1986 - Vinicio Cerezo
In 1986 Guatemala completed an orderly and open transition from a military regime to a democratically elected, civilian government. On January 14, the President, 100 deputies, and 330 mayors chosen in the 1985 general and presidential runoff elections took office, the first civilian government to assume power in Guatemala since 1966.
The new government, headed by President Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, inherited a deeply divided country which for more than 20 years had suffered a Marxist-led guerrilla insurgency as well as political violence carried out by rightist death squads and government security forces. This situation was complicated by ethnic differences separating the Ladino and indigenous populations. The 23 different Indian dialect groups, which make up 50 percent of Guatemala's population, have historically lived on the margins of national life.
Successfully organized by insurgents in the late 1970's, Indian participation in the insurgency gave the guerrillas the armed force and strategic position necessary to challenge the Guatemalan military. The resulting insurgency in the highlands was notable for its ferocity. Although both sides contributed to the carnage, reports of brutality and massacres committed by government security forces resulted in Guatemala being condemned and isolated by the international community.
Killings of civilian non-combatants with possible political implications declined for the fourth year in a row, dropping to 131 in 1986, the lowest figure in this decade; the l886 total compares with 280 such killings in 1985. Of these 131, 72 were attributable to guerrilla forces, 3 to right-wing groups, and 56 to unknown assailants. Although GAM and some foreign groups claim that government security services continue summarily to execute insurgents and insurgent sympathizers, there was scant evidence linking officials to such acts. In only a few of the 131 cases did a family member or associate attribute the death to government forces.
The decline in political killings can be attributed to the Cerezo Government's commitment to ending political violence, its reorganization of the security forces, and its stated determination to punish anyone using violence to undermine the democratic process. These actions signal the withdrawal of official protection and tolerance which previously allowed political violence to corrupt the political system.
There was a dramatic increase in 1986 in killings for other than political reasons. High levels of unemployment and insufficient numbers of trained police appear to be primarily responsible for the upsurge in criminal violence. During 1986, 1,832 people were murdered in Guatemala, compared to l, 539 the year before. Assaults with intent to kill jumped from 2,813 in 1985 to 5,088, and armed robberies rose from l, 727 to 2,570. Some observers point to this criminal violence as proof that political killings continue unimpeded. However, in few instances had a link been established between the killings and any political activity by the victims. President Cerezo told a foreign newspaper in September that outside observers have confused common crime with political violence.
The Guatemalan police report 203 persons were kidnaped in 1986. While most of the incidents appear to be criminally inspired, in 79 of the cases political motives cannot be ruled out. This total compares with 198 disappearances with a possible political motive recorded in 1985 and 425 in 1984. Historically, it had been difficult to assign responsibility for or motive to most disappearances and kidnappings. In Guatemala, personal vengeance or ransom can be as powerful a motive to kidnap as political differences, and abduction was a tactic used by individuals and groups for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, prior to 1986, kidnaping and subsequent killing of victims were methods frequently used by Security forces to capture, interrogate, and eliminate insurgents, their sympathizers, and others believed to pose a threat to the State. The distinctive modus operandi employed by the security forces and the ties of their more prominent victims to student, labor, or political groups, readily identified the Government as the probable author of such extrajudicial activities.
The four Marxist guerrilla organizations which had been waging the insurgency rejected the opportunity to participate in the elections and have continued their armed struggle against the civilian Government. Although armed encounters declined by approximately 50 percent from the 1985 level, 81 guerrillas, 50 Guatemalan soldiers, and 19 civilians were reported killed in combat. Guerrilla forces also executed five military commissioners, civilian representatives of the Army in rural areas, and continued their campaign against members of the civil defense patrols, killing 10 in combat and executing 6 others. Their program of physical intimidation extended to other sectors of Guatemalan society. In March 1986, guerrillas killed the auxiliary mayor of Santa Barbara, Suchitepequez. In El Peten, the mayor of La Libertad fled after receiving death threats from the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). The FAR shot to death several farm administrators and farmworkers in Escuintla, and booby traps left by the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) killed two farm workers in Suchitepequez. FAR gunmen shot and killed a Salvadoran businessman in the Peten area as he attempted to land his airplane on a FAR-controlled airstrip in the course of a holiday trip.
The Cerezo Government also inherited an economy struggling to recover from the ravages of a severe recession. Primarily an agricultural country, Guatemala was characterized by a badly skewed distribution of land and capital. The social tensions generated by such economic inequalities have been exacerbated by inflation and lack of employment. Although the Government embarked on a small public works program in 1986, its ability to respond adequately to social needs was curbed by limited resources.
Upon coming to power, the new Government announced that ending political violence and establishing the rule of law would be its top priorities. To that end, President Cerezo undertook a reorganization of the security forces and disbanded the Department of Technical Investigations, the plainclothes arm of the national police widely acknowledged to have engaged in extortion, robbery, and political kidnappings and assassinations. A new Supreme Court also embarked on a series of reforms designed to end corruption and improve the efficiency of the legal system. New laws were designed to give citizens legal recourse when they believe their rights threatened by the authorities. The Congress, in accordance with the Constitution, established a Human Rights Committee. It approved legislation covering the duties of a human rights ombudsman.
In 1986 political killings and kidnappings dropped to the lowest level in this decade. Human rights groups blamed the security forces for the abuses that remain, but they have not produced evidence linking the new Government to these crimes. In 1986 the United Nations rescinded the mandate of its Special Rapporteur for Guatemala, noting the return to civilian government and the Government's commitment to end political violence.
The decline in political violence had helped focus attention on the issue of accounting for past human rights abuses. Amnesty, available to insurgents since 1982, was expanded by decree by the outgoing military government to include anyone guilty of common crimes committed with political motivation. This applies to members of the security forces guilty of kidnaping and assassination. The Mutual Support Group (GAM), an organization of relatives of disappeared persons, called on the Government to rescind the decree and set up a special presidential commission to investigate past abuses. President Cerezo told GAM members that only the judiciary was constitutionally competent to conduct such an investigation. He had urged GAM to bring charges in the courts against alleged violators of human rights, something which GAM so far had refused to do. This impasse had bred ill will between the Government and GAM and had contributed to the politicization of human rights issues in Guatemala.
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