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"If Americans find it easy to
go anywhere and do anything,
they will always be
going somewhere and doing something."

Senator Richard Russell
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Fast Deployment Logistics Ships (FDLS)

Beginning in the early 1960s, a succession of commands was given the responsibility for planning Middle East operations. The first was the US Strike Command (STRICOM). Established at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, in 1962, STRICOM had responsibility for joint planning of operations in the Middle East, South Asia and sub Saharan Africa. Although a unified command, it controlled no Navy or Marine Corps (USMC) units. During STRICOM's existence, the Fast Deployment Logistics concept was formulated. Although never implemented, it became the forerunner of today's prepositioning ships.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted several studies of mobility requirements after 1961, but problems remained in determining exact needs, as McNamara acknowledged to a congressional committee in 1964: "Closely related to the general purpose forces are the airlift and sealift forces required to move them promptly to wherever they might be needed. The requirements for airlift and sealift forces are not susceptible to precise calculation. First, they are subject to most of the same uncertainties which afflict the general purpose forces, the wide variety of possible contingencies, the uncertainties concerning the military strength of our opponents, etc. Second, the quick reaction capability which these forces help to provide can be achieved in a number of ways: by forward deployment of military forces, by the prepositioning of equipment and supplies either on land or in ships, and by the deployment of both men and equipment from a central reserve in the United States. Each of these alternatives has certain advantages and disadvantages. Our present program is based on using a combination of these various methods, but we still have much to learn about the proper balance among them."

The Army's interest in the subject intensified in the mid 1960s as a result of the anticipated procurement of C-5A aircraft and fast deployment logistic (FDL) ships, which would greatly increase American capacity to transport men and supplies. With the Air Force urging development of the C 5A and the Navy promoting the FDL, both of which were still on the drawing boards, the Army feared that its interest as primary user of these new transport vehicles might be slighted. This fear prompted a memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Army asking DCSOPS to determine Army requirements for strategic mobility resources: "During the next several years heavy lift aircraft (C 5A) and fast deployment logistic ships will become available in sufficient quantity to significantly influence the rapid deployment posture of the U.S. Army. This improved capability requires detailed study to determine the optimum mix of C-5A aircraft, FDL ships, and prepositioning and resupply requirements."

The Fast Deployment Logistics ships were first proposed in 1964 by the Army and Navy to compensate for the shortage of overseas military bases. The Department of Defense worked very hard on strategic mobility during the mid-1960s. Three factors are significant: (1) Pre-positioning of equipment, so that only men have to be moved; (2) air mobility resources -- the development of the C-5s provided this capability; (3) Fast Deployment Logistics [FDL] Ships. The FDL would be loaded with military supplies, and rapidly deploy to trouble spots, or be anchored near them.

McNamara empowered the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) to base procurement programs on a costs-benefits basis, which it did. In one case, the Air Force and Navy analysts in the OSA combined the acquisition of the C-5A with the acquisition of the Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (FDLS). From a costs-benefits standpoint, the OSA analysts contended that improved strategic transportation capabilities could be achieved only through combining both programs.

The systems for loading, fueling, and off-loading all types of US Army equipment carried on Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships. used air cushion vehicles and other special landing craft for transport. The system could unload the cargo of an FDL ship to a dock in the record time of ten hours or on to a beach in only 20 hours in the roughest off-shore conditions.

By early 1967 Lockheed and two other aerospace companies were competing for the Navy contract to build a fleet of new Fast Deployment Logistics ships (FDL). If it won, Lockheed planned to build a new automated shipyard capable of producing FDL's on production lines.

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. had started out as a technical writing company, preparing engineering manuals for big systems projects: the Atlas weapon systems, radar systems, communications systems, shipboard systems. Volt's large proposal support efforts for clients were a natural evolution. This started when Volt sent hundreds of people to Lockheed in Marietta, Georgia to work on the proposals for the C-5" [heavy-cargo military transport plane]. General Dynamics sent key people from the entire company to Groton, Connecticut to work on a major US Navy proposal. To house the many proposal personnel who assembled, the General Dynamics team took over what had previously been a shopping center. They had about 200 people there, working on a proposal for the Fast Deployment Logistics ship - using new techniques and processes that few had ever heard of before. Disciplines like systems engineering, configuration management, data management, and life cycle cost were being introduced, first through the C-5 program and now through the FDL. Eventually Volt had about 100 people to support this effort. It was soon apparent that many members of the team were unfamiliar with these new disciplines and how to organize, manage and produce what eventually became two 30,000 plus page proposals. Recognizing the need to bring process to what was then chaos, the company''s efforts became more and more focused as the staff supported a string of proposal requirements, including those for the Navy's Landing Helicopter Assault ship (LHA).

MAFI has become synonymous throughout the world with systems using roll trailers for stevedoring operations on RoRo ships. MAFI was the original inventor of this revolutionary development. Roll Trailers, which are also known as Mafi Trailers are used for the transport of large heavy units, but can also be used for most types of general cargo and containers. Roll trailers are frequently used for transporting cargo into or and out of the lower decks of a vessel, where the cargo is taken off trailer and stowed loose and secured. In November 1966, MAFI was called in by Litton Industries in the USA to send a team of experts to develop the ro-ro cargo handling system on board the FDLS project.

