PLAAF Korean War Strength
Because of the demands of the Korean War, a large part of the CCAF's tactical strength, particularly jet-fighter strength, was allocated to the southern-Manchuria area. Western analysts at the time believed that probably some pattern of combat rotation among CCAF jet-fighter units in this area has been established during 1952. Using the boundary of the Yalu as a sanctuary line, fighter units based in the Antung-Tatungkou-Takushan complex, supported by additional aircraft staged through these fields from the Mukden complex, were able to mount regular and heavy flights of MiGs in the North Korean area to engage UN fighters and fighter-bombers. It was estimated that some 500 MiG-15's were in the Mukden-Antung area. The remainder of the CCAF was disposed primarily near Shanghai, with tertiary strength in the Peiping-Canton areas. In the meanwhile, by 1953 bases were being developed along the northwestern shores of the Yellow Sea near Tsingtao, and the Bay of Chihli near Tientsin and Yangtsun, screening Peiping; and in the interior of central China near Hankow.
In addition to the air units which had been established as indigenous CCAF units, there were certain units belonging to the North Korean Air Force and still other imits which could not be definitely associated with either the CCAF or the NKAF. All of these units, in combination with the indigenous CCAF, as far as the Communist Korean air operations were concerned, probably operated under a combined operational headquarters located in the Mukden-Antung complex.
It was estimated by Western analysts that by 1953 the indigenous Chinese Communist Air Force (exclusive of other Communist air units involved in Korean operations -- such asthe North Korean Air Force) had a strength of approximately 1,500 combat aircraft of all types. This total included approximately 900 jet fighters, predominantly first-line Soviet-built MIG-15 and some 1L-28 twin jet light bombers. Included in tactical units of the CCAF were some 150 IL-10 Stormovilk attack bombers for support of ground troops. This plane is well-armored to protect its vital parts and its two-man crew from ground fire at low levels. The 1L-10 propeller-driven airplane is relatively slow and would be unable to defend itself against modern jet fighters. With air protection, it would be effective against ground troops. The IL-10 carries two 23-mm. cannon and two 7.62-mm. machine guns in the leading edges of its wings, and a 12.7-mm. machine gun in the rear end of the cockpit. Beneath the wings and fuselage, it can carry several 132-mm. rockets and about 900 pounds of bombs. For short-range missions, ground-attack aircraft could increase their bomb load by reducing their fuel load. By 1953 the IL-10 ground-attack plane was obsolescent and needed to be replaced eventually.
Jet aircraft such as the MIG-15, or the IL-28 twin-jet light bomber, might be accepted for ground-attack missions as interim weapons pending the development and delivery of a new ground-attack aircraft from the USSR. In contrast to the rapid and consistent buildup of jet-fighter strength for defensive purposes, the buildup of light bombers and ground-attack strength proceeded at a much slower pace. In fact, the strength of the ground-attack (IL-10) forces, backbone of the Communist ground-support weapon, remained relatively static since 1951.
Augmenting the IL-10's in the ground-attack role were TU-2 light bombers. The TU-2 is a twin-engine, conventional, all-metal, shoulder-wing monoplane of World War II vintage. It proved itself time and again in the light-bomber role during the World War II, and was perhaps one of the Soviet's best bombers. These light bombers were available for operations in the Korean theater. Flying from bases in the Antung area, TU-2's were capable, within their maximum combat radius of 500 nautical miles, of reaching all of Korea. TU-2 armament consisted of two 20-mm. guns in the wing roots and three 12.7-mm. guns arranged in turrets. The TU-2 can carry 2,200 pounds of bombs. Because of the difficulties involved in providing this obsolescent aircraft with effective jet-fighter protection, TU-2 strikes into areas protected by jet fighters probably would not be very successful. For example, in the sole encounter with TU-2's over Korea, close cover was provided by LA-11 propfighters, while high cover was provided by MIG-15's. The subsequent interception by USAF F-86's resulted in heavy losses to the TU-2 force.
The CCAF also acquired by defection or capture from the Chinese Nationalists, a few United States B-24's and B-25's as well as a few Canadian Mosquitoes. But except for some training use, by 1953 these planes were no longer operational.
The Soviets supplied the CCAF with MIG-15's as well as some older MIG-9 jet fighters. In addition to jets, the CCAF has many piston types. These are believed to be LA-9's and LA-11's. They are post-War variants of a line of Lavochkin fighters, which are believed to be slightly inferior in performance to the F-51 Mustang and British Hawker Fury. Although these propeller-type fighters were not considered first-line combat planes, they were capable of effective operations in conjunction with ground troops, provided they were unopposed by aircraft such as jet fighters of greatly superiorperformance. In addition to the Lavochkin fighters, the CCAF reportedly acquired by defectionor capture, a number of P~51 Mustangs.
Some transport types were acquired through defection from the Chinese Nationalists. These include twin-engine, US-built C-46's and C-47's. In addition, a number of twin-engine Soviet-built IL-12's and LI-2's (C-47) had been supplied by the USSR. These transports were used by the CCAF and also for civil air transport.
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