PLAAF Korean War Combat Tactics
Significant information concerning CCAF tactics was provided by analysis of MIG~15 jet-fighter operations over Korea. The haven offered the Communists by the air sanctuary in Manchuria enabled MIG-15 units to operate from bases immune to attack; to select the time, place, and tactical conditions under whichthey engage United Nations' fighters; and to break contact from unfavorable combat conditions merely by fleeing across the Yalu.
By operating over Communist-controlled territory, the Migs operated close to their home bases. This advantage allowed the MiGs to remain in the combat area for longer periods while the F-86's patrol was limited because of the greater distance it must travel to reach the area. A Chinese tactic was to time their takeoff to put them over the combat area at the precise time that the F-86's had a minimum of fuel left to keep them over the area.
These advantages were exploited by the Communists and influenced their combat formations and tactics. During the course of the air war, the Communists frequently changed their formations and tactics in order to cope better with the USAF F-86 jet fighters. Since December 1950, when the F-86 was first used in combat against the MIG-15, the Communist pilots frequently varied their formation. Basically, they adhered to an offensive type of formation, with their flghts in trail, and with no lateral or mutual support deployment.
Formation sizes varied considerably from flights of four through various combinations up to 30 when a relatively large air effort was undertaken. They often stacked these large flights down from the lead formation, having as many as three groups of 20 to 30 MiGs flying in trail, with about 3,000 feet of separation horizontally, and about 1,000 feet of separation vertically. On some occasions, they flew into the battle area in line-abreast formations. It appeared that by 1953 they had adopted the basic two-airplane element.
The MIG-15 combat formations often showed a high degree of technique and precision. Generally the trend followed the line of gradual over-all improvement. Formation weaknesses were those of any fighter operations, and large formations were similar to those used by the USAF. One distinct difference wes that the spacing of the Mig elements and wingmen was closer than that of the USAF F-86 jet fighters. The MIG-15'S were seen to take off from the airfields north of the Yalu, form up in strings of formations, then come south from a point over the Sui Ho Reservoir, or from a point about half-way between there and Antung. These formations usually came in higher than the F-86 units flying in the area. On rare occasions when the Migs came in at the same level as the F-86's, their formation was often so loosely spread in the rear that the USAF pilots found it easy to turn in behind what appeared to be the tail end of a formation and wind up in front of another trailing element.
Since in no instance has it been possible to identify definitely the forces engaged by UN pilots as Chinese Communist, North Korean, Soviet, or other, it was not possible for the West to evaluate their combat efficiency by nationality. The Korean air war undoubtedly presented the Communists with an invaluable opportunity to gain actual combat experience. In general, the combat efiiciency of Communist pilots progressed from "fair" during the middle of 1951 and early 1952, to an over-all rating of "good" by 1953. Reports received from UN fighter and bomber units which engaged Communist aircraft over Korea indicated a steady general improvement in air tactics. Although the degree of individual pilot aggressiveness fluctuated periodically, the caliber of enemy pilots encountered in 1953 was considerably higher than that of one year earlier.
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