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Iraqi Military Reconstruction

On February 2, 2004 it was announced that Nour USA, Vienna, Virginia, U.S.A., (a firm which along with other U.S., Polish and Iraqi firms comprises the DES Group) was awarded a $327,485,798 firm fixed price indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity contract to procure equipment for the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. At this time, $39,254,982 of the funds has been obligated. Work is expected to be completed by February 2005. Bids were solicited on Nov. 11, 2003 and 19 bids were received. The Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, is the contracting activity. The Defense Department canceled the contract in March 2004 when protests by several losing bidders led to a finding that Army procurement officers in Iraq had violated procedures with sloppy contract language, and incomplete paperwork. The Army did not fault Nour USA.

On 25 May 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) announced the award of a contract to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces and Associated Security Forces in support of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) initiatives in Iraq. This indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ), firm fixed price contract is for delivery of supplies and associated training for a minimum quantity of 15 battalion sets and six brigade headquarters sets and a maximum quantity of 35 battalion sets and six brigade headquarters sets. After the initial delivery order for the minimum quantity, to be placed at the time of contract award, the contract allows for additional orders to be placed up to the maximum quantity, prior to its expiration in September 2006. This Iraqi Armed Forces Battalion Sets contract was awarded to ANHAM Joint Venture, Vienna, VA, and has an estimated maximum value of $259,321,656.

The rebuilding of the Iraqi military will, in all likelihood, be closely supervised and controlled by the United States as part of an overall rebuilding process. The rebuilding of the Iraqi military seems paradoxical considering the amount of time and effort spent dismantling the Hussein regime. However, a stable and well-trained indigenous military force will be key in maintaining internal stability and filling the power-void left by the removal of the Hussein regime.

It is important for the United States to monitor and supervise Iraq's military reconstruction as the US has an interest in reequipping Iraq with US military equipment. The use of US systems would require significant training and allow the US to have continued military influence in the country long after significant US units had departed. Likewise, if left to its own accord Iraq would likely turn to other available systems on the open arms sales markets, most likely Russian, or Russian derivative arms that the Iraqi military already has experience using.

Concerns over Iraq eventually turning these weapons against its neighbors should be limited when one considers that, as in Saudi Arabia, significant dependence on US technical advisors would exist to maintain the most sophisticated weapons systems. In addition the dependence on US technical expertise and training will ensure the US will have a continued military presence within the country.

Naturally, it will be difficult to guarantee that a defense force constructed in any country would maintain a permanent defensive poster. It would be important to formulate a control regime that would monitor Iraqi defense forces as well as integrate US technical personnel to attempt to insure that Iraq would continue to maintain a force structure with limited offensive capabilities.

This assessment assumes that Iraq will be able to resume normal oil production by the beginning of 2004 and military spending will be structured in a way to allow for maximum resources going toward infrastructure reconstruction. Assuming 22 billion dollars in oil revenues with 5 per cent available for defense allocation, Iraq would be able to allocate approximately 1.1 billion per year on defense. Procurement structuring would likely take place over five to ten years with an increasing in defense allocation to coincide with completion of infrastructure projects.

A caveat of military reconstruction will be that none of the systems provided will surpass Israeli systems and the force structure will primarily defensive in nature and therefore not an immediate threat to any of its neighbors.

Security Forces 200,000
Why this number?
These are enough troops to perform internal defense but not enough to launch offensive attacks against neighbors.

Tanks
M1A2 500
M60A3 750
Why this number?
Saudi Arabia and Jordan both utilize M-60 systems and Saudi Arabia has M1A2 tank systems but nearly half are in storage because of a shortage of trained tank crews.

APC
M2 500
LAV 500
M113 1500
Why this number?
Smaller force structure--Iraqi defense force will likely be a much smaller force than the Iraqi army prior to the first gulf war. To be effective, these troops need to be able to be highly mobile.

MOR
81mm
M29 81-mm 400
107mm
M30 107-mm 100
120mm
M121 120-mm 100
Why this number?
This number corresponds with proposed force structure and based on similar sales to other countries

Towed Artillery
105mm
M101/M102 100
155mm
M198 50
M114 50
Why this number?
This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Self-Propelled Artillery
105mm
M52 150
155mm
M109A6 110
203mm
M110 100
Why this number?
This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

MRLS
M270 MLRS 50

RCL
M-67 90mm 100
M40 200

Utility vehicles
AMEV 100
M548 500

Why this number?
It is like that Iraq would need this number of support vehicles to operate and supply its defense force.

Anti tank weapons
M136 AT4 500
M47 Dragon 750
Why this number?
Iraq will need systems to protect against armor assault from its neighbors. The optimal number of systems was derived from the number of AT systems possessed by Saudi Arabia and the relative size of armored forces possessed by Syria and Iran.

Attack Helicopters
AH-64 50
Why this number?
Attack helicopters have a relatively short range and can not hold territory. As a result they are perfect for a combined role but in and of themselves do not possess an inherent offensive threat. Sophisticated attack helos would be dependent upon US technical expertise for optimal usage and maintenance.

General-purpose Helicopters
S-70 15
UH-60 25
SA-365n 5
Bell 406c 15
Why this number?
These numbers are in line with other militaries' in the region of similar size and structure.

Air Force
25, 000

Fixed wing
F-15 40
F-16 160
Why this number?

F-15's are flown by the Saudi air force. They are modern fighting aircraft but are not the most advanced US aircraft being flown in the area. The F-15 is a capable of conducting both air and ground missions however, the variant likely to be sold or leased to Iraq would be the F-15C which is an air superiority craft not a ground attack craft.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively low-cost, high-performance weapon system.

In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius (distance it can fly to enter air combat, stay, fight and return) exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets in all weather conditions and detect low flying aircraft in radar ground clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions.

Naval Forces
FF-1040    Garcia 3
PC- 1 Cyclone 30
Anti mine 5
Service Craft 2
Why this number?
Iraq will have no need for offensive naval systems but well need craft capable of patrolling costal areas and guarding oil assets.

Air Defense
20mm
M163 PIVADS 100
30mm
AMX-30 50

SAM
MIM-104 Patriot 5
MIM-23 Hawk 10
M6 Linebacker 100
FIM-92A Stinger and Redeye missiles 500
MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS 10
Why this number?
Air defense will be a priority. Likely systems would include multi-use missile and air defense systems to protect against scud and mig systems prevalent in the area.



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Page last modified: 09-07-2011 02:48:58 ZULU