Viktor Orbán and Illiberal Democracy

Hungary's Political Transformation and Global Implications

Viktor Orbán, Hungary's longest-serving prime minister since the fall of communism, emerged as one of the most influential and controversial political figures in contemporary Europe. His explicit embrace of "illiberal democracy" represents a significant departure from the liberal democratic consensus that dominated European politics since the end of the Cold War. This concept challenges fundamental assumptions about the relationship between democracy, liberalism, and constitutional governance in the 21st century.

The Genesis of Illiberal Democracy

The term "illiberal democracy" gained prominence when Viktor Orbán explicitly embraced it during a speech at the 25th Bálványos Free Summer University in Baile Tu?nad, Romania, in July 2014. In this watershed moment, Orbán declared that Hungary was departing from Western liberal democratic principles to build what he called an "illiberal state" or "illiberal democracy." This was not a term that critics imposed upon his government; rather, Orbán himself proudly adopted it as a defining characteristic of his political project.

Orbán's embrace of illiberalism represented a dramatic ideological shift from his earlier political career. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Orbán was a young liberal activist who fought against communist authoritarianism and championed Western democratic values. His transformation from liberal reformer to champion of illiberalism reflects broader tensions within post-communist societies and the evolution of right-wing populist politics globally.

Defining Illiberal Democracy

Illiberal democracy, as articulated by Orbán and practiced in Hungary, represents a political system that maintains certain democratic elements—particularly elections—while systematically undermining liberal democratic institutions, norms, and values. This concept rests on several key distinctions and characteristics that differentiate it from both traditional liberal democracy and outright authoritarianism.

Core Principles and Ideology

At its foundation, illiberal democracy rejects the liberal premise that individual rights and freedoms should be protected from majority rule through constitutional constraints and independent institutions. Instead, it emphasizes popular sovereignty in a more absolute sense, arguing that the will of the majority (or those claiming to represent it) should face minimal institutional constraints.

The ideology of illiberal democracy typically incorporates several interrelated elements. It elevates national sovereignty and cultural identity above universal human rights principles. It frames politics as a struggle between the authentic "people" and corrupt elites, minorities, or foreign influences. It rejects multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in favor of cultural homogeneity and traditional values. It prioritizes collective welfare and national interests over individual rights and civil liberties. And it challenges the separation of powers, arguing for more unified and decisive governance.

The Hungarian Laboratory

Hungary under Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party has served as the primary laboratory for implementing illiberal democratic principles within a European Union member state. Since returning to power in 2010 with a supermajority in parliament, Orbán has systematically transformed Hungary's political, legal, and social institutions in ways that exemplify the illiberal democratic model.

Constitutional and Legal Transformation

The cornerstone of Hungary's illiberal transformation was the adoption of a new constitution in 2011, officially called the Fundamental Law. This document replaced the country's 1949 constitution (heavily amended after 1989) and reflected Orbán's conservative Christian nationalist ideology. The Fundamental Law emphasizes Hungary's Christian heritage, traditional family values, and national sovereignty while diminishing protections for minority rights and limiting the power of the constitutional court to review constitutional amendments.

Beyond the constitution itself, Orbán's government has engaged in extensive constitutional engineering through numerous amendments. Since 2010, the Hungarian constitution has been amended multiple times, often in ways that consolidate Fidesz's power or lock in its policy preferences. These amendments have covered diverse areas including judicial appointments, electoral rules, family policy, and the definition of marriage.

Institutional Capture

A hallmark of Hungary's illiberal democracy has been the systematic capture of independent institutions that are meant to serve as checks on governmental power. This process has been comprehensive and methodical, affecting virtually every institution that could potentially constrain the executive.

The judiciary has been particularly affected by this institutional capture. The government lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges, forcing hundreds of judges to retire and allowing Orbán to appoint younger, more sympathetic replacements. The Constitutional Court, once a robust defender of rights, has been expanded and packed with government-friendly judges. Its jurisdiction has been limited, particularly regarding fiscal matters and constitutional amendments. The creation of a separate administrative court system, with judges appointed by the government, further undermined judicial independence, though this specific reform was later suspended under EU pressure.

