1983 - Óscar Mejía Víctores
Although elements of the presidential guard engaged in a spirited though brief defense, the coup that overthrew Rios Montt on 08 August 1983 went smoothly. According to various observers. the chief of the national defense general staff, Brigadier General Héctor Mario López Fuentes, orchestrated the attack and the presence later in the day of the military commanders who signed the proclamation that deposed Ríos Montt and installed Mejía Victores. A few days after the coup Mejía stated in a television interview that “ about a month ago” Ríos Montt had met with all the military commanders” and had promised that “ when all the commanders met in general assembly and asked him to resign he would comply.” Mejía then observed that “ that took place on Monday, August 8. ” He added that Ríos Montt had been placed on inactive reserve (disponible) and was residing in his home in the section of the city reserved for the military officers corps. Mejía stressed that his predecessor remained a free man and could leave the country if and when he pleased.
At the time of the coup the 52-year-old Mejía had been in the service for 35 years, having entered as a cadet at the military academy, the Escuela Politécnia (Polytechnical School) in 1948. Shortly after promotion to brigadier general in 1980, he was designated inspector general of the army and soon thereafter the vice minister of national defense; Ríos Montt named him defense minister in July 1982. Although inexperienced in international and regional affairs, Mejía possessed considerable command experience and acted quickly and decisively on several issues. He announced on August 9 that the state of alarm had been lifted and on August 14 that the special courts — the objects of fear by the citizenry and of condemnation by international human rights organizations— would cease operations by September 1. To the sharp disappointment of the business and commercial chambers of commerce. however, he did not rescind the VAT, but he did state that his government would consider the possibility” of amendments to the tax reform package. He indicated that he could perceive no need for land reform.
In his early speeches and press interviews, therefore, Mejía revealed a political attitude that harked back to earlier military regimes. His devout Catholicism and fervent anticommunism were constant themes, albeit in nonspecific terms. In his first speech to the nation as chief of state. he reiterated the army's “ responsibility for the return to institutional life” and asserted that “ to fulfill this task” the army would adhere to specific guidelines, the first of which was “ to fight the Marxist-Leninist subversion and the paramilitary groups that may exist.” Nevertheless, on August 11 he proclaimed a 90 -day amnesty to go into effect August 19 under which those who surrendered, turned in their weapons, provided information. and took an oath to engage in no further anti-government activities would not be punished. Although the Roman Catholic Church had made known its objections to the compulsory participation of the Indians in civil self-defense operations, Mejía stated that his government would “ strengthen the people's organizations through civil defense.” He added, however, that the government would “ eliminate all possibilities of religious or political manipulation directed against the beliefs and feelings of the majority and against our customs and culture. " a stipulation that was expected to blunt the criticisms of the Catholic hierarchy.
On August 19 Mejía indicated that when the constituent assembly convened, he would propose that all active-duty military officers be banned as presidential candidates and that former defense ministers would be ineligible until they had been out of office for three years. If the constituent assembly were to adopt the proposal and if presidential elections were held in early 1985, Mejía would be excluded from participation, as would Ríos Montt, who served as defense minister from March to July 1982. Such active-duty officers as General López Fuentes, however, would become eligible on retirement. Herbruger, the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, confirmed that Mejía had discussed the suggestion in a meeting with members of the tribunal and added that Mejía and the tribunal members had discussed the possibility of advancing the date of the assembly elections. Herbruger stated that the aim was to hold the elections as soon as possible but that the mechanics of preparing a registry of eligible voters were so difficult that elections before July 1. 1984, might not be possible.
In the days and weeks after the coup, domestic and foreign observers sought to determine what might be expected from Mejía in foreign policy matters. On some issues he proved to be less than diplomatic. In an interview with a Spanish television company for transmission to Spain, Mejía was asked to comment on the Guatemalan police attack on the Spanish embassy in January 1980, during which most of the people in the building were burned to death and as a result of which Spain broke diplomatic relations. Mejía responded that he believed that diplomatic relations should be restored, but he then asserted that the Spanish ambassador had " collaborated” with the peasants who had seized the building and were holding the ambassador and his staff as hostages. The Spanish government sharply rejected Mejía's allegations, and it seemed unlikely that diplomatic relations would soon be resumed.
