Frigate - Small Surface Combatant
The US Navy has realized that the LCS, seeming like little more than large yachts with their modest weapons, are unlikely to frighten even the pirates (let alone the PLAN ...). Small surface combatants enable the Navy to implement the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) imperative to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives. This type of ship provides Combatant and Fleet Commanders a uniquely suitable asset for Theater Security Cooperation tasking and select sea control missions. These small surface combatants build and strengthen maritime relationships by operating with partners and allies in various theaters of operation.
According to frigate program officials, by the end of 2016 the acquisition approach called for the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for 12 additional LCS—not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals from both LCS contractors in late 2017 that would upgrade the block buy option of LCS to frigates using frigate-specific design changes and modifications. The Navy will evaluate the frigate upgrade packages and then exercise the option—now for frigates—on the contract that provides the best value based on tradeoffs between price and technical factors. This downselect to one shipyard was planned to occur in summer 2018. The Navy planned to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS contract to convert the ships in the block buy options to frigates.
As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy in February 2014 to explore alternatives to the LCS to address key deficiencies. In response, the Navy created the Small Surface Combatant Task Force and directed it to consider new and existing frigate design options, including different types of modified LCS designs. By 2016, the task force concluded that the Navy’s desired capability requirements could not be met without major modifications to an LCS design or utilizing other non-LCS designs.
When presented with this conclusion, senior Navy leadership directed the task force to explore what capabilities might be more feasible on a minor modified LCS. This direction led the task force to develop options with diminished capabilities, such as reduced speed or range, resulting in some capabilities becoming equal to or below expected capabilities of the current LCS. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate concept based on a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable — and more expensive — small surface combatant options. Navy leadership indicated this decision was based on LCS’s relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS and maintain stability in the industrial base and vendor supply chain.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation noted that the Navy’s proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS and does not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be less survivable than the Navy’s previous frigate class. The proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates to two mission packages at once, the capabilities in each mission area will be the same as LCS.
Barring Navy-directed changes to key mechanical systems, the frigate will carry some of the more failureprone LCS equipment, such as some propulsion equipment, and will likely carry some of the non-fleet-standard, LCS-unique equipment that has challenged the Navy’s support and logistics chain.
Background
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert assured members of the Senate Armed Services (SASC) Committee 27 March 2014 on the survivability of the littoral combat ship (LCS). Alongside Secretary Ray Mabus the two defended the need for 52 small surface combatants in front of the SASC and in front of media following their testimony. The secretary emphasized how LCS costs have been driven down and Greenert responded to questions on LCS survivability.
"Survivability is a broader term than we're giving it credit for," said Greenert. "There are three elements to survivability." The three elements of survivability are: susceptibility, the ability for a ship to defend itself; vulnerability, the effects of an initial casualty on a ship; and lastly recoverability, the ability for a ship to conduct damage control, said the admiral.
Responding to U.S. Sen. Carl Levin and media, Greenert explained that LCS meets or exceeds the same standards of those elements of survivability and recoverability. He said the attributes of survivability in the LCS is comparable to frigates and better than the ships it is designed to replace such as mine countermeasures (MCM) and patrol craft (PC).
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a 24 February 2014 briefing: "I am concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward. With this decision, the LCS line will continue beyond our five-year budget plan with no interruptions.
"The LCS was designed to perform certain missions -- such as mine sweeping and anti-submarine warfare -- in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely examine whether the LCS has the independent protection and firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary and emerging new technologies, especially in the Asia Pacific. If we were to build out the LCS program to 52 ships, as previously planned, it would represent one- sixth of our future 300-ship Navy. Given continued fiscal restraints, we must direct shipbuilding resources toward platforms that can operate in every region and along the full spectrum of conflict.
"Additionally, at my direction, the Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. I've directed the Navy to consider a completely new design, existing ship designs, and a modified LCS. These proposals are due to me later this year in time to inform next year's budget submission."
