Reduced Manning
The majority of the total ownership costs for Navy surface ships, almost 70 percent, is comprised of operating and support costs incurred over the life of a ship. Personnel costs are the largest contributor to operating and support costs incurred over a ship’s life cycle. As such, transitioning from the personnel- and workloadintensive ships of the past to optimally crewed ships with reduced workloads has potential to free up resources for the Navy to use in recapitalizing the fleet.
However, previous studies have found that reduced and optimal manning initiatives were implemented without complete analysis and may have had detrimental effects on crew training and the material condition of some legacy class ships. In addition, reductions in crew size are frequently offset by increases in shore support and contractor personnel to address shipboard workload.
The Navy’s newest surface ship classes, the Ford-class aircraft carrier, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Zumwaltclass destroyer, have been designed to leverage technology and optimal manning concepts to reduce the total crew sizes aboard these ships, but the impact of these efforts on reducing total ownership costs have not been fully demonstrated.
The two major contributors to through life costs of naval vessels are crewing and maintenance. The US Navy has identified the reduction of through life costs as a priority. This has led to an increased interest in how crewing levels can be reduced without jeopardizing the ship's ability to complete its mission. Of particular concern is how reduced crewing levels will impact of labor intensive operations such as fire and damage control.
During the Carter administration, FY 79, there were 458 ships in the US Navy and the total number of personnel in the United States Navy was 523,937. Under President Reagan and the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, the US Navy began a plan for a 600 ship Navy. It was well known that the labor supply market for 18-24 year olds would decrease approximately 2.2 million by the mid 1980s from the late 1970s. By 1997 there were 362 ships and 419,599 active forces in the United States Navy, The ratio between total personnel and active ships is 20 percent higher today than at the beginning of the AVF in 1973. Technological advances would suggest that the opposite effect should have occurred with a decreasing ratio of manpower per ship.
In the 1950's the DD 931 Forest Sherman Class, displacing 4200 tons, required a manning level of 337 men. Today the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer displaces some 8000 tons with an average manning of 338 men. There is no doubt, the DDG 51 class is more technologically advanced than the DD 931 class. However, examining the two era's, the capabilities of these platforms against the capabilities of their foes at the time of their commissioning, DDG 51 and DD 931 are somewhat equal platforms.
Therefore, uncertainty arises as to why the difference in displacement. One of the answers to the differences in displacement is probably because of improved habitability and quality oflife for sailors. Another answer hull size was pointed out to be critical in the flexibility of updating systems with more sophisticated and technologically advanced weapon systems.
Training personnel on combatants requires repetitive instruction and drills to attain proficiency and productivity. Training time is a constraint dictated by maintenance and allowed steaming hours. Studies prove that a crew that trains together and remains together is far more ready then the high crew turnover commands the Navy policy was creating.
The past four decades have produced many technical developments for weapon and engineering systems. These developments have greatly improved combat effectiveness and responsiveness. Automation in gun mounts is one example of this technology. Missile launchers required many hours of preventive maintenance to ensure smooth operation, until the 1980s when vertical launching systems, (VLS), became feasible. The most significant reduction in manpower from engineering systems has been derived from gas turbine marine, GTM, engines. By using GTM's to power combatants, manning reductions have been possible.
In the development of the DD 963 class, roughly 225 crew members were originally assigned. The manning requirements were based on a task analysis of maintenance and watch standing requirements. However, the Navy quickly realized how minimally armed the warship was, and devised ways to improve its combat power. In addition, the crew had to be increased to meet maintenance requirements and shipboard training. As a result the actual compliment was approximately 325-350.
During the spring of 1995 a study panel was assembled under the auspices of the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) to "assess the impact of science and technology (S&T) on life cycle cost (LCC) initiatives of current Department of the Navy (DON) systems and projected DON acquisition programs." Although always important, LCCs have become particularly critical as DON budgets have declined in recent years, while the tempo of naval operations has actually increased. Operations and Support (O&S) costs have thus remained almost constant, while the bulk of the budget reductions were absorbed in the procurement budget. If allowed to continue, this situation will prevent the DON from re-capitalizing its force structure.
In the post-Cold War era of down-sizing and reduced budgets, the Navy, tasked with new and expanded missions, was expected to do more with less. In this climate, approaches to reduced ship manning, without sacrificing readiness or jeopardizing mission, would be of great benefit inasmuch as manpower-related expenses combine to consume about 60% of the budget. With that background, in 1995 the Reduced Ship Manning Panel reviewed reduced manning concepts and technologies with the potential to enable significant ship manning reductions.