The electoral commission, central bank, state audit office, and prosecutor's office have all been staffed with individuals loyal to Fidesz. This ensures that these institutions, which should provide oversight and accountability, instead function as extensions of government power. The prosecution service, in particular, has been criticized for failing to investigate corruption allegations against government officials while aggressively pursuing opposition figures and critical journalists.

Media Control and Information Manipulation

The transformation of Hungary's media landscape represents one of the most comprehensive examples of illiberal democratic practice. The government has created a media environment where critical voices are marginalized, pro-government messaging dominates, and independent journalism faces severe constraints.

The state media system has been thoroughly transformed into a government propaganda apparatus. Public broadcasters, which are supposed to maintain editorial independence, instead function as cheerleaders for government policies. Private media ownership has been systematically reorganized to favor government allies. Many independent media outlets have been purchased by businessmen friendly to Orbán, who then aligned their editorial policies with government preferences.

Beyond ownership, the government has used advertising spending as a tool for media control. State-owned companies and government ministries direct advertising revenue primarily to pro-government media outlets, starving independent outlets of crucial funding. This "soft censorship" has been highly effective in forcing media outlets to either align with government preferences or face financial collapse.

Civil Society Under Pressure

Civil society organizations, particularly those advocating for liberal democratic values or receiving foreign funding, have faced increasing pressure under Orbán's government. This reflects the illiberal democratic suspicion of organizations that operate independently of state control and that might challenge government narratives.

The government passed legislation requiring organizations that receive foreign funding above certain thresholds to register as "foreign-supported organizations" and label themselves as such in their publications. This law, clearly modeled on Russian legislation targeting "foreign agents," was designed to stigmatize civil society groups and make their work more difficult. The law was eventually struck down by the European Court of Justice, but it achieved its purpose of intimidating and marginalizing critical NGOs during the years it was in force.

Beyond formal legislation, civil society organizations have faced hostile rhetoric from government officials, who regularly accuse them of being foreign agents, tools of George Soros (a frequent target of government conspiracy theories), or enemies of the Hungarian people. This rhetoric has created a climate of hostility toward civil society activism and has emboldened harassment of NGO workers.

Cultural and Social Policy

Illiberal democracy in Hungary has been accompanied by aggressive promotion of conservative social values and cultural nationalism. The government has framed this as defending traditional Hungarian and Christian values against liberal cosmopolitanism and foreign cultural influences.

Family policy has been central to this cultural project. The government has implemented extensive pro-natalist policies designed to increase birth rates among ethnic Hungarians, including generous subsidies for families, preferential loans for couples who promise to have children, and even tax exemptions for women who have four or more children. These policies are explicitly framed in nationalist terms, as a response to demographic decline and as an alternative to immigration.

LGBTQ rights have faced systematic rollback under Orbán's government. The constitution was amended to define marriage exclusively as between a man and a woman. Legal gender recognition for transgender individuals was eliminated. Most controversially, legislation was passed in 2021 that prohibits the "promotion" of homosexuality or gender change to minors, affecting education, media, and advertising. This law, similar to Russian legislation, has been widely condemned by international human rights organizations and EU institutions.

Education has been increasingly brought under state control and infused with nationalist ideology. Universities have been forced to reorganize under foundation structures with boards dominated by government appointees. Curricula have been revised to emphasize national history and traditional values. Gender studies programs have been banned as ideologically unacceptable. The most dramatic example was the forced departure of Central European University from Budapest, a internationally respected institution that the government viewed as a bastion of liberal values and foreign (particularly Soros-linked) influence.

The Economics of Illiberalism

While illiberal democracy is primarily a political and constitutional concept, it has important economic dimensions. Orbán's Hungary has pursued what might be called "illiberal economics," which combines market mechanisms with extensive state intervention, economic nationalism, and crony capitalism.

The government has not sought to dismantle capitalism or create a command economy. Instead, it has used state power to reshape market relationships in ways that favor politically connected businesses and consolidate economic power in friendly hands. This approach has been termed "clientelistic" or "mafia-like" by critics, who argue that loyalty to Fidesz has become more important than market competition in determining business success.

