The British Monarchy in the 18th Century
Historically speaking, the claim of independence from the Crown was first put forward by the judiciary, whose members, though for centuries both in law and in fact the servants of the monarch, liable to dismissal at pleasure. They succeeded, before the end of the Middle Ages, in banishing the King from his own law courts, and in acting as an independent department of state. Down to the end of the 17th century, their success varied with the political balance of power; but it was assured, soon after the Revolution, by the Act of Settlement, which, in fact, made the judges independent of the Crown, though still, technically, liable to dismissal for actual misconduct.
Meanwhile, Parliament, a later institution than the courts of law, had, by a series of struggles which have made it famous in the world's history, succeeded, not merely in emancipating itself from the control of the monarch, but in establishing itself as an essential part of the national government. On his restoration to the throne, Charles II realized that Parliament could be cajoled, but could no longer be bullied. Even the enthusiastic loyalty of the Restoration Parliaments would not tolerate violence, though it fell a somewhat easy prey to the more sinister influence of corruption.
The executive was much longer in securing its independence. Down to the Revolution, the holders of executive offices were, in fact as well as name, "His Majesty's servants." Outside legislation and judicature, the personal will of the King directed the policy of the country, subject only to the indirect check of a refusal by the House of Commons to grant supplies. But, with the accession of a foreign ruler, in the person of William III, and a renewal of the foreign element with the accession of the House of Brunswick, affairs rapidly changed. William was absorbed in great foreign schemes, and left home affairs to his Ministers. Anne was lethargic, and indifferent to matters which did not concern her personal comfort or the interests of the Church. George I knew no English, and soon ceased to attend meetings of the Council, except purely formal meetings where his presence was absolutely essential. Thus the real control of affairs passed into the hands of the great officials of state.
At this point there was a real danger (not sufficiently appreciated by English historians) that the government of England would become a bureauracy, each department in effect the private preserve of its chief, pursuing its way regardless of, or even in opposition to, the other departments, and intriguing for power and privilege. From this danger the country was saved by the peculiarities of the political situation, and by the financial power, based on long established tradition, of the House of Commons.
During the first half of the 18th century, the dominating feature of the political situation was the possibility of a Jacobite restoration. So long as the throne was occupied by a daughter of James II, or even by the husband of one of those daughters, the country accepted the Revolution settlement with acquiescence, if not with enthusiasm. But, when it became clear that
Anne would leave no heir, the hopes of the Jacobites revived. It was with difficulty that the Queen herself had been brought to accept the scheme of the Act of Settlement of 1701, by which the succession to the throne, on the failure of her issue, had been settled on the Princess Sophia of Hanover, the granddaughter in the female line of James I. The politically useful legend, that the "Old Pretender8 (the son born to James II on the eve of his flight) was a supposititious child, had long been exploded; the child himself, now a young man of winning personality, was prepared, at Anne's death to vindicate the claim which had passed to him on the death of his father; and the Queen was believed to sympathize fully with his ambitions. The House of Hanover was regarded as a mere stalking-horse for the ambitions of the Whig statesmen; and the first two of its princes to occupy the throne of Great Britain and Ireland were looked upon by the mass of the people as foreigners. In 1715, and again in 1745, the fate of the throne trembled in the balance.
Thus the Ministers of George I and George II carried their lives, or at least their fortunes, in their hands. A Jacobite restoration meant, at the very least, banishment and confiscation for them, if not something worse. They could not afford to run unnecessary risks.
There can be little doubt that the Whig leaders would have been glad, in spite of their constitutional principles, to dispense with the presence of Parliament during these troubled years. Apart from the possibility — the probability— that it might result in an accession of strength to the Jacobites in the House of Commons, there was always the fear that the license of a general election would be made the cover of a Jacobite coup de main. This fear is shown by the striking step taken soon after the accession of George I; when the Parliament, at the urgent instigation of Ministers, prolonged the term of existence, not merely of its successors, but of itself, from three to seven years, by the Septennial Act of 1715.
Fortunately, however, it was not possible for the Whig leaders to dispense with the assistance of Parliament; and this for the good old reason which had for so long been the sheet-anchor of Parliament in its struggle for power. In spite of the large hereditary revenue settled upon the Crown at the Restoration, and the rich inheritance of the Crown lands, George I and George II, like their predecessors, continually needed money; and the only stable source of money was a vote of the House of Commons. The chief secret of Walpole's favor at court, as well as of his ascendancy over his colleagues, was the power which he possessed of securing this vote. For the first time in the history of England, the power of the executive depended, openly though not officially, on the fluctuating moods of the representative House.
Gradually, then, by the teaching of events, the Ministers of George I and George II began to realize the conditions upon which Cabinet government depends for its success. It was necessary, if they were to prevent the commission of blunders which might bring down the dynasty and its supporters in one common ruin, that they should, in fact, control the action of the king. To secure this control, naturally very distasteful to monarchs brought up in the absolutist traditions of mediaeval Germany, it was necessary that they should (under forms of deferential politeness) be able both to coerce and to bribe the occupant of the throne.
So long as they acted as individuals, the former object was unattainable; for both George I and George II were quite shrewd enough to be able to play off one rival against another. But a threat of resignation by all his Ministers at once was more than a foreign ruler, ignorant of the temper of his subjects and of the machinery of government, could safely disregard. Equally was it desirable, if not essential, that Ministers, if they desired to bribe the king, should act together. For the means of bribery were only to be obtained from the House of Commons; and that House, though it doubtless regarded this new harmony of Ministers with deep suspicion, found it .more difficult to refuse supplies demanded by the unanimous voice of the government, than when it could plead as an answer to the demands of one Minister, that his colleagues differed from him as to the wisdom of his plans.
Thus gradually, from no very honorable motives, but as a mere counsel of expediency. Ministers acquired the habit of talking over their plans together; and the rival, and often openly quarrelling Ministers of William III and Anne, were replaced by the Cabinets of George I and his son. No doubt the unanimity, such as it was, was mainly superficial; but, for all that, in a matter wherein appearances counted for much, it was important.
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