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Merkava Tank - Design

The Merkava is the innovative Israeli design of Major General Israel Tal, a former Armored Corps commander. Tal's team sought to design a tank that provided maximum protection to the tanks crew. One element of that defense is the placement of the tank's engine at the front of the vehicle, where it serves as a shield for the personnel compartment. This in turn provided more space in the vehicle's rear, which can be used to carry up to six extra soldiers. In addition, a special "canopy" protects the commander from indirect fire; the turret and the hull are fitted with a modular armor system that can be changed in the field; and the forward section of the turret is fitted with additional blocks of armor that provide extra protection against the latest generation of anti-tank missiles. A "skirt" of chains with ball weights is attached to the lower half of the turret, causing incoming projectiles to detonate on impact with the chains instead of penetrating the turret ring.

Tal claimed the revolution in the concept according to which the Israeli tank will be built will be that the man will be in the center and the material will be arranged around him, so that in addition to all its functions it is designed to protect the man. Every drop of weight in the tank is intended to protect the man. The batteries The electrics are intended to provide energy, but the common purpose of all the parts is also to protect the crew. The ammunition will both damage the enemy and protect the crew. The fuel will also provide energy, but in the tank it also protects the crew.

In presenting his concept, General Tal relied on studies he conducted after the Six Day War, in which the factors that neutralize the tank in battle were examined. He came to the conclusion that since the first tank in the world was built, there was only one measure for the protection of the tank in the world, and that is the protection of the tank as a complete system. The studies conducted by the IDF proved that there are two indicators in the design of the tank structure. One, protection of the tank as a single system, and the other, protection that focuses on the crew, which may increase the level of protection tenfold.

The focus on the tank and its strategic concept led to a revolution in the concept of armor and a technological turning point in the fields of armor development and armor theory in the following aspects:

• The tankist is the center, and must be nurtured and protected.
• Tactical mobility is a result not only of speed, but also of the tank's degree of protection and survivability on the battlefield.
• The protection contributes to the tank's mobility. It allows him to move and operate on the battlefield, and the greater the tank's degree of protection, the greater the chances of survival, and also the greater its firepower.

Emphasizing the defensive consideration, General Tal came up with the idea of mounting the engine in the front of the tank, to increase the armor's defensive capacity. His theory was opposed by many, including American and German armor experts, who argued that the idea was not technically applicable. In the professional world in Israel and around the world, fierce debates took place for and against the theory. Tanks with an engine in the front had already been produced before, for example, the French 13AMX tank, or the self-propelled guns built by the IDF. The change in Tal's perception was that until then, tank designers around the world placed the engine in the front for automation-engineering reasons, while he was the first to ask to place the engine in the front for reasons of survival.

Tal had to defend his concept in various forums, and gradually he was able to convince more And more people, so that the Israeli tank crew would be more protected than other tank crews. However, his opponents attacked him on the grounds that he jeopardized the tank's mobility for the benefit of the crew members, since the engine in front would be more vulnerable and this would cause the tank to be disabled. With determination and fervor, which characterize him, Tal succeeded to prove to his opponents, the strongest of whom was Major General Amos Horev, that even if the tank's mobility is in danger, it is more important to save the lives of four young people than to save the tank. The sharp debates reached the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, and even slipped into personal slander and accusations Use of fabricated documents.

Tal felt that a war of attrition was being waged against him. He mobilized all his operational knowledge, and his combat experience as the commander of the armored divisions in the Six Day War, an experience that manifested itself not only in being a senior armor commander, but as someone who personally fought inside tanks, destroyed enemy tanks and even He was hit by enemy tanks.He impressed his listeners in Israel and abroad with his extensive knowledge of the history of armored battles in the world and his great technical knowledge.