This economic model has had mixed results. Hungary has maintained economic growth and avoided major fiscal crises, which the government touts as evidence of its successful governance. However, corruption has increased dramatically, income inequality has widened, and much of Hungary's economic growth has been dependent on EU funding—creating a fundamental contradiction in Orbán's anti-Brussels rhetoric.

The Ideological Context

Orbán's illiberal democracy did not emerge in a vacuum. It reflects and has contributed to broader ideological currents in contemporary politics, particularly the rise of right-wing populism and challenges to liberal democratic norms globally.

The Critique of Liberal Democracy

The illiberal democratic project rests on a fundamental critique of liberal democracy as it has been practiced in the West since World War II. This critique contains several interconnected elements that resonate with populist movements across many countries.

First, there is an economic critique. Orbán and other illiberal democrats argue that liberal democratic systems have failed to deliver prosperity to ordinary citizens, instead enriching cosmopolitan elites while leaving working and middle-class families behind. The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent austerity policies are often cited as evidence that liberal democratic capitalism serves the interests of banks and corporations rather than the people.

Second, there is a cultural critique. Illiberal democrats argue that liberal democracy has led to cultural decline, moral relativism, and the erosion of traditional values and national identity. They contend that liberal multiculturalism undermines social cohesion and national sovereignty, while political correctness stifles legitimate concerns about immigration, cultural change, and national security.

Third, there is a political critique. Illiberal democrats argue that liberal democratic systems are actually undemocratic because they place too many constraints on popular sovereignty. Unelected judges, bureaucrats, and international institutions impose their will on the people and prevent democratically elected governments from implementing the policies their voters demand. From this perspective, illiberal democracy is actually more democratic because it gives freer rein to the popular will.

Nationalism and Sovereignty

Nationalism is central to the ideology of illiberal democracy. For Orbán, the nation is the fundamental political community, and the primary obligation of government is to defend national interests and preserve national culture. This nationalism has several important implications.

It leads to deep skepticism about international institutions and multilateral cooperation, which are seen as constraints on national sovereignty. Orbán has been particularly critical of the European Union, despite Hungary's continued membership and dependence on EU funding. He frames EU institutions as arrogant, out-of-touch bureaucrats who want to impose their liberal values on unwilling member states.

It produces hostility toward immigration, particularly from culturally different regions. Orbán has made opposition to immigration a cornerstone of his politics, building border fences, refusing to accept refugee quotas, and launching extensive propaganda campaigns about the dangers of migration. He frames immigration as an existential threat to European Christian civilization.

It emphasizes ethnic and cultural homogeneity over diversity. While Orbán's nationalism is primarily cultural rather than explicitly racial, it nevertheless promotes an exclusionary vision of Hungarian identity that marginalizes minorities, particularly the Roma population and newer immigrant communities.

International Dimensions and Reactions

Hungary's turn toward illiberal democracy has had significant international ramifications, affecting its relationships with European partners, Western allies, and authoritarian regimes globally. The international response has been complex, revealing tensions within the liberal democratic world about how to respond to backsliding by a member of the democratic club.

Tensions with the European Union

Hungary's relationship with the European Union has become increasingly fraught as Orbán's illiberal project has advanced. This tension is particularly significant because it represents a challenge to the EU from within—a member state explicitly rejecting fundamental values that are supposed to bind the union together.

The EU has initiated numerous legal actions against Hungary for violating European law and democratic principles. These include infringement proceedings over judicial independence, civil society restrictions, asylum policies, and treatment of minorities. The European Parliament has even invoked Article 7 of the EU Treaty, the so-called "nuclear option" that could theoretically lead to suspension of Hungary's voting rights, though this process has been slow and politically fraught.

More recently, the EU has begun to use financial leverage to pressure Hungary. The bloc has held up billions of euros in recovery funds and cohesion funding due to concerns about corruption and rule of law violations. This "conditionality mechanism" represents a more effective tool than previous political sanctions, as it targets an area where Hungary is genuinely dependent on the EU.

Relations with the United States

Hungary's relationship with the United States has also been affected by its illiberal turn, though the relationship has varied significantly depending on who occupies the White House. Under the Obama administration, relations were strained, with American officials criticizing Hungary's democratic backsliding and Orbán facing a ban on travel to the United States over corruption concerns (though this was later lifted).

