award. Even in the twilight of his days, "Talik" remained in the picture, and he even managed to participate in the unveiling ceremony of "Markave Siman 4".

Immediately at the beginning of the operation of Mantak, according to the framework of the research carried out to examine the economic viability, it was decided to prepare a special computer program - a "cost model" - which was unique in its kind. The purpose of the program was to present the cost of the production of the tank at any time, as well as to present the layout of investments for development and to expand the infrastructure over the years and according to the various issues. A "cost model", which presented all the economic data and calculations, became an important control tool of the NTA. It provides data for the needs of decisions at all levels during the execution of the plan, and for the purpose of repeated checks of the economic viability, whenever the prices of raw materials and parts change and whenever there is a need to deviate from the original plan.

The original plan was to develop a tank that was mainly based on existing systems and assemblies, but already in the first years of development, due to knowledge constraints, technological reasons and operational requirements that developed over time, NATAK switched to an innovative tank design, which was based on original and modern assemblies. The development task was updated accordingly, while Strict financial control.

The trend to shorten the development time of the tank created an original method of abbreviated development process, while taking calculated risks, later called "telescopic development" . This method is characterized by the start of serial production before the completion of all the stages of development and experiments, before the completion of all the production files and while basing on models.

In order to reduce the investments needed to establish and manage the tank industry, it was decided not to establish a new and large organization, which would include all the overhead services required in a project like this (documentation, procurement, legal and financial services, etc.). It was determined that the administration of the program would use the existing infrastructure of the Ministry of Defense and the IDF, such as the equipment and spare parts center, the procurement and production administration, the legal advisor unit, the economic advisor unit, etc. It was also decided to be based on the industrial infrastructure of the IDF, and on the defense and civilian industry in Israel , and try as much as possible not to establish inflated mechanisms, overheads and new industries.

In this framework, it was determined that the Center for the Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the IDF Tanks (the IDF) will serve as the tank's assembly plant, and 200 other industrial plants (defense and civilian) will absorb new knowledge, be converted and adapt themselves to the production of the thousands of parts, assemblies and systems of the tank "buggy".

A policy was established to spread local production over the entire country, including development areas, with maximum participation of the civilian industry and without a monopoly for the defense industry. It was determined that the missing technological knowledge will be acquired in part from foreign companies, and in part will be developed in the defense system, in the industrial plants and research institutions in Israel.

Once the development and production of the Merkava tank was decided upon, the captains approached the planning of the entities that would deal with the project. They made it their goal to base themselves as much as possible on existing headquarters and executive bodies and to utilize the existing industrial infrastructures. It is understood that these had to be adapted and expanded according to the requirements of the project, but these steps were taken only to the extent of necessity. According to these principles, the organization was built both in industry and in the headquarters and service bodies.

The infrastructure of the foundry in "Ordan" was expanded and adapted to heavy armor castings, including the turret body and the coffin parts. On the basis of existing factories of "IMS" an infrastructure was added for the production of tank guns, and other industrial plants throughout the country were expanded and adapted for the construction of prototypes and the establishment of production lines.

MSA 7000, which until then had been involved in the restoration and conversion of tanks, already had the basic infrastructure needed to set up an assembly line, including the essential professionals for this. There was no need but to expand the capacity to perform machining of large bodies (tank and turret) and to weld heavy armor, And therefore, it was decided to prefer this option over the establishment of a tank infrastructure from the base. Masha 7000 was therefore expanded, and a dedicated factory was established there - the "Chariot Factory", which joined the other factories in the center.

The development of the tank was completed within nine years from the date of the decision. For the purpose of its production, new factories were established and existing factories were expanded, such as: in Ordan, where the turret is cast from ballistic steel, in the Slavin factory of the IAS, cannons are manufactured; At Elbit and El-Op, optical systems were developed; Machining tools were developed at the Ishkar factory; In Ashkelon they produce relays and final drives; In the Industrial Industry/Ma'alot springs are produced for the MAZKO; in the central laboratory and in the chemical factories in the Industrial Industry, ammunition for the 120 mm cannon is produced; In Shahal (Lod Hydraulic Services) they produce hydraulic systems and more. The main contractor for building the tank is the Ministry of Defense through Mantak. In terms of monetary values, IAS is the largest subcontractor. The second largest subcontractor is the Merkava factory, which is the subcontractor for the construction of the turret and the tank and the subcontractor for the assembly of the tank, and produces 14% of the value of the tank. From a quantitative point of view, Masha 7100 is the only contractor that touches all the parts. It is associated with about thirty civilian factories, which serve as manufacturers of main kits and two hundred factories that are sub-manufacturers. The project employs thousands of workers.

At the end of the seventies, the Merkava was born from the designs of "Israel Tal", and entered service in 1979, which is the same year, ironically, in which the peace agreement was signed with Egypt on the one hand, and in which the Iranian revolution broke out on the one hand, and in which it seemed, unfortunately for "Tal", that regular wars in Slow decline phase. Over the course of the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a boom in irregular warfare among the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which quickly transferred its expertise to the Lebanese Hezbollah in order to confront the Israeli army after it invaded Lebanon in 1982. In addition to this, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict also spread. To the world of irregular war with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and then Hamas and other factions that continued armed resistance against the from the 1990s onwards.

Looking back, this was a real revolution in Israeli industry. From a country that engaged in the conversion (as deep as it was) of existing tanks, the State of Israel became the owner of a skilled and extensive industry, which includes all the required professional diversity and is able to carry out the production of a complex system such as a modern tank, while integrating and combining inter-industry and branched interdisciplinary. This industry has earned many reputations in the world, and its professional and business development is continuous and significant.




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