On August 7 Mejía had traveled to Honduras to meet with General Eugenio Vides Casanova, the commander of El Salvador's armed forces; General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, the commander of the Honduran armed forces; and Brigadier General Frederick Woerner, a brigade commander in the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). based in Panama. Mejía also visited the U.S.S. Ranger, the flagship of a task force then in the Pacific waters off Central America. The coincidence of Mejía's activities on the eve of the coup gave rise to allegations in Guatemala City that the United States had been involved at least peripherally in the overthrow of Ríos Montt. Despite categorical denials by the United States government, the allegations were widely believed in Guatemala.
Mejía nonetheless made it abundantly clear that he strongly supported President Ronald Reagan's policies in Central America. In a press conference on August 10, Mejía described the Nicaraguan Sandinistas as a threat “ not only to Guatemala and Central America but to the entire continent.” He suggested that the efforts of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Panama, Venezuela. and Colombia) to resolve regional problems were well-intended, but he declared that they could play no real role in Central America. In his meeting with the diplomatic corps a week later, he voiced Guatemala's “ appreciation of the so-called Contadora Group ” and its efforts to resolve regional problems, but he added that he “ would like to stress. as a Guatemalan and a Central American. that the Central Americans alone should make the decisions that will enable us to achieve our objectives.” These statements elicited negative reactions in Mexico City, Caracas, and Bogotá; and the president of Costa Rica, whose government endorsed the Contadora efforts, bluntly declared that his government did “ not like coups d'etat or the military in government.
In the weeks immediately following the coup, Mejía and his associates were forced to focus from time to time on foreign affairs, but their primary concern was to solidify their internal position. and they were reminded almost at once that they could rely on neither the armed forces nor the private sector for unqualified support. Both foreign and Guatemalan observers continued to report that Mejía and his key associate. General López Fuentes. had seized control to forestall a coup against Mejía as defense minister that was being organized by officers with links to the MLN. The MLN made it clear that it would “monitor” Mejía's government, meaning that the MLN would seek to force Mejía to hew to far-right domestic and foreign policies. The commercial interests continued to agitate for repeal of the VAT, and the landowners allowed no one to forget their opposition to land reform. no matter how mild. And within days of the coup an organization that dubbed itself " the young officers group " began to interrupt and over ride" commercial radio broadcasts to proclaim opposition to the new military government and to call for socioeconomic reforms.
By August 24 Mejía reportedly had completed the changes he intended to make in the cabinet he had inherited from Ríos Montt. The more significant changes were in the ministries of foreign relations, government (or interior). and agriculture. Fernando Andrade Díaz Durán. who had served as foreign adviser to three earlier military presidents — including Brigadier General Fernando Romeo Lucas Gar cía, who was deposed in the March 1982 coup - became foreign minister; Colonel Carlos Armando Moreira-López, who had served as the defense attaché in Washington in the late 1970s, took over as deputy foreign minister. Adolfo González Rodas replaced Ricardo Méndez Ruiz as minister of government, and Ivan Najera Farfán replaced Leopoldo Sandoval Villeda, who had recently proposed a program of land reform, as minister of agriculture. Eugenia Isabel Tejada de Putzeys assumed charge of the Ministry of Education, thus becoming the first woman to serve at the cabinet level.
On August 29 the government announced that Jorge Antonio Serrano Elías would be replaced as president of the Council of State by Ricardo Asturias Valenzuela. One month later, however, Mejía prorogued the council, stating that it had “ fulfilled its delicate mission ”. At least some Guatemalan observers categorized Mejía's publicly unanticipated action as a victory for the far right-wing parties, which had opposed the council's existence and role.
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