The Trump administration took a markedly different approach, with President Trump praising Orbán and hosting him at the White House. This reflected broader ideological affinities between Trump and Orbán, particularly regarding nationalism, immigration, and hostility toward liberal elites. The relationship normalized Hungary's illiberal model within conservative American politics, with some Republican politicians and intellectuals openly embracing Orbán as a model for how conservatives should govern.

The Biden administration has returned to a more critical stance, emphasizing concerns about democracy, rule of law, and human rights. However, the relationship remains complex due to Hungary's NATO membership and its strategic position in Central Europe.

Authoritarian Affinities

As Orbán has distanced himself from Western liberal democracies, he has cultivated closer relationships with authoritarian and illiberal regimes around the world. These relationships serve multiple purposes: they provide alternative sources of investment and political support, they demonstrate that Hungary has options beyond the West, and they reflect genuine ideological affinities.

Russia has been perhaps the most important of these relationships. Orbán has maintained friendly ties with Vladimir Putin even as most European countries have moved toward confrontation with Russia. Hungary opposed strong sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and even after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Hungary has been the EU member state most reluctant to support Ukraine and sanction Russia. This has been justified partly in terms of economic interests (particularly energy supplies), but it also reflects Orbán's view of Russia as a fellow proponent of sovereignty and traditional values against Western liberalism.

China has also become an important partner, with Hungary welcoming Chinese investment and supporting China's Belt and Road Initiative. Orbán has praised the Chinese economic model and has been reluctant to criticize China's human rights record. Turkey under Erdogan, despite historical tensions, has become a partner as both leaders pursue similar illiberal democratic projects. And Hungary has developed ties with various authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

The Spread of Illiberal Democracy

While Hungary under Orbán has been the most explicit and systematic example of illiberal democracy within the European Union, similar trends have appeared in various forms across the democratic world. This has led some observers to speak of a global wave of democratic backsliding or illiberal populism.

Poland's Parallel Path

The most dramatic parallel to Hungary has been Poland under the Law and Justice party (PiS), which governed from 2015 to 2023. Like Orbán's Fidesz, PiS pursued policies that undermined judicial independence, restricted media freedom, promoted conservative social values, and framed politics as a struggle between the authentic people and corrupt elites. The similarities were so striking that Hungary and Poland often supported each other within EU institutions, with each threatening to veto sanctions against the other.

However, there were also important differences. Poland's civil society proved more robust and resistant than Hungary's. The Polish opposition, media, and courts mounted stronger resistance to PiS's illiberal measures. And ultimately, Polish voters removed PiS from power in 2023, demonstrating that illiberal democratic backsliding is not necessarily irreversible—though the new government faces enormous challenges in undoing the institutional damage.

Broader European Trends

Beyond Poland, various European countries have seen the rise of political movements that share elements of illiberal democratic ideology, even if they have not implemented the comprehensive institutional changes seen in Hungary. Italy, with the rise of Giorgia Meloni and her post-fascist Brothers of Italy party, represents another example of right-wing populism gaining power. Though Meloni has so far governed more moderately than her rhetoric suggested, concerns remain about Italy's democratic trajectory.

In other cases, parties with illiberal leanings have entered coalition governments or significantly influenced policy despite not controlling government fully. Austria, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Scandinavia have all seen the rise of parties that challenge liberal democratic norms, oppose immigration, and promote nationalist agendas. While these have not led to the systematic institutional transformations seen in Hungary, they indicate broader discontent with liberal democratic politics.

Global Resonances

The illiberal democratic model and its underlying ideology have resonated beyond Europe. In various forms, similar movements and leaders have emerged across the democratic world, from Brazil under Bolsonaro to India under Modi, from the Philippines under Duterte to Turkey under Erdogan. While each case has its own unique characteristics and historical context, they share common features: populist rhetoric pitting the people against elites, nationalist ideology emphasizing cultural authenticity, challenges to liberal institutions and norms, and leaders who claim to represent the true will of the people against constraining institutions.

