Military

PROBLEM 1-9: Units avoid the press for fear of making mistakes or not being comfortable with granting an interview.

PROBLEM 1-10: Units do not plan or prepare for public affairs deployment operations at Home Station.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 1-11: Brigade and Battalion staffs are seldom proactive in planning and preparing for dealing with possible media coverage in their area of operations.

PROBLEM 1-12: Repeat of Problem 1-2.

PROBLEM 1-13: Repeat of Problem 1-2.

PROBLEM 1-14: Repeat of Problem 1-4.

PROBLEM 1-15: Repeat of Problem 1-5.

PROBLEM 1-16: Repeat of Problem 1-7.

PROBLEM 1-17: Repeat of Problem 1-8.

PROBLEM 1-18: Repeat of Problem 1-10.

1. Appoint media liaisons at all levels of command;
   - interact with the news media
   - serve as a media escort.

   Locate the task force public affairs officer, NCO and other public affairs assets in the area logistics operation center (ALOC) containing the assets to support the media's needs during media events.

   Plan for both scheduled and unscheduled media visits.

   - Do not automatically reject unscheduled interviews with the media.

   - Grant the interview if time is available and the visit will not interfere with the mission.

   - Do not use the mission as an excuse not to talk.

   - Contact a public affairs liaison

   - advise of the presence of media

   - use the liaison as a go-between

   - see if time can be reasonably set aside for a visit.

   If you recognize the news reporter, allow him/her a few minutes of your time. If you do not recognize them, politely refer them back to the division or JTF public affairs officer for credentialing.

   Do not delay the media at the wire during scheduled visits.

   - Allow credentialed media accompanied by a military or DOD escorts immediate access.

   - Prompt and courteous assistance to the media pays big dividends for your unit.

   Treat all media the same, regardless of affiliation or nationality.

   - Tell your story truthfully and accurately to all affiliations and nationalities.

   - Remember to maintain OPSEC.

   Do not avoid the press.

   - If you do not tell your unit's story, the media will tell it for you.

   - If time or mission do not permit an interview, explain your situation to the reporter.

   - Tell him/her you are busy now, but that you would like to reschedule.

   Staff at all levels should have plans and SOP's to deal with all types of media situations:

   - scheduled vs. unscheduled

   - credentialed vs. uncredentialed.

   Tailor plans to fit each type of deployment: Combat, Peacekeeping and Operations Other than War.

   Essential elements within each plan should include:

   - Location and proper use of available Public Affairs assets

   - Actions upon notification (scheduled vs. unscheduled)

   - Battletracking events with possible media interest

   - Developing command message answers for anticipated questions

   - Actions/Agenda to take when media arrives

   - Guidance on information that can be shown and talked about -- what items cannot be shown or discussed (OPSEC at the Source -- explanation of why something can't be shown or discussed).

   - Logistical, transportation and safety requirements.

   Remember, time is mission to the Army; time is money to the media. Proper planning will help the command to quickly deal with the media, get back to the mission, and facilitate an accurate story with appropriate messages being told to the public.

   Units should deploy with PA assets to assist with PA operations and advise the commander when appropriate.

   Locate the PA officer or NCO and other PA assets in the BSA during deployments. The BSA contains the logistical assets required to support the media's needs, and facilitate the PA requirement to do their mission.

   Situate PA assets near rear CP's to track key events and missions to help plan for possible media interest.

   Provide PA assets support essential movement and communication with forward units and their commanders.

   - Enables the PA element to plan for the public affairs implications of the battlefield.

   - Facilitates the PAO's briefing of the media plan to the commanders forward, giving them a chance to prepare for possible media interest.

   Do not make credentialing a requirement to speak with US forces.

   Ensure public affairs guidance, plans, and important information gets to the lowest level.

   Emphasize the importance of speaking with one voice

   - Unit members must stay in their lanes of knowledge

   - Helps the unit get an accurate story out

   - Builds credibility with the media.

   Remember to practice OPSEC.

   Make sure that the individual assigned as the unit media representative is trained on how to deal with the media.

   Familiarize Bde Cdr's and subordinate commanders with interview techniques and how to express proper command messages.

   Provide training at all levels. Do not concentrate all efforts on training for interviews. Include the following topics:

   - planning for media

   - recognizing what events or missions are of media interest

   - preparing guidance - questions and answers(Q&As)

   - understanding the media

   - knowing how to express your unit story,

   - protecting OPSEC

   - accommodating the media without detracting from the unit mission.

TA.7 Negative Trend 2: Resupply Operations

4QFY94

PROBLEM 2-1: Heavy teams either lack written logistical SOPs or ineffectively use them.

1. Heavy teams deploy without a working logistical tracking, reporting, or requesting system.
2. The link from the heavy team to the brigade ALOC typically lacks the appropriate coordination and planning to be effective.
3. The needs of a light infantry BDE task force and the heavy team differ significantly.

PROBLEM 2-2:

1. Brigade S-4s typically do not adequately coordinate, synchronize or control aviation assets earmarked for use in aerial resupply.
2. Brigade support area (BSA) tenants also fail to efficiently manage aviation assets.

RESULTS:

1. Flight and crew days are not maximized.
2. Air missions are not adequately planned and briefed.
3. Loads are not properly rigged.
4. Army airspace command and control (A2C2) procedures are not fully implemented.

PROBLEM 2-3: The actual resupply process between the forward support battalion (FSB)/ammo transfer point (ATP) and the deployed STINGER and Avenger sections frequently breaks down.

1. ADA units routinely do not tie into and use existing LOGPACs from the FSB to the task forces.
2. Requesting, receiving and issuing small arms, anti-tank (e.g., AT4, LAWS, etc.), and claymore mines is difficult .