On 11 December 2014, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that he had accepted the Navy's recommendation to build a new small surface combatant (SSC) ship based on upgraded variants of the LCS. The new SSC aims to offer improvements in ship lethality and survivability, delivering enhanced naval combat performance at an affordable price. Hagel directed the Navy to assume a total buy of 52 LSCs and SSCs, with the final number and mix dependent on future fleet requirements, final procurement costs, and overall Navy resources.
As directed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Navy explored options for Small Surface Combatant [SSC] design, including a completely new design, existing ship designs (including the LCS) and a modified LCS. The Chief of Naval Operations directed a Small Surface Combatant Task Force to report on these options by July 31, 2014. The report had not been released as of November 2014.
“The Secretary is very close to a decision,” Adm. Jonathan Greenert said in an interview with Reuters on 16 November 2014. “It was our endeavor to provide an option which would provide a more lethal ship, one that is more survivable, with capabilities that can be back fit, and as much as feasible, not interrupt production.”
USNI News reported 17 Novemer 2014 that "the primary difference between the current crop of LCS and the SSC will be the inclusion of a 3D air defense radar, some type of offensive anti-air missile and perhaps an over-the-horizon anti-surface missile."
For FY2019, (two ships procured) and beyond, the procurement would be based on the results of the study. The last three FFG-7 Class ships would be decommissioned in FY2015. With a 25—year service life, the first LCSs would begin retiring in FY2033. Consequently, a follow-on SSC needs to be procured in FY2030, in the middle of the mid-term planning period.
The defense budget proposal for 2015 cut the littoral combat ship (LCS) procurement from a planned 55 to 32 ships. The FY2015 budget request includes money to look at options for a future small surface combatant. Whether it's a frigate or an up-gunned LCS remains to be seen, but the Navy would re-look at would be done with additional ships beyond the 32 LCS that would be built.
Defense Secretary Chucke Hagel said in a 24 February 2014 briefing: "I am concerned that the Navy is relying too heavily on the LCS to achieve its long-term goals for ship numbers. Therefore, no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships would go forward. With this decision, the LCS line will continue beyond our five-year budget plan with no interruptions.
"The LCS was designed to perform certain missions -- such as mine sweeping and anti-submarine warfare -- in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely examine whether the LCS has the independent protection and firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary and emerging new technologies, especially in the Asia Pacific. If we were to build out the LCS program to 52 ships, as previously planned, it would represent one- sixth of our future 300-ship Navy. Given continued fiscal restraints, we must direct shipbuilding resources toward platforms that can operate in every region and along the full spectrum of conflict.
"Additionally, at my direction, the Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate. I've directed the Navy to consider a completely new design, existing ship designs, and a modified LCS. These proposals are due to me later this year in time to inform next year's budget submission."
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert answered question of members of the Senate Armed Services (SASC) Committee 27 March 2014. In responding to questions about the need for a small surface combatant, Greenert described that the next ship after LCS could look quite different although maybe the same LCS hull. Greenert compared it to the evolution of Hornets and destroyers. He pointed out that the Navy is coming up on a fourth flight Arleigh Burke destroyer which the Navy is very, very, satisfied with.
Ship characteristics are generally determined based on historical precedent. Characteristics such as max sustained speed, signatures, acceleration, and maneuvering are picked based on what was done previously, unless that characteristic was proven bad or needed improvement. However, such decisions can have far reaching impacts to the platform size, lifetime logistics, manning, and cost.
Large naval surface combatants are potentially held at risk by adversarial anti-access aerial denial (A2AD) weapon systems. To mitigate that risk a distributed surface force concept relies on a cost-effective small surface combatant (SSC) capable of augmenting current forces in the 2025 2030 timeframe. Dispersing offensive and defensive power onto numerous smaller platforms has several advantages, including a more resilient force structure, greater number of ships, and fiscal cost savings.