Technology is not a roadblock to reduced manning. The application of proven, currently available technology, such as low cost, high speed computers, object-oriented software, open-system architecture, friendly graphical user interfaces, shipboard fiber optic networks, networked digital communications, reliable equipment health monitoring systems, automated ship positioning systems, and corrosion and wear resistant coatings, would yield substantial manpower savings.
Other than the "Law of the Sea" requirement for a posted lookout, there are no legal impediments to crew reduction. Barriers can, however, be found in an unwillingness to break with culture and tradition, in self-imposed policies that inhibit or discourage manpower reduction, in a pervasive perception in the Fleet that manpower is a "free" commodity and need not be constrained, and in a risk aversion philosophy founded on a lack of confidence in earlier attempts at automation.
Foreign navies, also faced with draconian budgetary constraints, have ventured into crew reduction through automation. The results are mixed, with greater success evident in ships designed initially for reduced crews, as compared with those in which the reductions have been imposed as a back-fit.
Automation is already impacting the ways in which the Navy trains its personnel. The use of multi-media training has reduced learning time and improved individual performance. Embedded training ensures that technicians and operators train on the same systems that they maintain and use.
Manpower-related policy, doctrine and procedures (at all levels of command) tend to impose additional manning requirements and inhibit reductions. Historically, the availability of manpower encourages the continuation of full manning and provides little or no incentive for reduction even when automation is introduced that replaces a manned function. The Ship Manning Document (SMD) is based on ship missions and capabilities and on the Condition III watches specified in the ship's Required Operational Capability (ROC)/Projected Operational Environmental (POE) document. Because there are currently no incentives to constrain manpower, watch requirements are inflated.
At all levels of command in the Fleet, there seems to be a general perception that manpower is a "free" commodity. Thus, there is no inclination to either conserve or reduce manning since there is no "cost" to the user.
The Program Executive Office, Ships, commissioned a study to examine and analyze alternatives to reduce manning for Arleigh Burke Class ships with the expectation that lessons learned from this effort would not only benefit current and future flights of DDG 51 Class ships, but would also benefit future ship classes, particularly the DD(X) family of ships. The 2003 DDG 51 Reduced Manning Study was conducted in two phases by a Navy-Industry Team, Phase I Concept Study and Phase II The Plan for Assured Manning.
This study was coordinated with both past and ongoing manning reduction initiatives, particularly current reduced manning experiments being conducted by Commander, Naval Surface Forces. It came to important conclusions and recommendations regarding ways to reduce manning in DDG 51 Class ships and focused especially on changes in policy, processes, culture, and tradition. The study's manning reduction initiatives covered three primary areas: (1) Achieving economies of scale by moving many functions currently performed by a ship's crew off the ship, (2) Accepting increased levels of risk by eliminating or consolidating some watch stations and reducing some support and hotel services, and (3) Investing in emerging technologies that would reduce the numbers of Sailors needed onboard Navy ships.
The drive to reduce manning raises questions of its own. The most important of these is how will labor intensive tasks, such as damage control, replenishment at sea, and maintenance be carried out with fewer crew. When this question is considered, the most promising approach is the introduction of technology (and the concomitant automation of tasks). Tasks that were performed by ships crew are done using new technology or are eliminated by the introduction of technology.
Damage control is the largest single condition manning load and is the most difficult evolution to deal with in terms of automation, information management, system design and arrangement, and personnel operations. Casualty control is a close second, has a lot of common factors with damage control, and for combat and major damage often has to be done in conjunction with damage control. Once the automation concept and corresponding level ofpersonnel required for damage and casualty control is established, then everything else should be designed around optimal use ofthese systems and the corresponding number ofpeople needed to operate them.
The introduction of technology and automation to reduce crewing levels comes at a cost. That is, the technology must be paid for during the procurement phase of the acquisition program.
The increasing cost of manpower in the United States Navy and the decline of the defense budget generated a new initiative called the Smart Ship Program. Smart Ship, using a combination of technology and nontraditional policies and procedures to reduce manning on U.S. naval vessels, was first implemented on the USS Yorktown (CG 48). However, some of the technology and concepts were not readily transferable to other ship classes. The USS Rushmore (LSD 47) was chosen to implement and evaluate Smart Ship concepts on an amphibious ship through the Smart Gator Program.
