The British Monarchy in the 19th Century
The executive power in the English government is vested in the crown, and includes very large and dangerous powers. In the 19th Century some might have been too eager to minimise the importance of the actual political functions of the "Constitutional" monarch. M. Thiers defined such a Constitution as one in which the "King reigns but does not govern." The aphorism is characteristically Gallican: crisp and crystalline; but it is only partially accurate. Walter Bagehot described the Crown as the pivot of the "dignified" part of the Constitution. As to its political functions, his conclusion was summarised in the brilliant phrase, "a Republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a Monarchy."
Bagehot was a sincere admirer both of the monarchy and of the monarch, and his work has long been regarded as the most brilliant analysis ever penned of the practical working of the English Constitution of the 19th Century. He gives some very ingenious reasons in favor of the hereditary monarchy, in which he concludes that the monarch is the representative of the pomp and dignity of the government, stands at the head of its society, is the head of its morality, is a quiet councilor with a long experience from which he may make suggestions to his ministers, with power to dissolve the Parliament, and thus appeal from the old to the new representative of the people, and that if disposed not to make his prerogative trench upon the liberties of the people, he may pass a comfortable life himself, without much detriment to the public interest.
Throughout her long reign Queen Victoria was ever tempted to turn aside from the strait path of "Constitutional" rectitude, or to strain the powers of "Prerogative." That the Queen was exceedingly tenacious of the just claims of the royal "Prerogative" is seen when i in 1858 she wrote to Lord Derby that she " . . . was shocked to find that in several important points her Government have surrendered the prerogatives of the Crown. She will only refer to the clauses concerning the Indian Civil Service, and the right of peace and war. ... As to the right of the Crown to declare war and make peace, it requires not a word of remark; yet Lord Stanley agrees to Mr. Gladstone's proposal to make over this prerogative with regard to Indian questions to Parliament under the auspices of the Queen's Government; she is thus placed in a position of less authority than the President of the American Republic. When a Bill has been introduced into Parliament, after having received the Sovereign's approval, she has the right to expect that her Ministers will not subsequently introduce important alterations without previously obtaining her sanction. . . . The Queen must remind Lord Derby that it is to him, as the head of the Government, that she looks for the protection of those prerogatives which form an integral part of the Constitution."
Before her accession the Queen had been admirably coached in the traditions of Constitutional Monarchy, both by Prince Leopold and by Baron Stockmar. The latter had come to England as physician and secretary to Prince Leopold some twenty years before the Queen's accession to the throne. Upon her accession he "joined the Court in a private capacity, and for fifteen months he held an unofficial position as her chief adviser." He shared the general unpopularity of the "German coterie," and history vindicates the suspicions which have commonly attended it.
And it must never be forgotten that in the early days of Sir Robert Peel's Ministry he rendered an incalculable service alike to the Crown and the Constitution. The Queen, naturally enough, could not bring herself to suspend all communication with the fallen Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne. Stockmar it was who intervened, and on his own responsibility virtually interdicted all communication.
In his memoranda of October 6th and October 25th, 1841, he writes with admirable sense :— "I have cause to doubt that Sir Robert is sure within himself of the goodwill and confidence of the Queen. As long as the secret communication exists between her Majesty and Lord Melbourne, this ground upon which alone Sir Robert could obtain the position necessary to him as Premier must remain cut away from under his feet. I hold, therefore, this secret interchange an essential injustice to Sir Robert's present situation."
No one can now doubt that Stockmar was right in the firm position he took up, and in his assertion (to Lord Melbourne) that it would be impossible "to carry on this secret commerce with the Sovereign without exposing the Queen's character and creating mighty embarrassments in the finer and regular working of a Constitutional machine."
Lord Palmerston described Melbourne as "the most devoted subject who ever had the honour to serve a Sovereign." The Queen's own verdict after his death was: "Though not a firm Minister he was a noble, kind-hearted, generous being." But until she learnt to know and trust Peel Lord Melbourne was all in all to the girl-Queen, and the relations between them as revealed in this work are entirely charming. His paternal kindliness, his courtly sagacity, his unfailing tact and common-sense on the one side, and on the other her daughterly affection, her touching reliance on his political judgment, her tender solicitude for his comfort in his old age of imaginary poverty. The resignation of her first Prime Minister in 1839 caused her naturally the deepest pain, which she was at no trouble to conceal either from Lord Melbourne or from those whom she called to succeed him.
With the famous "Bed-Chamber Question" in 1839, Sir Robert Peel insisted, quite properly, that the highest Household officers, female no less than male, must change with the Government, and the Queen flatly declined to part with her ladies. Melbourne consequently had to come back. At the moment the Queen was in the highest spirits '' at having got out of the hands of people who would have sacrificed every personal feeling and instinct of the Queen's to their bad party purposes." Sixty years later she said to Sir Arthur Bigge :—" I was very young then, and perhaps I should act differently if it was all to be done again."
Throughout the Corn Law crisis the Queen gave her Minister loyal and consistent support. On the merits of the question, she had formed a decided opinion, and was at no pains to conceal it. In January, 1846, she opened Parliament in person, and the Prince Consort was, to the chagrin of Peel's enemies, present in the House of Commons when Peel unfolded his elaborate scheme for the gradual abolition of the Corn Laws. To the Prime Minister himself the Queen wrote (January 23rd, 1846) :—"The Queen must compliment Sir Robert Peel on his beautiful and indeed unanswerable speech of last night which we have been reading with the greatest attention."
Of all the Prime Ministers of the reign, the Queen was least at her ease with Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston. It was naturally on questions of foreign policy that friction was most apparent. Of these the Queen made a profound and a prolonged study. Begun before her accession to the throne, under the tutelage of Prince Leopold, it was continuously maintained throughout the reign. That her views were at times biassed by dynastic considerations is undeniable; that the claims of "legitimacy" colored her sympathies — notably and unfortunately in regard to Italian unity — is equally true; but alike in detailed knowledge of facts, in familiarity with the personal equation, and in continuity of interest, she had, of course, no rival among her successive Ministerial advisers. Hardly was the Russell Ministry installed in power than friction began to manifest itself between the Sovereign and the Foreign Secretary. Thus on April 17th, 1847, the Queen complains that she "has several times asked Lord Palmerston through Lord John Russell and personally, to see that the drafts to our Foreign Ministers are not despatched previous to their being submitted to the Queen. Notwithstanding, this is still done .... the Queen therefore once more repeats her desire that Lord Palmerston should prevent the recurrence of this practice."
On the Italian question, now becoming acute, the views of the Queen and the Minister were diametrically opposed, and Palmerston seems to have regarded the Queen as tiresome and wrong-headed. The Queen denounces Palmerston's policy with increasing vehemence as "a disgrace" and "most iniquitous." During 1850 the relations between Crown and Minister became even more strained, until finally Lord John Russell nerved himself to dismiss his overbearing and impetuous colleague.
No Minister could expect her countenance, still less her confidence, who displayed lack of patriotism or political courage during the Crimean War. Her own attitude towards that and other wars is eminently characteristic. War in itself she detested, but once convinced that war was inevitable or essential to the honour of her country, her brave heart knew no shrinking, and her tireless vigilance neglected no detail. One day she writes to Lord Aberdeen to urge upon his attention a matter '' of paramount importance, viz., the augmentation of the Army"1; another day to the Duke of Newcastle, then Minister for War, to get assurance as to the ''effective state" of the home defences.
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