A single mission SSC adapted to anti-surface warfare (ASUW) employed in an armada composed of existing naval forces, which provide a protective shield against a multi-threat enemy force. The Armada is nominally composed of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships and SSCs. The SSC'As capabilities include eight anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 90 nautical miles, speed greater than 25 knots, and organic detection and classification range of at least 60 nautical miles.
On 09 April 2014 the Navy issued a Request for Information (RFI N00024-14-R-2306) for Market Information Pertinent to the Navy's Future Small Surface Combatant. The Navy was interested in market information pertinent to a future small surface combatant (including modified Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)). In particular, whole ship design information, including cost, on mature ship designs and mature concept designs that have the capability and lethality generally consistent with a small surface combatant was desired.
The Navy was interested in the perspective of experienced shipbuilders, ship design agents and large system integrators on how their ship design supports the roles and missions of a small surface combatant, and cost information, especially the cost drivers, associated with the level of capability inherent in their designs (i.e., how capability drives cost).
The Navy was particularly interested in how the ship design fits within the operational concept for a small surface combatant, and to what extent the ship’s capabilities are dependent on operations within a supporting/supported force structure as phases of operations proceed from peacetime presence to full scale conflict.
The Navy was interested in estimated cost and schedule information for designing, building, testing and delivering the first ship and a notional class of 20 small surface combatants. The Navy was interested in all pertinent data and assumptions related to the provided estimates, to the lowest level available.
The Navy was also interested in follow ship and average ship estimates assuming a notional 20 ship small surface combatant requirement. The Navy was interested in the shipbuilder’s assessment of the most affordable procurement profile to achieve efficient shipyard loading. The Navy was interested in yard capacity and loading analysis (manning and throughput), and economic order quantities. The Navy was interested in the shipbuilder’s assessment and technical risk of the impact of the integration and test of the combat system suite.
The Navy was also interested in any innovative acquisition and shipbuilding approaches to include strategies that utilize build-to-print of existing mature designs, maximize the capabilities of the shipbuilding industrial base, cost effectively deliver small surface combatant capabilities and requirements, and provide for and maintain a competitive environment.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed 11 December 2014 the Navy "to move forward with a multi-mission small surface combatant based on modified Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) hull designs." Consistent with the Fleet's views on the most valued capabilities delivered by a small surface combatant, the modified LCS ship would be more lethal and survivable.
It would provide multi-mission anti-surface warfare (SUW) and anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ASW), as well as continuous and effective air, surface and underwater self-defense. Adding to current LCS Flight 0+ baseline configurations, which include the 57mm gun and SeaRAM missile system, this ship would be equipped with over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missiles, air defense upgrades (sensors and weapons), an advanced electronic warfare system; advanced decoys; a towed array system for submarine detection and torpedo defense, two 25mm guns, an armed helicopter capable of engaging with either Hellfire missiles or MK-54 torpedoes, and an unmanned FireScout helicopter for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.
Modularity design features would also be retained to augment SUW and ASW capabilities as directed by the Fleet Commanders. Available mission modules include Longbow Surface to-Surface Missiles (Hellfire), two MK46 30mm guns, and two 11M RHIBs for Surface Warfare, or a variable depth sonar for submarine warfare which, when added to the ship's organic multi-function towed array and embarked helicopter, make this an effective anti-submarine warfare platform.
In addition to the improved weapon systems capabilities for this ship, which reduce its susceptibility to being hit by a threat weapon, the small surface combatant would also include improved passive measures - measures that would reduce the ship's signature against mine threats, and measures that would harden certain vital spaces and systems against potential damage caused by weapon impact - to further enhance its overall survivability.
Statement by Secretary Hagel 11 December 2014 : "The LCS was designed to be a modular and focused-mission platform individually tailored for mine-sweeping, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. Given today's fiscal climate and an increasingly volatile security environment, I concluded the Navy must direct its future shipbuilding resources toward more multi-mission platforms that can operate in every region and across the full spectrum of conflict.
