P-8 MMA - Development
The Navy's P-8A Poseidon is a Boeing commercial derivative aircraft to replace the P-3C Orion. The Program Executive Office (PEO) for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault, and Special Mission Programs and the Program Manager for Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (the program manager) are responsible for program management of the P-8A Poseidon aircraft (the P-8A Poseidon), to include conducting system specific test and evaluation.
The Commanding Officer of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Two Zero (VX-20) is responsible for providing the program manager with pilots for developmental flight testing and test reporting. The Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) is responsible for providing an independent and objective evaluation of the operational effectiveness and suitability of the P-8A Poseidon. The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) is responsible for testing, operationally evaluating, and certifying the Poseidon aircraft’s information technology capabilities for joint interoperability.
The contractor for the system development and demonstration phase was the Boeing Corporation. On 14 June 2004 Boeing was awarded an over 3,889 billion dollar cost-plus-award-fee contract to develop the Navy's Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft. The aircraft procurement section of the program was estimated to be a $20 billion effort. The then total life cycle cost for 25 years of life cycle support, as well as, the aircraft is estimated to be about a $44 billion program. These numbers were FY04 dollars, not inflated to be then-year dollars.
The program objective was initially 108 aircraft, along with an additional three SDD aircraft. As of mid-2004 the fleet of P-3 aircraft was 196 aircraft. The Navy was gradually bringing that number down, because of the time that was being put on the P-3 fleet, the ability maintain them, as well as, the anticipation of MMA. The government was looking for a full rate production decision in FY13 at the latest, and was trying to accelerate that, if possible. The Navy expected to buy 34 low-rate initial production aircraft in the years FY10, FY11 and FY12, and then transition beyond that in the year FY13, to hit full-rate production.
The smaller fleet size at 108 aircraft reflected some work that had been done between the acquisition team and the requirements community about what the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system, or BAMS, anticipated to be an unmanned air vehicle. There was an assessment about the persistent surveillance and coverage that BAMS would provide, and about the manned segment that augments that surveillance and provides additional armed capability and performs other missions. The assessment also included discussions of littoral mission capabilities. The balance between those systems provided the full Navy maritime surveillance capability.
BAMS was proceeding on course in the budget. The budget considered the time frame anticipated for MMA, and laid in funds for P-3 maintenance, sustainment, and even some structural life modifications to extend the life of that fleet to the time at which the Navy anticipated MMA would be deployed in numbers.
The system design and development contract covered the full range of aircraft design. It included all of the onboard mission systems, the modifications to the airframe itself, all of the training systems, and all of the software laboratories that were required. There was an extensive amount of software development, almost 2 million lines of code just for MMA application. It covered developing all of the integrated logistics elements, including the trainers and the simulators and the courseware. Essentially everything that was required to get ready to build the production aircraft that would be delivered to the fleet.
In terms of the technical risk, it was not so much the technologies that were particularly of concern. Had there been a fear of high technical risk an award fee plan might have been established to make sure integration and getting the mission systems to work together was actually being achieved. There was a very significant step forward in what is often called an open architecture, to make sure that any of these sensors can play with the current suite, and then, as future technologies evolve, they can be plugged in to the open architecture backbone without requiring an extensive amount of redesign. It was intended to be a relatively straightforward plug-in.
The Navy completed a three-day Systems Requirements Review of the program on 30 September 2004. This was the first major review of the program since the SDD contract was awarded. The review was a crucial step that permited the program to continue forward. The purpose was to ensure understanding of the planned system and contract requirements. A Preliminary Design Review was slated for September 2005. This design review was completed in November of 2005.
The P-8A program entered development in May 2004 with none of its four critical technologies mature. The program developed maturation plans and identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical technologies. According to programofficials, the P-8A would lose some capabilities but would still meet the minimum requirements if the backup systems were to be used. Between 2006 and 2007 the program decided to use one of its backups. Two of the remaining three critical technologies were not anticipated to reach maturity until 2008 and 2009, at least 4 years later than recommended by best practices. The program office was unable to provide the number of drawings completed (a measure of design stability), but expected that 80 percent of the design drawings would be released by a critical design review planned for 2007.
In March 2007 a Government Accountability Office report stated that the program had previously expected all four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design review in July 2007. Between 2006 and 2007 the program has decided not to use the acoustic bellringer algorithms. The decision was made to instead use the backup technology, which was baseline signal processing without the bellringers. Bellringers are advanced signal-processing aids that provide sorting and identification of specific sounds. The backup was being used because an analysis of bellringer performance showed that it would not meet expectations. The bellringer algorithms were not required to meet baseline performance requirements, but had the potential to provide increased performance above the required capability.
None of the three remaining critical technologies, electronic support measures (ESM) digital receiver, data fusion, and integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher, were mature as of March 2007. These technologies had not moved beyond the laboratory environment, and have not matured since the beginning of development in May 2004. The program office stated that decisions on using backup technologies for the ESM digital receiver and the sonobuoy launcher may not be made until after design review.