In March 1967 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara "rapid deployment concept" called for an expanded airlift capacity centered on the C-141 StarLifter and the mammoth C-5A jet transport now abuilding at Lockheed's plant in Marietta, GA. Equally important, if less spectacular, are the Fast Deployment Logistics Ships (FDLS) needed to haul the Army's tanks and trucks, artillery and ammunition, and "marry up" with the airborne troops. If McNamara had his way, the US by 1970 would be able to speed American-based troops within hours to any trouble spot in the world.

The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) examined the feasibility of an off-shore logistics base, but one that might be even more extensive, especially if Okinawa reverted to Japan. ESSG relied on the two earlier studies as models because these "were considered by the Army Staff to provide a basic pattern for developing an offshore logistics base. "89 Once again the group postulated the mission of this logistics base, and calculated the facilities it would require and its cost. Because the Army wanted to locate the base in the United States trust territories in the South Pacific, the diplomatic and political problems of the earlier studies were largely avoided. But the base to be constructed in the mid 1970s would still be expensive. Although the study concluded that there was "no question as to the technical feasibility of siting an operation and logistic base in the Trust Territory," it cautioned that there might be "better ways to solve the Army's offshore logistic support requirement.

The ESSG noted that increased strategic mobility acquired from improved transportation means (C-5A aircraft and FDL [fast deployment logistic] ships) may significantly reduce the logistic mission considered in this analysis. " ESSG's series of studies in strategic mobility had led to the conclusion that projected techniques of long distance logistics support should be considered as alternatives to the construction of a fixed, overseas logistics base.

When the analysts at ESSG began work on the project, they discovered that an OSD group, including some Army officers, was developing a computer mobility model with the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), the Army version of Rand. The model considered all the major airlift aircraft, ships, and prepositioned equipment and determined the least cost mix of each that would be appropriate for any given situation. ESSG analysts worked with this group in refining and testing the new computer model, and the results became a key element in the final ESSG study.

Before using the model to estimate mobility requirements, however, ESSG had to develop a series of hypothetical yet plausible situations that might require the deployment of American forces overseas. As McNamara had implied in 1964, preparing for the huge variety of possible crises that might appear six years hence would make estimates of sealift and airlift requirements either unrealistically high or unnecessarily vague. Working with DCSOPS, the group postulated six situations that represented a range of likely crises, made estimates of the enemy threat and American force requirements, and used the computer model to calculate the most effective and least expensive mix of aircraft, ships, and prepositioned supplies required to transport and support American forces. The study concluded that no single means would be sufficient and that the proper mix depended on a variety of factors including the actual costs of the projected C-5As and FDLs.

Authority for FDL construction was sought for three years beginning in 1965. The FDL concept involved a new and modern shipyard and series production. By 1968 the shipyard had been built in Pascagoula, Mississippi and a highly satisfactory ship design had been obtained. The ship production was planned to take two or three years. A total of 30 FDLs and the C-5s would enable the US to reinforce NATO with two divisions in 30 days. From the military standpoint, the same forces in Europe could be maintained and this increased strategic mobility be used to reinforce and not as a substitute. Many of the supporters of the FDL would, however, expected that its development would yield some cuts in US forces in Europe.

The FDL was ultimately cancelled by the Congress in 1967, on the grounds that it might tempt the United States to become the world's policeman. Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), chair of the senate Armed Services Committee, was a leading opponent of the FDL. The Committee's report on the Pentagon's fiscal 1968 authorization bill concluded that "Beyond the cost, the committee is concerned about the possible creation of an impression that the United States has assumed the function of policing the world, and that it can be thought to be at last considering intervention in any kind of strife or commotion occurring in any of the nations of the world. Moreover, if our involvement in foreign conflicts can be made quicker and easier, there is the temptation to intervene in many situations." Or as Sen. Russell warned, "if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something." Though Congress delayed the procurement of the FDLS, it funded the Air Force's C-5A.

In December 1967 the Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 27 C-5As in FY 69 at a cost of $548 million. The JCS concurred. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 4 Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships in FY 69 at a cost of $187 million. The JCS concurred. The Secretary of Defense recommended that the Forward Floating Depot (FFD) program be cancelled. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended that the FFD program be continued. The Secretary of Defense then concurred.

As late as 1969 one Air Force analyst proposed the use of the Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ship as a V/STOL platform in coastal waters. If the FDL concept was put to use, self-contained air protection could be provided as the FDL approaches a shoreline and later as it discharged its cargo.

One notable initiative by the Nixon administration was the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of sixteen nonmilitary members to advise on defence organisation. Their report issued in 1970 was critical in important areas. " The evolution of defence organization since 1947 has not substantially reduced the inherent difficulties arising from the fact that the division of roles and missions among the military departments is still based fundamentally on distinctions between land, sea, and air forces which have become increasingly less relevant.

The report cited as examples of this parochialism "the development of the AX aircraft by the Air Force and the Cheyenne aircraft by the Army for the close air-support role, the lack of enthusiasm for airlift by the Air Force and the fast deployment logistics program by the Navy, both intended to support the Army, and the continued failure to resolve the issue of the best balance between land- and carrier-based tactical air."