Tank designers in the United States and Germany, to whom his theory was presented, believed that in the feasibility tests they conducted, it would not be possible to build a tank with the parameters presented to them and drive it with the Continental engine for thermodynamic reasons. They also argued that it would not be possible to get rid of the engine's heat and also to drive the tank, since from a 1,000-horsepower engine, for example, 200-horsepower would be required just to cool the engine, and this is energy that will not be used. A very delicate thermodynamic balance had to be found to overcome the problem.

Israel Tilan (Litwin), who was Tal's right-hand man, was the first to be appointed head of the Tank Development Authority (RAPT) in August 1970 and was promoted to the rank of colonel. Tilan was the head of the planning team for the Merkava tank and held this position until his retirement from in 1975. As head of the planning team, and was not only a very talented engineer but also a scientist, found the technical solution. Although he had never been involved in building tanks, he was able to present ingenious technical solutions, which convinced Tal that it was possible to succeed in the program.

The Merkava is the only contemporary tank without a loader’s hatch because of the elevated risk of ATGM penetration from any opening in the turret roof. Cook-offs are less common in the case of a tank fire since tank rounds are stored in separate fire-proof canisters.

Among the features of the Mark III are a new suspension system, a 1200-horsepower engine and new transmission, a more powerful main gun, and ballistic protection provided by special armor modules. The main 120-mm gun, developed by Israel Military Industries, is enclosed in a thermal sleeve that increases accuracy by preventing heat distortion.

The primary design criteria was crew survivability. Every part of the overall design is expected to contribute to helping the crew survive. The engine is in the front to provide protection to the crew. There is a special protective umbrella for the tank commander to enable protection from indirect fire with the hatches open. Special "spaced armor" is in use along with protected fuel and ammo compartments. Rear ammunition stowage is combined with a rear entrance and exit. Since the rounds are stowed in containers that can be removed from the vehicle whenever necessary, this space can accommodate tank crewmen who have been forced to abandon their vehicles, or, if thought to be appropriate, even infantrymen. Rear ammunition stowage allows replenishment much more easily than if rounds have to be replaced in a carousel in the hull center, as in typical Russian vehicles.

Using turret-mounted sensors and explosively manufactured projectiles, the Trophy active-protection system mounted on the tank shoots down enemy tank gun rounds, rockets, and anti-tank guided missiles to defend the Merkava IV. The Trophy has a combat history, having defended multiple Merkava IV tanks against anti-tank weapons from Hamas in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge in 2014.

Tank soldiers have long admired Merkava's rear entrance and exit, recognizing that it would allow them to mount and dismount unobserved by the enemy and would provide an excellent alternative escape route. The Merkava can carry a small Infantry team internally under complete armored protection. It has a crew of 4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader) and can carry 6 troops.

“We have reached the ceiling in the amount of protection we can provide to any vehicle, without making it too big or heavy to fit into urban infrastructure, and at the same time, the lethality of munitions directed at tanks has increased at a rapid rate,” is how Jack Watling, a professor at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense in Britain (RUSI) put it, adding that the era of the tank has not necessarily ended, but the transformations taking place in the twenty-first century mean a shift in the role of the tank and the priorities of its future designs, which must raise its speed and firepower at the expense of its armor. This is bad news for the Merkava and its makers.

The Israeli strategy had always relied on technical and material superiority, adopting tactics that reduce the number of deaths among soldiers and officers as much as possible given the limited population of Israel, in addition to transferring the war to enemy territory, and initiating the first pre-emptive attack in the event that the existential threat to it worsens (as happened in 2014. 1967 and the invasion of Lebanon). Here the similarities between the Israeli defeat in October 1973 and October 2023 are clearly evident. In both cases, Israel was surprised by tactics, equipment, and equipment that it had not taken into account, by heavy loss of life that pained it greatly, and by its enemy taking the initiative and surprise.

The chapters of the October 2023 battles have not fully revealed themselves, but the course of the Ukrainian war and the fortifications prepared by the resistance in the Gaza Strip may mean that the harsh intelligence lesson will not be the only painful lesson for Tel Aviv. Rather, there could be a new lesson on its way to the Israeli tanks.