"My decision today follows consultations with DoD's senior leadership and careful review of the Navy's recommendation and underlying analysis, which included detailed evaluation of 192 design concepts as well as consultation with fleet commanders, industry, surface warfare officers, engineers, program managers, and analysts.
"The more lethal and survivable SSC will meet a broader set of missions across the range of military operations, and addresses the Navy's top war-fighting priorities. It will feature an improved air defense radar; air defense decoys; a new, more effective electronic warfare system; an over-the-horizon anti-ship missile; multi-function towed array sonar; torpedo defenses; and additional armor protection.
"I have directed the Navy to assume a total buy of 52 LSCs and SSCs, with the final number and mix dependent on future fleet requirements, final procurement costs, and overall Navy resources. Production of the new SSC will begin no later than fiscal year 2019, and there will be no gap between production of the last LCS and the first SSC. A significant advantage to this approach is the ability to enhance naval combat performance by back-fitting select SSC improvements to the LCS fleet."
By April 2017 a Requirement Evaluation Team [RET] was examining adding a local air defense capability to the frigates to protect Combat Logistics Force ships. The enhanced anti-air capabilities would change the Navy designation from FF, meaning frigate, to FFG — guided missile frigate. The baseline frigate design was armed with anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles, but only to protect itself. The goal was at a minimum to double the load out of Block 2 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles from eight to 16, or incorporate a Mark 41 vertical launch system with at least eight Standard Missile-2s. The RET was considering a variant of the new Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, developed by Raytheon for the Ford-class aircraft carriers and big-deck amphibious ships. The new frigate design would also have Cooperative Engagement Capability.
The US Navy sought more “distributed lethality,” with China and Russia beefing up their navies, and ship manufacturers viedfor the opportunity to bring heavier firepower to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the service’s smallest warship. US-based Lockheed Martin and Australia-based Austal suggested distinctly different designs and options for arming the Navy’s vessels.
Austal offered an LCS frigate featuring the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), which previous analyses deemed too expensive and unwieldy, along with the standard multi-purpose missile launchers typically found on destroyers and cruisers. The Lockheed Martin-led industry team said that it had the capability to integrate the VLS onto its own vessel but hasn’t because the service hasn’t expressed a desire for them to do so.
The Navy had not yet hammered out all the details in its official requirements, but the service will have to decide whether the VLS is worth the weight, price tag and effort to remove something else off the vessel.
Both the Lockheed and the Austal designs feature two 30mm autocannons and a 57mm bow gun. The LCS’ lack of combat power had long been a point of contention for some critics, and all littoral ships are now receiving the Hellfire missile, a weapon originally designed for anti-tank operations that can only travel five miles. The service was also considering Over The Horizon anti-ship missiles, which boast a range of over a hundred miles.
The LCS doesn’t pack as much firepower as smaller vessels in foreign countries because great firepower wasn’t a priority when the ships were first designed, and the vessels are designed to carry unmanned watercraft, helicopters and drones, instead of serving as a kind of well-armed missile boat. With its spacious hull the LCS can clear mines, defeat attack vessels and hunt submarines. Shifting defense priorities caused Beijing and Moscow to outpace Washington with their ships’ firepower, prompting the US to sacrifice some of the mission space to make room for bigger guns.
The US Navy now envisions its own version of a frigate with no minesweeping capacity but which will feature sensors for anti-submarine and anti-ship operations and built-in weapons. Trading in the bulky VLS for the lighter Over The Horizon system would eliminate the Navy’s ability to haul its standard long-range weapons, making it difficult to protect ships that are being attacked. When then-Naval Operations Chief Adm. Jonathan Greenert first presented his proposal for a weapons upgrade in 2014, he said “They did evaluate a Vertical Launch System,” but it was "kind of heavy, kind of big, a major change [adding] cost, time," according to Breaking Defense.
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