FGM-148 Javelin - Development
Beginning in the 1970s, DARPA began the Tank Breaker program in response to deficiencies identified by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps in their existing infantry anti-tank weapon. The related Assault Breaker was a concept using standoff weapons to attack moving, rear echelon armor massed deep behind enemy lines. At that time, the only nonnuclear means for attacking these targets was by the use of manned, penetrating aircraft. The advantage of Assault Breaker is that it would permit attacking these targets with standoff weapons.
A January 1978 Antiarmor Mission Need Statement identified the deficiencies of the Army's current manportable antiarmor weapon, the Dragon. The Tank Breaker antitank missile concept was developed in FY 79. This fire-and-forget, manportable missile system is based on a staring focal plane array seeker and employs advanced guidance and control concepts that result in impacts against the top armor of tanks. This missile was also to be effective against other battlefield targets, such as bunkers, and offers high operational flexibility. The potential operational utility and technical feasibility of Tank Breaker were established after extensive exposure to the user community and to industry.
This led to the initiation of a joint DARPA/Army Missile Command (MICOM) program in FY 80. The program had two phases. Phase I, a 1-year effort, consists of demonstrations of critical technologies and development of detailed designs. Phase II was a 3-year hardware effort that culminated in full-scale system demonstrations. The four Phase I hardware contractors were Hughes Aircraft, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell International, and Texas Instruments and the Phase II contractors were Hughes Aircraft and Texas Instruments.
The Department of the Army (DA) decided against an Improved DRAGON missile product improvement program (PIP) in October 1979, instead electing to use funds to develop the Advanced Medium Antiarmor Weapon System (AMAWS). But in 1985, the Army adopted the Dragon II - a Dragon I missile with an improved warhead - as the interim medium antitank system until the Javelin was fielded. However, since then the Congress periodically expressed concerns over the Dragon II’s ability to effectively fulfill its interim role and whether an enhanced interim capability ias needed. Both the Dragon II and the Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal (BILL) were wire-guided antitank weapons with detachable day and night sights (trackers). Generally, Dragon II had a higher probability of hit, but BILL had a higher probability of kill, given a hit. Dragon II is designed to follow the gunner’s line-of-sight to the target where the warhead is detonated by an impact fuze. GAO suggested in 1992 that consideration could be given to further improvements to the Dragon II as an alternative to the BILL. Although the upgrades may not offer earlier fielding than the BILL, the improvements would cost significantly less than BILL and provide greater capabilities than Dragon II.
The Joint Service Operational Requirements document for the Javelin was approved in 1986 and amended in 1988. The Army evaluated two Tank Breaker designs by industry participants against alternatives in a shoot-off conducted in 1987-1988. The results led to selection of the Texas Instruments (later Raytheon) solution to the tank warfare challenge. Department of Defense officials approved it for full-scale development in 1989 under the Army’s Advanced Anti-armor Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M) program.
The contract for Javelin EMD was awarded in 1989. After encountering significant problems in developing the missile’s focal plane array component, the Army and development contractor determined that the 36-month Javelin development schedule could not be met. In September 1991, the Defense Acquisition Executive approved the Army’s restructured 54-month development program. The restructured program extended the engineering and manufacturing development program by 18 months to December 1993 and delayed initial fielding by 26 months to April 1996.
The IOT&E, which was completed in December 1993, resulted in the conclusion that the Javelin was effective, but required further assessment for suitability, necessitating follow-on testing in the form of a Limited User Test (LUT) beginning in April 1996. LRIP was approved by the DAB in July 1994. There were several Javelin enhanced producibility program (EPP) changes that were being incorporated in the system to enhance producibility and reduce cost.
The LUT consisted of three events: Situational Tactical Exercises, which were limited force-on-force engagements; Live Fire Exercises, which consisted of six explosive warhead shots; and Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System Pairing and Operational Lock-on Trials, which compared the ability of the Javelin field tactical trainer to replicate the tactical system. Missile reliability problems caused a temporary halt in the firing program. Three failed launch situations occurred early on, requiring fixes before the Army could complete the LUT in June 1996.
Between the end of development in 1993 and the beginning of low-rate production in 1994, the Army made 39 design changes to correct reliability problems. Since 1994, the Army has made a number of changes to the system's design to reduce production and logistics costs and expects to continue making changes through the beginning of full-rate production in 1997. Most of these changes were being incrementally incorporated into hardware produced under three low-rate production contracts. The contractor is continuing production while changes were developed and qualified. As changes were approved, the contractor incorporates them into units in the production process.
Before low-rate production began, engineers made changes to electronic components in the warhead fuzing device. When missiles incorporating the changes were fired, the warheads failed to function properly. Army officials considered this problem so serious that they stopped round assembly until engineers identified and implemented a solution. Another post-development change—buying a liner for the main charge warhead from a second source—also caused problems. The liner should collapse and form a jet capable of perforating armor. However, the new vendor's liner formed a jet that was not compatible with other Javelin components. Project office engineers believe the jet would have degraded Javelin's lethality. The engineers modified Javelin components to correct the problem.
LFT&E started in November 1995 and was completed in October 1996. It consisted of three progressive phases that challenged the Javelin against current and emerging tank threats. Phase A consisted of a large series of shots to determine the missile's capability to penetrate rolled homogeneous armor and to more fully understand its ability to create behind-armor debris immediately upon penetration. Phase B tested the missile's ability to penetrate shotline targets representing an advanced threat tank, and Phase C was the full scale, full-up LFT&E phase.
The full rate production, Milestone III, decision was made May 13, 1997. In March and April 1997, and in accordance with the approved TEMP (March 12, 1997), a Confirmatory Test (CT) was conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, to confirm that a Javelin Enhanced Producibility Program (EPP) had not adversely affected the effectiveness and suitability of the system.
The final phase of the Javelin LFT was completed in early 1997. The required report to Congress on Javelin's lethality was included in the BLRIP report (May 1997). DOT&E approved an LFT&E strategy for a potential warhead improvement program to keep pace with expected advances in threat heavy armor, and to improve lethality in the direct-fire mode against currently fielded threat tanks.
At Milestone III, missile reliability was to be 0.82 and at System Maturity (MS III plus three years), 0.92. Developmental testing continued on the LRIP and EPP versions of the command launch unit and missile.
A series of Operational and Live Fire Tests were adequate to determine the system's operational effectiveness, suitability and lethality. The final OT&E assessment was based on the complete evaluation period, including the 1993 IOT&E, 1996 LUT, 1997 CT, and LFT&E. As outlined in the BLRIP (April 1997) to Congress, the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapons System was judged to be operationally effective, suitable and lethal.
The LRIP missile exceeded the Milestone III reliability requirement but had yet to meet the reliability requirement for system maturity. EPP missiles have been fired and were to be scored to determine their reliability.
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