After selection USS Yorktown made swift changes to its watch bill without any technological improvements. USS Yorktown adjusted its watch bill underway from 140 men to 77 men. Further watch bill modifications were made by determining these 77 crew members as the "core watch team". Engineering spaces were unmanned, as first designed in the 1970's. There were safeguards which include monitors and sensors throughout the plant to ensure safe steaming, and to protect the ship from major leaks and fires. When all was complete, $5.8 million of technology was added, with a maximum reduction of 25 percent in crew.
The initial reduction in manpower, combined with increased training required on new equipment, produced an increase in the crew's workload and negatively impacted mission readiness. Major reduction can drop crew size down below the point where people can reasonably compensate for integration discontinuities and normal gaps in leadership and support. These problems cancel out the savings that reducing personnel and increasing technology are supposed to produce. They also degrade shipboard life down to a never-ending struggle to meet constantly changing, short-term related requirements that have very little tangible positive effect on primary missions.
At only a bit over 160-feet-long, Sea Shadow (IX 529) was used to test advanced hull forms and structures, automation for reduced manning, sea keeping and signature control, Sea Shadow doesn't have much room for a large crew. In fact, with only 12 bunks aboard, the maximum she's ever taken to sea at once is 24.
The “bundle” of technologies embodied in DDG 1000—as well as future technologies that could easily find homes in this ship—represents some of the most cutting-edge and transformational technologies ever adapted for naval uses and a host of other advances related to network-centric warfare, stealth, survivability, and dramatically reduced manning levels. The DDG 1000 ship class utilizes a smaller crew size, therefore cross-training and inter-division support was an integral part of the training. “IPS and electric drive will revolutionize surface ship and submarine warfighting capabilities by increasing combat effectiveness and agility while reducing ownership costs, space requirements, vulnerability, and crew size. The DDG-1000 has a reduced-size crew of about 140 sailors (compared to roughly 300 on the Navy’s current destroyers and cruisers) so as reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs.
DDG-1000 was able to decrease its crew size through increased automation and by growing shore support primarily to complete maintenance traditionally performed by ship’s company. On the DDG-51, enlisted crew berthing spaces accommodate 20 to 60 sailors each. On the DDG1000, every sailor would have a stateroom, and each stateroom would accommodate four sailors. The Navy believes these features would improve crew quality of life, which can improve retention rates.
While there are cost savings associated with the DDG 1000’s smaller crew, they are largely offset by higher estimated maintenance costs for this significantly more complex ship. On balance, the procurement cost of a single DDG 51 is significantly less than that of a DDG 1000, and the life-cycle costs of the two classes are similar.
According to the Navy, a DDG-51 class ship costs $25.0 million per year to operate, including $13.0 million for the crew. The Navy estimate is that its present modernization plan could reduce the crew cost per ship by $2.7 million per year. A larger reduction in crew size would clearly appear to result in significant savings over the estimated 18 years of remaining normal service life, especially noting that per capita personnel costs may be expected to increase during that period.
The Gerald R. Ford will replace USS Enterprise (CVN 65), which was inactivated Dec. 1, 2012. Updates to the new carrier include improved warfighing capabilities, lower maintenance, reduced manning requirements and a better quality of life for the Sailors. The class brings improved warfighting capability, quality of life improvements for Sailors and reduced total ownership costs.
The CVN 78 design is intended to reduce manning. While the Nimitz class had a nominal crew of about 5,200, including 3,000-3,200 Ship's Company, 1,500 air wing and 500 other, the Ford class as a total crew of 4,535 (ship, air wing and staff). The newly designed nuclear power plant is intended to operate at a reduced manning level that is 50 percent of a CVN 68 class ship and produce significantly more electricity.
Staffing the ship at less than 100 percent; that is, with fewer personnel than the projected total force of 4,535, had an adverse effect on quality of life at sea because the crew had to perform additional duties or remain on duty for longer periods. This manning analysis also found that reducing staffing to 85 percent — which is typical for a Nimitz-class ship — compromised ship operations. That is, the Ford class requires 100% of 4,500, while a Nimitz would typically operate with 85% of 5,200, or about 4,400, which is slightly less than the "reduced manning" Ford class.
As manning requirements have been further developed, analysis indicated the ship was sensitive to manpower fluctuations; and workload estimates for the many new technologies such as catapults, arresting gear, radar, and weapons and aircraft elevators are not well-understood. Some of these concerns have already required re-designation of some berthing areas and may require altering standard manpower strategies to ensure mission accomplishment. CVN 78 will not meet a requirement that allows for increases to the size of the crew over the service life of the ship. In fact, the ship may not even be able to accommodate the likely need for additional crew to operate the ship without operational tradeoffs.
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