Even established democracies like the United States have experienced challenges to liberal democratic norms, particularly during the Trump presidency, which challenged many long-standing democratic conventions, attacked media and judiciary, and culminated in an attempt to overturn election results. While the American constitutional system proved more resilient than Hungary's, the Trump phenomenon demonstrated that illiberal democratic tendencies could emerge even in the world's oldest continuous democracy.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The rise of illiberal democracy raises profound questions about democracy, liberalism, and governance in the 21st century. These questions are both theoretical—challenging understanding these concepts—and practical—forcing us to confront concrete problems in defending democratic systems.

The Relationship Between Democracy and Liberalism

Illiberal democracy forces us to confront the relationship between democracy (rule by the people) and liberalism (protection of individual rights and constitutional limits on power). Liberal democratic theory has generally assumed that these two elements are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Democracy provides legitimacy and popular input, while liberalism constrains majority power to protect minorities and individual rights. The constitution and independent institutions serve as guardrails that keep democracy on track.

Illiberal democracy challenges this synthesis by suggesting that these elements can conflict. It argues that constitutional constraints and independent institutions can frustrate the will of the people and that truly democratic governance requires fewer constraints on elected officials. This raises difficult questions: Is a system still democratic if it maintains elections but eliminates checks on majority power? Can a system that protects individual rights through unelected institutions truly claim to be democratic? Where should the line be drawn between healthy democratic majoritarianism and tyrannical majority rule?

Political theorists have long grappled with these questions, with thinkers like John Stuart Mill worrying about the "tyranny of the majority" and others like Carl Schmitt celebrating popular sovereignty unconstrained by liberal legalism. The rise of illiberal democracy brings these debates out of philosophy seminars and into real-world politics.

Competitive Authoritarianism and Electoral Autocracy

Political scientists have developed various frameworks for understanding systems like Orbán's Hungary. One influential concept is "competitive authoritarianism," coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, which describes systems where democratic institutions exist and elections are held, but the playing field is so tilted toward the incumbent that true competition is impossible. Opposition parties can compete, but they face enormous disadvantages due to state control of media, resources, and institutions.

A related concept is "electoral autocracy," which emphasizes that these systems use elections not as genuine democratic exercises but as mechanisms for legitimating authoritarian rule. Elections occur regularly, but they are manipulated through media control, intimidation, gerrymandering, and other techniques to ensure the desired outcome. This allows leaders to claim democratic legitimacy while maintaining authoritarian control.

These concepts help us understand what makes systems like Hungary's different from both traditional dictatorships and functioning democracies. They occupy a grey zone where the forms of democracy exist without its substance—what political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell called "delegative democracy" or what Fareed Zakaria termed "illiberal democracy" even before Orbán embraced the term.

Democratic Backsliding and Resilience

The transformation of Hungary and similar cases has sparked extensive research on how democracies decline. Unlike the dramatic military coups that ended many democracies in the 20th century, contemporary democratic backsliding tends to be gradual and legalistic. Elected leaders use their democratic mandate to systematically dismantle democratic institutions from within, often while claiming to strengthen democracy by making it more responsive to the people's will.

This process typically follows recognizable patterns. It begins with attacks on the independence of referees—courts, electoral commissions, and anti-corruption agencies. It continues with efforts to tilt the political playing field through control of media, gerrymandering, and changes to electoral rules. It involves sidelining opposition through intimidation, legal harassment, or cooptation. It includes efforts to capture the economy and civil society. And it typically relies on constitutional hardball—using legal and constitutional tools in ways that violate democratic norms even while respecting formal rules.

Understanding these patterns is crucial for developing strategies to defend democracy. Research suggests that democratic resilience depends on strong democratic norms (unwritten rules about how political competition should work), robust civil society institutions, free and diverse media, independent judiciaries, and active citizenship. When these elements are weak, democratic backsliding becomes easier. Conversely, strengthening these elements can help democracies resist illiberal tendencies.

Critiques and Defenses

The debate over illiberal democracy involves not just empirical questions about what is happening in places like Hungary, but also normative arguments about whether these developments are positive or negative. While critics outnumber defenders in Western academic and policy circles, illiberal democracy has its advocates who offer various defenses of the model.

The Case for Illiberal Democracy

Proponents of illiberal democracy offer several arguments in its favor, which deserve serious engagement even if one ultimately rejects them.

