T-AKR Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) Multi-Mission Ships (MMS)
The Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Report for fiscal year 1976 indicated that the program for acquiring two multimission ships had been deferred. Deferral of the program, however, rather than deleting it, meant the program would be reconsidered at some future date.
MSC planned in 1973-1975 to upgrade its sealift transportation capability by acquiring two dry-cargo ships of a specialized type known as roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ships. Such ships are broadly classified as multimission ships (MMSs). RORO ships are capable of carrying outsized cargo, such as helicopters, tanks, trucks, and other cargo of unusual weight or dimensions. The vehicles are usually driven under their own power directly onto the ships. Essentially the ships would be of a commercial design slightly modified to meet specific military requirements. Such ships, if acquired under a build- and-charter program would become a part of MSC's dry-cargo nucleus fleet.
The need for acquiring two MMSs for the MSC-controlled fleet was first identified in a DOD-sponsored interagency study of DOD's sealift procurement policies. The study group considered the economic desirability, based on improving the efficiency of peacetime cargo movement operations, of replacing Government owned or chartered ships through the acquisition of new ships for the MSC-controlled fleet. The group's conclusion was that MSC could operate two MMSs efficiently in the controlled fleet without preempting DOD cargo that would normally be moved by commercial ships. The ships recommended for acquisition, however, were not RORO ships but were a distinctly different type of MMS -- the barge carrier.
In August 1972 the study group released the results of its study -- the Sealift Procurement and National Security study. On September 20, 1972, the Deputy Secretary of Defense endorsed the recommendation to acquire two MMSs for MSC and directed that appropriate action be taken. Accordingly, on October 26, 1972, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) authorized the Commander, MSC, to acquire one seabarge ship and one lighter aboard ship (LASH). Both LASH- and seabarge-type ships are designed to carry floating cargo containers that also serve as lighters. They can be taken off the ship and floated to the dock for unloading; loaded lighters can be floated to the ship and taken aboard. The advantage of these ships is that turnaround time is improved at ports where dock facilities are inadequate.
In 1973 MSC attempted to acquire the recommended barge carrying ships under a build- and-charter programr but no offers for construction were received. The chief reasons cited for the lack of shipbuilder interest included a growing shortage of shipyard capacity for ships of this size. The proposed single-ship buys could not compete with the multiple-ship buys characteristic of Maritime Administration (MARAD)-sponsored programs. The shipyards which had not constructed either LASH or seabarge-type ships were reluctant to gear their shipyards for these relatively complex ships for a single purchase.
The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Defense concluded that the best way to obtain ships under these circumstances was to add to production lines planned or already in existence. They decided that the most useful type of ship for contingency sealift purposes, other than seabarge and LASH, would be a RORO ship. At that time two shipyards either were planning to construct or were actively constructing such ships. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy asked the. Commander, MSC, to determine the suitability of RORO ships as a substitute for the seabarge and LASH ships.
Since late in 1973 MSC has been developing plans to acquire two RORO ships as alternatives to the LASH and seabarge ships. The ships would be acquired under a build- and-charter program. Under this method, the construction of the ships would be privately financed and the ships would be chartered to MSC for 30 years, or essentially for their total estimated economic life. The amortization of the construction costs would be included in MSC Is annual charter payments. Acquiring the ships under the build- and-charter method would require congressional approval. Legislation was introduced in the Congress to authorize this procurement method. MSC would operate the two RORO ships over a designated route between the east coast of the United States and the Far East. MSC contended that this particular route was selected to avoid any preemption of cargo from commercial operators.
The Military Sealift Command's need for the two roll/on roll/ off ships was founded on two basic premises: (1) peacetime operation of the ships would not preempt cargo normally carried by commercial shippers and (2) the ships are needed to meet contingency sealift requirements. Once the RORO ships were obtained, MSC planned to retire five old, break-bulk ships of approximately equal tonnage from the controlled fleet.
MARAD officials believed that the RORO ships would preempt cargo and would have a negative impact on commercial shippers. These officials implied that the impact would be long term since once acquired, prudent management would dictate that the ships be used to their fullest extent. The then Chairperson of the Federal Maritime Commission was also opposed to MSC's acquisition of the two RORO ships. Although no specific analysis was provided, the Chairperson stated that a surplus of US-flag, dry-cargo ships was, expected and would be available to MSC for charter.
To meet cargo sealift requirements involving nonmobilization contingencies, MSC has two sources of shipping capability in addition to its dry-cargo controlled fleet. The first are privately owned vessels pledged under the Sealift Readiness Program. Under this program, commercial shipping firms that bid on DOD cargo commit themselves to making available 50 percent of the ships in their fleet for DOD cargo movement in the event of a contingency. As of 1973 there were 117 privately owned ships committed to MSC under the program, Half of these ships would be made available within 30 days and all 117 would be available within 60 days.
The second source of shipping capability available to MSC is the 130 ships in the NDRF, being held in a mothballed state for emergency and contingency purposes. This fleet is under the control of MARAD, and consists largely of World War II-type ships. The Secretary of Defense stated that a revitalized NDRF would greatly aid the Sealift Readiness Program since it would limit reliance on the commercial fleet to the few weeks it would take to place NDRF ships in service. Congressional interest in a revitalized NDRF was evidenced by the passage of Public Law 93-605 in which newer dry-cargo ships would be taken into NDRF and preserved in exchange for an equivalent scrap tonnage of older ships.
The sealift procurement study, which originated the requirement for MMSs, was concerned in part with the economics of modernizing the controlled fleet. An integral part of any economic analysis is the cost of constructing the two RORO ships. The construction cost of these ships, however, has not been sufficiently defined to permit such an analysis. The official MSC cost estimate for constructing the two ROR0 ships, as published in a formal 1974 study, established a per ship cost of $44.4 million, or a total cost of almost $89 million. Two different MSC divisions, however, estimated the construction costs will be higher. One division believed that the cost of the two ships will be approximately $98 million; the other set the cost at about $119.2 million.
There were several alternatives to acquiring RORO ships. DOD could purchase enough flat racks [modular, open-sided container for vehicles] so that container ships could be more efficiently used in moving wheeled vehicles and outsized cargo. In considering the question of trade-offs between MMSs and flat racks, the sealift procurement study concluded that, although the procurement costs for 15,000 flat racks, or 2 sets, would be about $50 million, without the racks 6 additional RORO ships or barge-carrying ships would be required to move the tonnage specified in the scenario the study group was considering. More than one set of racks would be needed to maintain ship turnaround time. Two major DOD studies recommended that DOD acquire flat racks to facilitate container-ship movement of wheeled vehicles and outsized cargo.
DOD could purchase three C-4 break-bulk ships under charter to MSC from U.S. Lines, These are the newest break-bulk ships in the American-flag fleet and would approximate the lift capability of two RORO ships. DOD spokesmen have continuously stressed the need for a break-bulk capability in contingencies and mobilizations. These ships are not well suited to present liner trades. Should any of them be returned to U.S. Lines, the company might charter the ships for long terms to other interests with the probability of their being committed under the Sealift Readiness Program less likely.
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