1950 - Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán
Francisco Javier Arana and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the two military participants in the junta that had held elections after the overthrow of Ubico, were the leading candidates for the presidential election of 1950. Under Arévalo, Arana served as army chief of staff and Arbenz as minister of national defense; Arana was favored by the right, Arbenz by the left. When Arana was assassinated, suspicion attached to close supporters of Arbenz, but hard evidence was lacking, and no one was ever charged with the crime.
The right wing finally selected Brigadier General (retired) Ydígoras Fuentes. a Ubico-era military officer and administrator, as its candidate, while moderate progressives supported Jorge García Granados. scion of one of Guatemala's old families, the distinguished drafter of the 1945 constitution, and a participant in the founding of the UN.
Arbenz supporters included organized labor, peasants. students, and intellectuals, as well as the communists and other left-wing parties. The first Communist Party of Guatemala (Partido Comunista de Guatemala - PCG ) was established in 1923; in 1924 this group joined the Communist International. This small group was generally ineffective throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1947 various Marxist groups formed an organization called the Democratic Vanguard (Vanguardia Demo crática ), but in 1949 the members changed the name to PCG: In 1951 the PCG merged with the Revolutionary Workers' Party of Guatemala. In 1952 the PCG, which had secured legal status the previous year, changed its name to Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo — PGT). In 1983 the party, illegal since 1954, retained that name.
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán won the 1950 election easily, securing 65 percent of the popular vote. In his inaugural speech he stated his objectives as those of transforming Guatemala from a dependent nation having a semi-colonial economy to an economically independent country, replacing feudal arrangements with modern capitalism and raising general living standards. Clearly these objectives would not be easy to achieve, nor were they necessarily compatible with each other. The “ transformation of the feudal system and the ending of economic dependency ” implied a confrontation with the interlocking American corporations in the country - the United Fruit Company, the IRCA, and the Electric Company of Guatemala (Empresa Eléctria de Guatemala — EEG ), the power generating company that was a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company, an American corporation.
In an effort to maintain the popular support with which he took office so that he could put through his program. Arbenz pursued a strategy of mass mobilization. He encouraged not only the participation of Indian peasants in an agrarian reform program but also the militancy of student and labor activists. who had been decisive in putting down the right-wing revolt against Arévalo after Arana's assassination.
Arbenz at first attempted to deal with the dominant foreign corporations by building competitive installations and thus challenging their monopoly position. A government-run hydroelectric plant would, it was hoped, force EEG to be competitive in the rates it charged ; a highway from the capital to the Caribbean. parallel to IRCA's railroad lines. was designed to force the railroad company to lower its rates; and a new port on the Caribbean was proposed to compete with Puerto Barrios, which was largely owned by the United Fruit Company. Arbenz also began suits against the foreign corporations, alleging non-payment of back taxes and wages. In addition to their economic rationale, these policies appealed to Guatemalan national pride.
The major policy innovation of the Arbenz government, and that which constituted its principal claim to be considered a revolutionary government, was its land reform. As approved by the legislature on 17 June 1952, however, the Law of Agrarian Reform was more progressive than revolutionary and was certainly not a communist measure. The lands subject to redistribution were those publicly owned; those not farmed by the owner (that is. lands that were idle or were rented out) ; and /or property in excess of 90 hectares. Exceptions were provided for estates that were farmed in a modern and rational way. Some beneficiaries of the law would receive lands only on a lifetime lease ownership remaining with the state — and would pay 3 percent annually of the value of the crop by way of rental. Others who received lands in outright ownership would pay 5 percent; they would come into ownership of the land after 25 years and be able to sell or mortgage it after that point, but not before. Former owners of the land would be compensated in bonds maturing at various times up to 25 years and paying 3-percent annual interest.
The most controversial aspect of the legislation was the proviso that the property valuation on which compensation would be paid would be the value declared for tax purposes, normally a small fraction of the actual market value of the land. This was one of the points that occasioned great protest by owners. Another was the provision that the land of those who opposed the law by violent or subversive means could be expropriated without compensation, a provision ostensibly designed to discourage armed resistance. The law ruled out landowners ' appeals to the courts, however, and this was considered by some observers to be a violation of constitutional rights. Proponents of the law. pointing to Mexican experience. argued that otherwise large landholders would be able to defeat the purpose of the law by interminable litigation, which in effect would ensure that no lands would ever be distributed. Arbenz removed four judges of the Supreme Court after they suspended application of the law because of their doubts about its legal propriety.
Another feature of the law resented by landlords was the provision that the initial recommendations for expropriations of land be made by local-level committees of five members, two named by the government and three by the local peasant union. These committees would clearly be biased in favor of peasants and against landlords although their recommendations would be subject to confirmation or rejection by officials of the newly established Department of Agrarian Affairs.
In addition to redistributing land, the government set up a national agrarian bank, which joined existing government banks in making loans to small farmers. From March 1953 to the overthrow of the Arbenz government at the end of June 1954, the bank loaned out the equivalent of over US$ 11.9 million to small producers. Although exact figures are difficult to come by, partly because the succeeding government destroyed many of the records, it appears that a total of about 884,000 hectares became available for distribution and that about 100,000 peasant families were beneficiaries. Of the total of US$ 10 million in bonds authorized to pay for the expropriation, by June 1954 the bank had issued US$7.9 million.
The United Fruit Company was especially affected by the land reform. particularly because it only farmed about 15 percent of its holdings. leaving the rest as a reserve against the decline of fertility of the soil or the onset of banana diseases. Of the 220,000 hectares owned by United Fruit, about 160,000 hectares were expropriated; the land had a tax value of US $610,000, but the company asserted in claims against the government that the true value of the land was US$ 15.9 million. The government fixed the expropriation compensation at US$ 1.2 million.
Arbenz also made political decisions that were labeled by some observers as being pro-communist. In 1951 the government granted legal status to the communist party, and in the next election four party members were elected to the legislature. Party members remained few in number, but they were energetic and effective in organizing labor, students, and peasants. Moreover, their rhetoric was stridently anti-capitalist and anti-United States.
During 1953 and 1954 the American press carried numerous articles that depicted Guatemala as a state either already under communist control or approaching that situation. Various articles and books published shortly after the collapse of the Arbenz government presented basically the same picture. Assertions were made, for example, that the communists had organized cells at every level of government and that in 1953 and 1954 over 30 plantations were seized by armed laborers.
Academic research in the intervening three decades had demonstrated that the reports of the 1950s reflected the cold war, not the situation in Guatemala. Peasants and armed laborers armed with hoes, machetes, and other primitive weapons did attempt to seize land, but they not only were unsuccessful but also were frequently repulsed and driven off by forces of the Arbenz government. The communists did establish a following of sorts among the previously unorganized and powerless laborers and no doubt created communist cells in various parts of the government, especially among teachers. But the small number of communist agitators did not need to teach or inculcate feelings of resentment against the United Fruit Company or the United States ; those feelings were already present as a function of the society's history and recent experience.
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