RESULT:

1. ADA leadership must use organic lift for missile resupply.
2. ADA personnel conduct combat operations with ammunition quantities below basic load.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 2-4: Units fail to consistently submit daily DA Form 2406 to the brigade S4.

RESULT: The S4 and the support operations officer cannot assess the task force's combat readiness.

PROBLEM 2-5: Units consistently deploy with a high zero balance for their "come as you are" authorized stockage list (ASL).

PROBLEM 2-6: Units do not plan or execute requisite command and control of resupply operations and assets.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not maximize available Army aviation and ground assets.
2. Units do not receive needed supplies
   - untimely
   - improperly configured
   - wrong location.

PROBLEM 2-7: Units routinely disregard the procedures established in TM 10-69, Petroleum Supply Point Operations.

RESULT: Degraded overall storage and distribution capability because the doctrinal supply points lack adequate components.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8:

1. Battalion S-4s and support platoon leaders do not plan and conduct LOGPAC resupply as combat operations.
2. Units do not brief the enemy situation, routes, fire support plan and actions on contact to members of the LOGPAC convoy.
3. Basic checklists for convoy operations are not implemented at the unit level.
4. Units do not generally ensure that there is a communications link with combat or field trains.
5. The combat trains command post (CTCP) does not battle track LOGPACs.

RESULT: Supplies are lost before they get to the requestor.

1. Establish a single point of contact in the brigade command post/brigade support area responsible for planning and coordinating aviation requirements.
2. Station an aviation LNO in the rear command post to articulate brigade lift requirements to the aviation task force commander.
3. Conduct abbreviated air mission coordination meetings between user units and the aviation LNO.
4. Locate the first sergeant at the forward support battalion (FSB)/ammo transfer point (ATP) to serve as the air defense liaison.
5. Conduct LOGEXs at Home Station. Train and reinforce reporting requirements.
6. Conduct an ASL review board at least 90 days prior to deployment. Take corrective action based on board results.
7. Set up supply points according to doctrine.
8. Ensure heavy team CSS personnel are totally integrated into the brigade area logistic operations center (ALOC) planning process.

1. Strictly enforce reporting procedures in TSOPs.
2. Designate a command and control element to track issue and receipt of supplies.
3. Develop a LOGPAC resupply SOP that includes the following:
   - basic checklists.
   - briefing topics for convoy leaders (e.g., enemy situation, routes, known minefield locations, fire support plan, actions on contact, etc.)

   Establish a communications link between combat trains and field trains.

   Make sure the combat trains command post (CTCP) tracks LOGPACs until mission completion and debrief the convoy leader in order to gather intelligence.

TA.7 Negative Trend 3: Ammo Management

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 3-1: Units are not adequately managing and controlling ammunition.

1. Units do not plan ammunition in volleys.
2. Ammunition tracking is deficient.
   - Ammunition counts at batteries, battalion TOC and battalion ALOC often widely differ

   Ammunition resupply is often pre-packaged prior to D-Day.

   - little planning for follow-on missions.

   Resupply plans frequently rely on only one means of delivery.

   - if weather or the enemy eliminate that means, units are slow to develop alternatives.

RESULTS:

1. Units have insufficient ammo to meet commander's guidance for fire support.
2. Infantry companies initiate attacks with insufficient ammunition to meet the desired attack criteria.

PROBLEM 3-2:

1. Units do not consider quantity or distance when selecting locations for ammunition transfer points (ATP).
2. Large quantities of high explosives and projectile ammunition are frequently stored close to high traffic areas within the brigade support area (BSA).

PROBLEM 3-3: Proficiency in establishing jump forward arming and refueling points (FARPS) continues to decline.

RESULTS: The OPFOR often targets the main FARP. A successful attack destroys a major portion of the aviation task force's refuel capability.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 3-4: Repeat of Problem 3-1.

PROBLEM 3-5: Repeat of Problem 3-2.

1. The brigade FSO:
   - identifies ammunition requirements for the brigade and battalion fights
   - allocate volleys to meet the commander's desired effects on enemy forces
   - estimates requirements for future operations.

   The FA battalion S3:

   - refines the FSO's requirements

   - identifies the amount of ammunition for gunnery needs (registration and calibration), and counterfire efforts

   - tracks and controls the expenditure of the ammunition

   The FA battalion XO:

   - identifies ammunition resources

   - plans and coordinates all resupply operations (consider use of multiple means)

   - monitors consumption

   - anticipates future requirement

   The brigade FSCOORD:

   -monitors the process and identifies shortfall to the brigade commander

   For mortar ammunition:

   - the battalion FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion commander and S-3 to assign priorities for mortar fire

   - FSO's must work closely with the infantry battalion XO and S-4 to ensure both the battalion and company mortars are resupplied with sufficient ammunition to accomplish the commander's intent.

   Develop an ammunition transfer point (ATP) layout plan based on quantity/distance tables.

   - Set up the ATP according to the layout plan to ensure safety and security.

   - Include a generic plan in the unit's TACSOP.

   Cache fuel assets throughout the assembly area to reduce the likelihood of all assets being destroyed.

   Establish silent and/or jump FARPs prior to offensive or defensive operations.

   Plan ammunition in volleys:

   - Calculate the number of volleys required to accomplish the mission

   - Allocate ammunition by volleys.

   Doctrinal reference:

   - TM 9-1300-206, Quantity/Distance for Storage of Ammunition in a Field Site.

   - FM 9-13 and FM 9-6, Chapter 2. Quantity/distance tables

Table of Contents
TA. 6, Mobility, Countermobility and Survivability
TA. 7, Part 2