S 55 Sindhu Ghosh Class - Problems
These submarines have been criticized in India as being highly underpowered for a conventional boat. Almost all the Indian Navy officers who underwent EKM training in Russia gathered the impression from their Russian instructors that the EKM’s teardrop hull, coated with anechoic rubber tiles to absorb adversary sonar transmissions and muffle echoes and other characteristics were features of a submarine that was supposed to be propelled by a miniaturised nuclear reactor. But during development, either the reactor could not be fitted in the space available or technical problems constrained further miniaturisation and the design reverted into a diesel-electric propelled boat.
This may help to explain why, despite the Russian Design Bureau’s awareness of the Indian side’s pressing need for greater air conditioning capacity when operating Russian submarines in tropical temperatures, the EKM’s inadequacy in air conditioning could not be remedied before the submarines were delivered.
In the initial years in India, this class of submarines suff ered acute inadequacy of air conditioning. This was progressively resolved by installing indigenous air conditioning in units. The acute shortage of fresh water was also solved by fitting indigenous reverse osmosis plants.
Several internal memos written in long hand by several top naval commanders since 1991 onwards outlined the extent of deficiency in the submarine. The 3000-tonne submarine's major handicap is its higher indiscretion rate. An indiscretion rate of a submarine is a critical element of its offensive capability. Though a Principal Staff Officer's report mentions the exact rate of indiscretion, it was not made public in the interest of national security. But it was way above the standard indiscretion rate of other submarines -- 6 to 8 percent while patrolling and 12 to 15 percent in the transition phase. A naval commander said, `the indiscretion rate of EKM submarine was clearly unacceptable'.
The Sindhu (as the EKM has been christened in India) is grossly under-powered. Its 2x120 batteries are inadequate to give it a surging power in times of crisis. The Sindhu submarine's other problem is its sonar: especially its low frequency band coverage and frequent break downs. Naval officials said, the low frequency band coverage makes it difficult for a sub-commander to accurately classify an enemy target. Commodore P.R. Franklin, Director of Submarine Operations, Naval Headquarters also wrote three years ago that the shortcomings of this class are known. All of these cannot be overcome, and we will have to live with some of them.
From 1991, when the Soviet Union (USSR) dissolved until the mid 1990s when the successor Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stabilised, the delays in the delivery of submarine batteries and 6-yearly Medium Repair (MR) refit kits adversely afflicted submarine availability resulting in prolonged delays in the completion of ongoing MRs. Operational non-availability was aggravated by the bunching up of the mandatory MRs of the new Sindhughosh 877 EKM Russian submarines that had to be inducted in a compressed time period to sustain minimum force levels.
In December 1996, the Russian Rosvoorouzhenie State Corporation and India signed a set of contracts for the repair of the Indian Navy's INS Sindhuvir submarine. The contract volume involved the repair of the submarine hull, a number of systems, special technology and equipment as well as modernization. Prior to signing this contract, Zvyozdochka specialists executed large-volume preparatory work at the submarine's home base. They checked the technical condition of the submarine's hull, equipment, and all its systems and compiled a repair sheet incorporating all revealed defects and their remedy.
The contract stipulated rendering services to the submarine's crew: provision of comfortable apartments for officers and their families and hotels for seamen; provision of fully equipped working spaces, all types of communications, motor transport; and also offering an entertainment and recreation program for the submarine's crew. In June 1997, the Dockwise Company (Belgium) delivered the INS Sindhuvir to the Zvyozdochka facility where it was placed on the slipways of shop No.10 which had previously repaired dozens of different types of nuclear-powered submarines.
INS Sindhuvir was repaired in the Zvyozdochka's spacious berth provided with hull machining, welding and assembly, mechanical repair, pipe bending, outfitting, insulation & painting, and machining bays, as well as chemical cleaning, electroplating, and instrumentation and automatic equipment repair shops. All the sub's parts & elements, instruments & devices, systems & equipment were checked, repaired (if required), tested and examined. The results were entered into a computer system to create a repair electronic database. Replacement of a pressure hull section should be specially pointed out from the entire range of work executed on the submarine. The filling of Indian-made storage batteries with electrolyte was executed for the first time in Russia (this work was considerably more complicated than that done on Russian submarines).
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) took over the loss making Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) from the Ministry of Shipping at Vishakapatnam, as it was right next to the Ship Building Centre (SBC) where India’s nuclear submarines were being built. HSL was given the contract to refit INS Sindhukriti. The Type 877EKM SSK INS Sindhukirti was ripped open in the mid-1990s without Russian approval/licence at Vizag-based Hindustan Shipyard, not at MDL. While a section of top officials argued for sending it to Russia for refit, another wanted submarine refit capability to be developed indigenously. Finally, the Navy asked the dying Hindustan Shipyard to upgrade it, retrofitting it with new sensors like Ushus and weapons like the Klub missile. It was an attempt at rejuvenating a yard at the cost of a potent war-fighting platform,
Taking it apart was the easy part, but putting it back together was far more complex and beyond the capability of Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. According to some, this SSK had been written off by the Navy. By 2008 the INS Sindhukirti was the navy's "dry dock queen". For close to five years, this submarine had been sitting in a medium refit - conducted when a submarine completes half its operational life of 15 years-manned by a skeletal naval crew. She was to rejoin the fleet only after another five years, by which time INS Sindhukirti would have spent a third of her useful life of 30 years in refit.