The final production hardware was complete for the ESM digital receiver, a technology being leveraged from the EA-18G Growler program. Technology maturity would be demonstrated by design review, 3 years later than recommended by best practices standards. The data fusion and the integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher had not been integrated into a prototype system, but were expected to reach maturity in 2008 and 2009 respectively, at least 4 years later than recommended by best practice standards.
As of June 2006, the P-8A program was on budget and on schedule. However, if the P-8A failed to develop as expected or experienced additional schedule slippage, the Navy would have to continue relying on its aging P-3C Orion fleet.
The P-8A is intended to share the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role with the BAMS UAS. The BAMS UAS development start was delayed 2 years until October 2007. If the BAMS UAS did develop as planned or continued to experience schedule delays, the P-8A was its fallback and according to the Navy, the overall cost of the program would increase due to a need to procure additional P-8A aircraft.
Another program that could potentially be impacted by the P-8A program is the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). The ACS was intended to replace three current systems, including the Navy's EP-3. However, the Army terminated the ACS contract in January 2006 because the airframe selected could not accommodate the intended mission equipment. Decisions concerning the ACS program would determine whether the Navy participates in a future Army-led ACS program. One of the alternatives assessed by the Navy to replace the EP-3 included incorporating the ACS equipment onto the P-8A airframe.
The Navy concurred with GAO's assessment of the P-8A MMA program. The Navy stated that the program continued to manage the three remaining critical technologies. Furthermore, the maturation of the technologies was on schedule and would be assessed at the critical design review planned for the third quarter of FY07. The airplane design remained approximately 70 percent in common with that of the commercial 737-800 baseline. Over 25 percent of the detailed design drawings were then complete. The metrics for measuring drawing release were now defined and were being used as one critical measurement to assess design maturity for the critical design review. According to the Navy, the program continued to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance parameters defined in the program baseline.
The program office completed critical design review (CDR) in June 2007 and a design readiness review (DRR) in August 2007. However, only 70 percent of the design drawings, a measure of design stability, were complete at CDR. The P-8A had experienced a $1.2 billion contract cost increase due to inefficiencies in the release of design drawings, software development risks, and subcontractor cost and scope increases. Further, the program office was assessing, as of March 2008, how its production aircraft would meet the specialty metals provision of the Berry Amendment.
In its 2007 assessment the GAO reported that the acoustic bellringer algorithm technology was replaced with a less capable, but more mature backup. During a technology readiness assessment in November 2006, the program made significant changes to the critical technologies list. First, the integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher was removed from the critical technologies list. While the program still planned to utilize this technology as of March 2008, it was recategorized as a developmental risk. As such, it was noted that it might not be fully mature prior to production and could lead to delays should design changes or a backup technology be necessary.
Second, the program replaced the data fusion technology with its backup. Program officials stated that alternative algorithms could be utilized in place of the data fusion technology, which would provide less capable data fusion, but would still meet minimum P-8A requirements. Third, the Magnetic Anomaly Detector Control Surface Compensation Algorithms were added as a critical technology. These compensation algorithms, needed to reduce noise interference, pose an additional technical risk because they had not been tested on an aircraft. The program, as of March 2008, estimated that the technology would reach maturity by the time of the low rate production decision in 2010, which was 6 years later than recommended best practices. Finally, the ESM digital receiver, which was being leveraged from the EA-18G program, was the only critical technology for the program that has been demonstrated in a realistic environment, and is considered mature as of the GAO's 2008 assessment.
The contractor had estimated that the cost of producing an aircraft that was compliant with the specialty metals provision of the Berry Amendment would be significantly greater than program cost estimates as of 2008. The program office was therefore assessing how its production aircraft would comply with these restrictions.
The P-8A would undergo structural modifications while on the production line. This effort to reduce production time and cost represented the first time that DoD would attempt to militarize an aircraft on a commercial production line and had added risk to the program according to the GAO.
The GAO also reported in their 2008 assessment that as of June 2007, the System Development and Demonstration contract costs had risen from $3.8 billion to $5.0 billion as a result of contract modifications to address software development risks as well as delays in releasing system design drawings. This would delay the build and delivery dates for the seven aircraft test articles by an expected 7 to 14 months. The cost increase was also driven by subcontractor/supplier issues, according to the program office. For example, at the subcontractor level, some development costs had exceeded estimates and schedules had slipped. Despite the cost increase and delays, the program was still attempting to meet its milestones and cost targets by combining the developmental and operational test programs.
Because the P-8A mission overlaps with that of the BAMS UAS, changes or delays in the development of that program had the potential to result in the need to procure additional P-8A aircraft.
In response to the GAO's 2008 assessment, the program office stated that the maturation of critical technologies was on schedule to support the System Development and Demonstration phase. The airplane remained about 60-65 percent common with the commercial 737. Although contract costs had grown, they remained below the program objective value for development cost parameters and below the system development cost estimates. The program continued to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance parameters defined in the P-8A Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement.
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