Prussian Artillery
At the commencement of the 19th century the Prussian artillery was rather powerful than mobile, the field artillery counting 216 12-pounders, 96 heavy 6-pounders, and only 120 light 6-pounders. After the disasters of 1806–7 this defect was remedied; and in 1816, when a further reorganisation took place, the ninety-six guns allotted to each army corps were in the proportion of three heavy to eight light. The horse artillery numbered twenty batteries in 1809, and twenty-seven in 1816, and for many years formed the bulk of the reserve artillery. The personnel of the Prussian artillery developed enormously during the 19th century. In 1808 it formed three brigades, each consisting of six field and two horse artillery batteries. In 1814 it was increased to nine brigades, each composed of twelve field and three horse artillery batteries, besides a proportion of garrison artillery and artificers, and corresponding to one of the permanent army corps of the Prussian army.
It was with this organisation but slightly modified that Prussia undertook the wars of 1864 and 1866. In the latter war the Prussian artillery did not shine so much as its Austrian adversary; and deficiencies were brought to light which were carefully remedied in the few years of peace which followed. In 1867 an addition was made of three Prussian and one Saxon regiment of field artillery, with four divisions of garrison artillery, consequent on the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, &c., and the formation of three new army corps from these provinces.
It was with this establishment that the war of 1870–71 commenced. The South German forces contributed four regiments of Bavarian artillery and twenty-eight batteries of Würtemberg, Baden, and Hessian artillery; and altogether seventeen regiments of field and nine of garrison artillery took part, or were effective for service, in that war.
It is remarkable that Prussia triumphed in 1866 and in 1870-71 without her armies having had an absolute superiority of artillery and infantry fire over those of Austria and France. In 1866, the Prussian infantry was armed with a rifle (Dreyse needle) and had some batteries equipped with a gun quite perfect for that epoch (Krupp gun, breech loading). Their artillery was, nevertheless, dominated in several encounters by the Austrian artillery, surer in its methods and more readily manœuvred.
In 1870-71 the Germans employed their Krupp material with boldness and power, while the French artillery, used timidly and dispersed, was paralyzed by reason of the adoption of a defective fuse, time fire being impossible between 1500 and 5000 metres. On the contrary, the French had a rifle (Chassepot) superior to the Dreyse and from which they obtained excellent results (losses of the German infantry in the battles of the month of August).
If the Prussian command gained the war in 1866 and 1870-1871, it was due above all to the manner in which it conducted its operations taking advantage of the number and the means of communication, in a word, "manœuvre."
There was no artillery staff machinery for higher formations in the Prussian Army in the campaign of 1866, but before the war of 1870 began the Germans appointed corps artillery commanders. The results were not satisfactory from the point of view of organization and command, although the early entry of artillery into action (Worth) and the large concentrations of guns (St. Privat and Sedan) were successfully achieved. The system lacked elasticity.
In the struggle for supremacy of the two great German powers in 1866, both combatants were armed with the new weapons, but their proper applications seem to have been totally misapprehended. The Prussian batteries were kept too much in rear of the other troops while on the march, and came into action at ranges which only a very exaggerated view of the powers of rifled guns could justify. At Trautenau, Nachod, and Skalitz their artillery played an unimportant part; at Sadowa comparatively few of the vast number of their batteries came into effective action. The Austrian artillery had but little opportunity of displaying superiority of management or tactical training, though its heroism and self-sacrifice in covering the retreat on the eve of Sadowa is worthy of mention.
Till the campaign of 1870–71, the proper management and powerful effect of modern artillery was never thoroughly realised. The pungent criticism of certain anonymous writers on the 1866 campaign bore its fruits, and revolutionised the system of artillery tactics. From the storming of the Spichern heights up to the capture of Le Mans the same tactical features were prominent on the victorious side. A battle was preluded by the bold advance of all available guns. The attack commenced with a concentrated fire of artillery, the moral, if not actual, effect of which enabled an offensive movement of infantry to be made with success, or at least kept the enemy in check till the flanking movements, so conspicuous in this war, were carried out. At Sedan the German guns were pushed forward regardless of escort, even in front of the advanced guards, and enclosed the ill-fated French army in what has been aptly described as a circle of fire.
On the march the German artillery was no longer kept in rear of columns of infantry, but was pushed well to the front, being preceded only by enough infantry to protect it from surprise. It was brought into action at the very first opportunity, and almost invariably in large masses, which concentrated their fire upon the objective of the infantry attacks, and the mastery of the hostile artillery was deemed necessary before the infantry advance. Its fire, in almost every case, was deliberate and accurate, and was employed at ranges varying from 3300 to 650 yards, while the French wasted their ammunition in a rapid fire at ranges too long for the best effect. The French committed the further fault of retaining their batteries too long in reserve, and employing them, too often, singly instead of in masses.
In 1872 the German artillery was reorganised, the field artillery of each army corps being augmented to seventeen batteries, and divided into two regiments. In the Napoleonic wars guns were massed at the crisis of an engagement in order to strike a decisive blow, now they were assembled much earlier in order to render an attack possible. The new artillery tactics may be summed up in a few words. The artillery of advanced guards was considerably increased, and the greater proportion of the corps and divisional guns marched close to the head of the main columns. At the commencement of an engagement batteries were pushed to the front with great boldness, massed as much as possible, and concentrate their fire. Frequent change of position was deprecated, as guns must be kept within effective range, and their safety subordinated to the success of the other troops.