First, they argue that it represents a legitimate form of democracy that is better attuned to the needs and preferences of many societies than the liberal democratic model imposed by Western powers and international institutions. From this perspective, liberal democracy is not universal but rather reflects specifically Western cultural values and historical experiences. Other societies may have different traditions that emphasize community, order, and national identity over individual rights and pluralism.

Second, defenders argue that illiberal democracy has delivered better economic and social outcomes than liberal democratic alternatives would have provided. They point to Hungary's economic growth, low unemployment, and generous family policies as evidence that Orbán's system works. They argue that liberal democratic concerns about institutional independence and media freedom are abstract values that matter less to ordinary people than jobs, security, and prosperity.

Third, they contend that illiberal democracy is more effective at addressing the real challenges facing nations in the 21st century. Strong, decisive leadership unencumbered by excessive checks and balances can respond more quickly to crises, whether economic, security-related, or demographic. Liberal democracies, by contrast, are gridlocked by partisan division, unable to make difficult decisions, and vulnerable to being captured by special interests and ideological activists.

Fourth, some defenders argue that illiberal democracy is actually more democratic than liberal democracy because it gives greater weight to the will of the majority. Liberal democracy, they argue, has become dominated by unelected judges, bureaucrats, and experts who impose their preferences on the people. Constitutional courts strike down popular legislation, central banks make economic policy without democratic input, and international institutions override national decisions. Illiberal democracy restores power to the people and their elected representatives.

The Case Against Illiberal Democracy

Critics of illiberal democracy offer numerous counterarguments that highlight its dangers and shortcomings.

First, they argue that the term "illiberal democracy" is fundamentally misleading because systems like Hungary's are not truly democratic. While elections occur, they are so manipulated through media control, gerrymandering, and institutional capture that they cannot be considered free and fair. The absence of genuine competition, independent oversight, and equal opportunity makes these systems authoritarian rather than democratic, regardless of the electoral rituals they maintain.

Second, critics contend that illiberal democracy leads inexorably to authoritarianism. Once you remove the constitutional constraints, independent institutions, and civil society organizations that check governmental power, there is no stopping point short of dictatorship. The distinction between "illiberal democracy" and outright authoritarianism becomes merely semantic, as power becomes increasingly concentrated and opposition increasingly dangerous.

Third, critics argue that illiberal democracy is economically inefficient and corrupt. Without independent courts, free media, and robust oversight institutions, corruption flourishes. State resources are distributed based on political loyalty rather than merit or market efficiency. This may produce short-term gains for political insiders, but it undermines long-term economic development and creates a system that benefits oligarchs rather than ordinary citizens.

Fourth, critics emphasize that illiberal democracy is harmful to human dignity and human rights. Minorities, LGBTQ individuals, immigrants, and political opponents face discrimination, marginalization, and sometimes violence. Women's rights are constrained by patriarchal policies. Civil liberties like freedom of speech, assembly, and association are restricted. These violations of human rights are not merely unfortunate side effects but essential features of illiberal democracy, which explicitly rejects the universal protection of individual rights.

Fifth, critics argue that illiberal democracy is bad for international peace and cooperation. Nationalist, sovereignty-obsessed regimes are less willing to compromise, less respectful of international law, and more willing to use force to achieve their objectives. The rise of illiberalism has contributed to declining international cooperation on issues like climate change, trade, and conflict resolution. It has also created divisions within international organizations like the EU and NATO, weakening collective responses to common challenges.

The Future of Liberal Democracy

The rise of illiberal democracy poses fundamental questions about the future of liberal democratic governance. Is this a temporary backlash against globalization and cultural change, or a more permanent shift in how democracies organize themselves? Can liberal democracy reform itself to address the legitimate grievances that fuel illiberal movements, or is it too rigid and ideologically constrained to adapt?

Challenges Facing Liberal Democracy

Understanding the appeal of illiberal alternatives requires acknowledging the real challenges facing liberal democratic systems. These include economic inequality and insecurity resulting from globalization, automation, and financialization, which have left many working and middle-class people feeling economically precarious. Rapid cultural change related to immigration, secularization, and shifting norms around gender and sexuality has created anxiety about identity and community. Political polarization and institutional dysfunction have made it difficult for liberal democracies to address major challenges effectively. Loss of trust in traditional institutions including media, political parties, courts, and expert communities has created space for demagogic alternatives. And the perceived domination of politics by educated elites who are out of touch with ordinary people's concerns has fueled populist resentment.

