FGM-148 Javelin - Production
The FGM-148 Javelin is an American man-portable fire-and-forget anti-tank missile fielded to replace the M47 Dragon anti-tank missile in US service. It uses automatic infrared guidance that allows the user to seek cover immediately after launch, as opposed to wire-guided systems, like the Dragon, which require the user to actively guide the weapon throughout the engagement. The Javelin's HEAT warhead is capable of defeating modern tanks by attacking them from above where their armor is thinnest, and is also useful against fortifications in a direct attack flight. As of January 2019, over 5,000 Javelin missiles had been fired in combat.
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued antiarmor munitions master plans beginning in 1985 and updated the plans annually until 1990. Prior to 1990, antiarmor requirements were primarily justified according to the potential threat of a Central European conflict. A principle component of this threat was the very large Soviet and Warsaw Pact inventories of armored vehicles. While the 1990 plan still concluded that the Soviet Union would retain major conventional and strategic forces and would remain the major concern of defense planning, it recognized that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a credible military alliance. The armored threat facing the United States had dropped substantially since 1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency Outyear Threat Report showed that the number of armored targets U.S. forces expect to face has dropped significantly during the period.
DOD prepared a new master plan and issued it in August 1999. In 2000, GAO reviewed the plan and reported that it did not identify any excess antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analysis needed to identify such excesses. It also did not provide the data and analysis necessary to support the services’ plans to acquire new antiarmor weapons.
In 1987, the Soviet inventory totaled approximately 52,000 tanks, including about 29,000 in Europe. About 26,000 of the tanks in the inventory were produced after 1978 (including the T64B, T72M1, and T80). The technical sophistication and the sheer numbers of these armored vehicles were far greater than the armored threat associated with any other war-fighting contingency. However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduced the likelihood that the United States would have to face an opponent with such technically sophisticated armored weapons.
In January 1998, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that threats had diminished substantially, that the United States was unlikely to face a global military threat similar to the former Soviet Union for at least two decades, and that ground forces throughout the world were being reduced.
The overall size of the antiarmor weapon inventory has remained fairly constant since 1990. At the same time, weapons have become more sophisticated, lethal, and effective. These more highly sophisticated weapons, some of which are capable of killing multiple targets, were developed to defeat the anticipated future Soviet tank threat.
Since June 1989, the Army planned to procure 58,000 Javelin missiles and 6,000 command launch units. Since the threat posed by the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries had diminished, all the military services were reducing their force levels. By 1994 the Marine Corps had reduced the number of Javelin systems it plans to procure by over 30 percent. The Army, however, did not plan to reduce its Javelin procurements. Instead, by 1994 it planned to provide the Javelin to units that earlier had insufficient priority to receive them.
The Army planned to award a multiyear contract for Javelin full-rate production in 1997, even though at that time the system did not meet the criteria established for multiyear production contracts and the Army had not yet adequately tested Javelin's suitability for full-rate production. The Army had not demonstrated that Javelin's design was sufficiently stable for a multiyear contract, and tests had not shown that the weapon to be produced during full-rate production was suitable for combat.
The Army expected the multiyear contract and design changes to decrease system costs. However, if the Army had to modify the multiyear contract because the system requires further redesign to meet operational needs, program costs could increase. Therefore, the General Accounting Office believed the Army should (1) not award a multiyear contract for Javelin production at this time and (2) operationally test the redesigned Javelin, as required by regulation, before proceeding to full-rate production. In addition, the Army decision to award a third low-rate initial production contract for command launch units was questioned by GAO because (1) the Army planned to replace these launch units with redesigned units about 3 years after the originals are fielded and (2) the Army was not purchasing Javelin to address an urgent threat, but rather to improve warfighting capability. Accordingly, GAO believed the contract should be modified to produce as few command launch units as possible.
The Army completed development of the Javelin system in December 1993. However, operational testing showed that the system's design did not meet operational suitability requirements. As a result, the Army made numerous design changes to the launch unit and round before the contractor initiated low-rate production in June 1994.
In the early 1990s, the Army made budget decisions that stretched Javelin's procurement phase from 6 to 14 years. In addition, the end of the cold war caused the Army and Marine Corps to reduce Javelin's procurement quantities. Combined, these actions increased the average cost of the launch unit to about 4.5 times its originally estimated cost and more than doubled the average cost of the round.
Initially, the Army planned to shorten procurement from 14 to 11 years by using production, logistics, and multiyear savings to purchase Javelin systems earlier than planned. On February 13, 1996, the Army announced that Program Budget Decision 104 added $993 million of additional procurement funds for fiscal years 1999 through 2001 to reduce Javelin's procurement phase to 9 years. As the program is currently planned, these funds allow the Army to complete fielding by fiscal year 2004.
The Army also hoped to reduce Javelin's cost by awarding two multiyear contracts—one in 1997 and another in 2000. Multiyear procurement is a method of acquiring up to 5 years' requirements of a system with a single contract. The procurements help the government reduce costs and provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity by investing in capital facilities, equipment, and advanced technology. However, multiyear contracts decrease annual budget flexibility. The Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) commit themselves to fund multiyear contracts through completion or pay any contract cancellation charges, which may be substantial.
According to the President's 1997 Budget, the Army and the Marine Corps planned to purchase 31,269 Javelin rounds and 3,264 command launch units. The Army's share of the purchase is 26,600 rounds and 2,800 command launch units. The Marines Corps plans to acquire 4,669 rounds and 464 launch units. By 2022 the Javelin Joint Venture had produced more than 50,000 Javelin missiles and more than 12,000 reusable Command Launch Units. Javelin is expected to remain in the U.S. weapon arsenal until 2050 and is subject to continual upgrades to support evolving operational needs.
Since the start of Russian special military operation, the United States had supplied more than 10,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. According to a rough estimate, Ukraine has received one third of the US stock of anti-tank missile systems of this modification. It was reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had problems maintaining Javelin missile launchers. They are more difficult to use than other types of portable missiles, and require batteries and an argon cooling agent to operate.
The Army awarded a production contract for $311 million on 13 September 2022 to the Javelin Joint Venture (JJV) between Raytheon Missiles and Defense and Lockheed Martin for delivery of more than 1,800 Javelins that will serve as replenishment for those rounds from DoD stocks sent to Ukraine in support of their military and security forces. "This award is a great example of our continued commitment to strengthening our domestic industrial base while supporting our allies and partners,” Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William A. LaPlante said. “As we use various authorities to replenish our own stocks, industry can expect a strong, persistent demand signal.” This procurement is part of the Ukraine Supplemental appropriation. The contract includes Army Ukraine replenishment, Army FY22 procurement, and international partner missiles.
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