Hindustan Shipyard signed a contract on 03 October 2006 with Indian Navy for MR-cum-Modernization of INS Sindukirti and the total refit was jointly undertaken by HSL, Naval Dockyard (Visakhapatnam) & Rosoboron Export (ROE). In this regard, contracts were concluded with ROE for material supply as well as for turn-key & modernization works. HSL infrastructure was also being augmented to take up repairs on submarines as per the DPR submitted by ROE. The major works on submarine that were completed under this refit contract include:
- Completion of entire degutting by May 2007
- Completion of blasting on entire hull structure for defect survey by Febuary,2008
- Removal of Compartment 6 hard patch. First time in India.
- Installation & Commissioning of 2 Nos. pipe bending machine at HSL.
- HSL welders were qualified to take up repairs on hull structures.
- Received all documents from Russia by May 2008 to take up any repairs on submarine.
While the submarines of the class were upgraded in Russia in less than two years, retrofitting them in India meant setting up the infrastructure, imparting critical skills, transferring technology and the like, which took considerable time. Officially, the Sindhukirti, for whose refit the navy had already paid Rs 650 crore, was to join the navy in 2010. But with barely 30 per cent of her medium refit - where the submarine is stripped of all equipment, her hull inspected for wear and tear and machinery replaced - completed since 2004, officials said there was no way she can join before 2015. The Medium Refit cum Upgradation of INS Sindhukirti was under progress in 2012 and recorded a cumulative production of 65% till the end of July 2012. But by 2014 media reports indicated that workmanship on the submarine was so bad that Indian Navy had termed it “unfixable” and unlikely to ever enter into service again.
In June 2010, a Zvyozdochka delegation and representatives of the Indian Ministry of Defence signed a contract for repair and modernisation of INS Sindhurakshak for a planned 27 months. Zvyozdochka, which specialises in repairing and scrapping nuclear submarines, had modernised four Indian diesel-electric submarines since 1997 – INS Sindhuvir, INS Sindhuratna, INS Sindhughosh and INS Sindhuvijay. The company also provides repair and modernisation services for another submarine of this class, INS Sindhukirti, at its base in Visakhapatnam.
An internal explosion occurred onboard INS Sindhurakshak around midnight on 13/14 August 2013 in the forward compartment, where ordnance was stowed, resulting in major fire onboard. The submarine remained submerged and resting at the bottom at the Naval Dockyard, Mumbai. The submarine which is submerged in the water is not accessible due to severe deformation of the interiors after the explosion and fire, as also due to poor visibility under water and siltation. The submarine submerged at her berth with only a portion visible above the surface.
Initial assessments indicate that an internal explosion occurred in the forward compartment of the submarine, where ordnance was stored, resulting in further near-simultaneous explosions, and major fire onboard INS Sindhurakshak. Fire tenders from the Naval Dockyard as well as Mumbai Fire Brigade were pressed into action and the fire was brought under control. However, INS Sindhurakshak was observed to be slowly submerging, due to damage sustained during the fire and explosions onboard. A minor fire was also observed on the upper casing of INS Sindhughosh, which was berthed alongside INS Sindhurakshak which was brought under control, and she and other ships in vicinity were moved away from INS Sindhurakshak to safe locations.
A total of 18 naval duty personnel, comprising 03 officers and 15 sailors, were inside the submarine at the time of the incident. As the explosion and resultant damage were near instantaneous, these personnel could not evacuate. The boiling waters inside the submarine prevented any entry till noon of 14 August. Access to the inner compartments of the submarine was made almost impossible due to jammed doors and hatches, distorted ladders, oily and muddy waters inside the submerged submarine resulting in total darkness and nil visibility within the submarine even with high power underwater lamps. Distorted and twisted metal within very restricted space due extensive internal damage caused by the explosion further worsened conditions. A total of 18 sailors were charred to death. The bodies of crew members were severely disfigured and not identifiable due to severe burns.
INS Sindhukirti is unlikely to enter into service again. External hull survey indicated that approximately half of the submarine was embedded in silt. A Board of Inquiry (BoI) has been constituted by Indian Navy to investigate into the circumstances leading to the incident. The exact cause of explosion can only be established post salvage of the submarine. The efforts to salvage the submarine are being undertaken. The BoI would finalise its report post salvage of the submarine.
The INS Sindhurakshak tragedy was the second biggest after the sinking of INS Khukri in 1971, which was being torpedoed by Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor. The ill-fated ship had 18 officers and 176 sailors [!!!] on board when she sank with all hands on board.
January 2014 INS Sindhughosh, the leading ship of her class of diesel-electric submarines of the Indian Navy, ran aground at the naval harbour in Mumbai. The submarine was freed later and did not suffer much damage. At the time of the incident, it was fully armed, carrying its entire compliment of 70 personnel, all of whom were safe.
At least seven Navy personnel were injured and two naval officers were missing and declared dead in a mishap on board the Kilo Class submarine INS Sindhuratna 26 February 2014. Dense smoke filled a cabin of the submarine early this morning, when it was being sea tested after a refit, about 80 km off the Mumbai coast. Russian-origin INS Sindhuratna had recently undergone a refit and was handed over to Navy in December 2013. INS Sindhuratna, carrying a total of 94 naval personnel was underwater when the incident happened. The submarine was brought to the surface and headed towards the Mumbai coast. This is the tenth accident involving an Indian Navy warship and the third submarine mishap in the last seven months.
Indian Navy chief Admiral D.K. Joshi resigned from his position hours after a submarine mishap off Mumbai coast in which seven sailors were injured and two officers went missing. The Indian Defense Ministry has accepted the resignation of 59- year-old Admiral Doshi, the first military chief to quit taking moral responsibility of a spate of mishaps involving Indian Navy warships and submarines in the past few months.
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