These challenges are real, and liberal democracies must address them if they hope to compete effectively against illiberal alternatives. Simply defending the status quo or dismissing concerns as ignorant or bigoted will not suffice. Liberal democracies need to demonstrate that they can deliver prosperity, security, and community while protecting rights and maintaining democratic accountability.

Potential Responses and Reforms

Various proposals have emerged for how liberal democracies can respond to the illiberal challenge. These include economic reforms to reduce inequality and provide greater security, such as stronger social safety nets, progressive taxation, and policies to share the benefits of economic growth more broadly. Cultural reforms might involve more sensitivity to concerns about rapid change and community disruption, while maintaining commitment to equal rights and non-discrimination. Institutional reforms could make democratic governance more effective and responsive, such as electoral reforms, changes to how legislatures function, and strengthening democratic participation. Media reforms might address the crisis in journalism and the spread of misinformation through public media support, regulation of social media platforms, and media literacy education. And education and civic engagement initiatives could strengthen democratic culture and norms.

However, implementing these reforms is difficult precisely because liberal democratic systems are designed to move slowly and require broad consensus. This creates a paradox: liberal democracies need to reform to compete with illiberal alternatives, but their constitutional structures make rapid reform difficult.

The Stakes

The contest between liberal and illiberal forms of democracy is not merely an academic debate or a struggle for political advantage. It involves fundamental questions about human freedom, dignity, and flourishing. Liberal democracy, for all its flaws, has historically provided the best framework for protecting individual rights, enabling pluralism, facilitating peaceful change, and promoting human development. Its decline would have profound consequences not just for those living under illiberal regimes, but for the global order as a whole.

At the same time, liberal democracy cannot rest on its laurels or assume its superiority is self-evident. It must prove its value through performance, demonstrating that it can deliver what people need while respecting their rights and dignity. It must also show humility, acknowledging its failures and limitations rather than presenting itself as a perfect system that has reached the end of history.

Conclusion

Viktor Orbán's embrace of illiberal democracy represents one of the most significant challenges to the liberal democratic consensus that has dominated the Western world since the end of World War II. By explicitly rejecting liberal principles while maintaining democratic forms, Orbán has articulated and implemented a model that other leaders and movements around the world have found attractive.

Hungary's transformation demonstrates how democracies can be subverted from within using ostensibly legal and constitutional means. It shows that elections alone do not guarantee democracy if other essential institutions and norms are undermined. And it reveals the fragility of democratic systems when faced with determined leaders who are willing to exploit constitutional loopholes and democratic procedures to concentrate power.

At the same time, the Hungarian case also illustrates the limitations and contradictions of illiberal democracy. The system is sustained by extensive EU funding even as it attacks EU values. It claims to defend national sovereignty while becoming increasingly dependent on authoritarian powers like Russia and China. It promises economic prosperity but delivers crony capitalism and corruption. It claims to represent the people but systematically marginalizes and silences dissent.

The rise of illiberal democracy forces confronting difficult questions about the relationship between democracy and liberalism, the universality of human rights, the balance between majority rule and minority protection, and the role of constitutional constraints on popular sovereignty. These are not new questions, but they have taken on renewed urgency as illiberal alternatives gain ground.

Ultimately, the contest between liberal and illiberal forms of democracy will be decided not primarily by intellectual arguments but by practical results. Can liberal democracies deliver prosperity, security, and community while protecting rights and maintaining democratic accountability? Can they adapt to 21st-century challenges while preserving their core values? Or will they prove too sclerotic, too captured by elites, and too detached from ordinary people's concerns to survive?

The answer to these questions will shape not just the political systems of individual countries, but the character of our global civilization. Observers struggle to must understand both the appeal and the dangers of illiberal democracy, neither dismissing its supporters as simply ignorant or malevolent, nor accepting its claims to be a legitimate alternative to liberal democratic governance. The stakes could not be higher, for they involve nothing less than the future of human freedom and dignity in the modern world.