Military

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: Most units are unfamiliar/untrained on dealing with civilians on the battlefield (COB).

1. Reactions range from the unnecessary use/display of force to allowing civilians free access to the position area and allowing them to disrupt unit activities.
2. Units frequently call battalion for guidance when civilians show up at the perimeter.
3. Battalion is extremely slow deciding how to handle the civilians.

RESULTS:

1. Unnecessarily angering friendly/neutral civilians
2. Allowing neutral/anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2 nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities etc.).
3. Frequently terrorists gain unobstructed access to a battery and destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section by detonating a ruck sack or car bomb.

1. At the direct support team (DST) level, the intelligence preparation of the operational area (IPOA) cycle is driven by the use of area assessment checklists for information derived from the following sources:
   - operational area evaluation
   - government functions
   - geographic analysis
   - demographic analysis
   - economic functions
   - public facilities functions
   - special functions analysis
   - database integration

   The S-5 (in conjunction with the SJA) should produce a videotape.

   - required viewing by all soldiers.

   - Distribute copies to company level.

   Alternate solution -- If video support is not available, put together an area handbook for task force distribution prior to conducting combat operations.

   Develop a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti- civilians. Disseminate to the lowest level.

   - provide clear, concise guidance on actions to take with each type of civilian

   - include guidance on how to handle civilians who do not appear on any list.

   Establish clear procedures on what soldiers should do upon contact with civilians - train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with COBs at home station.

   Doctrinal reference: FM 34-3 6, chapter 10. Civil affairs OPB/IPOA.

1. The G-5 is a reporting channel, not a command channel.
   - The G-5 does not exercise command authority over the S-5 or DSTs.

   Use FM 41-10, appendix B, area study and assessment formats for a start point in DSTs developing their own specific checklists.

   - Use the checklists to provide information to update the civil military operations (CMO) estimate. This becomes the S-5 staff estimate.

   - Use area assessment checklists to generate demographic, civil supply support and dislocated civilian overlays.

   - Additional reporting requirements should be spelled out by the S-2 in the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) collection plan.

TA.7 Negative Trend 5: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

4QFY94

PROBLEM 5-1: Air defense leaders and soldiers are seldom familiar with their supported unit's casualty evacuation plan.

RESULT: Untimely evacuation of the wounded results in a high number of air defense soldier deaths directly attributable to "die of wounds".

PROBLEM 5-2: CASEVAC continues to be a significant shortcoming.

1. Units frequently neglect to establish procedures for evacuating casualties from the point of injury to the division rear and out.
2. Staffs do not develop an effective plan.
   - not familiar enough with doctrine and unit SOP.

   Control of aeromedical evacuation assets continues to be an unresolved issue.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3: The forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) leader frequently underestimates the importance of his role in the brigade's casualty evacuation plan.

1. During air assault operations, MEDEVAC routes often converge with air assault routes without a time of separation.
2. Casualty collection points are not used for evacuation. "Nine-line" requests are submitted while the air assault is still being executed.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 5-4:

1. Inability to evacuate casualties from the company casualty collection points (CCPs).
2. Battalion plan is usually uncoordinated and poorly executed.

RESULT: Continually high died of wounds (DOW) rate at the unit level.

1. Include the evacuation liaison team (ELT) leader in the air assault coordination and air mission brief (AMB).
2. Ensure the forward support medical team (FSMT) and ELT leaders attend the brigade's medical planning and rehearsal process.
3. Ensure that the FSMT leader develops a working relationship with the forward support medical company (FSMC) commander, the brigade S-1 and the brigade surgeon prior to deploying from the intermediate staging base ( ISB).
4. Synchronize the battalion medical evacuation plan with the maneuver plan. Do not develop the plan in isolation.
5. Treat medical evacuation as a combat operation.
6. Rehearse the medical evacuation plan at battalion level.
   - Recommended attendees:
   - Bn XO
   - CSM
   - S-1
   - Public Affairs Officer
   - Medical Officer
   - Medical Platoon Leader and PSG
   - Company XO
   - 1SG
   - Senior Medics.

   Strive to designate at least one combat lifesaver per squad and vehicle.

   References:

   - CALL newsletter 89-5, "Commander's Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) System" and 91-5, "Battlefield Logistics."

   - CALL newsletter 91-5, "Battlefield Logistics."

TA.7 Negative Trend 6: Combat Health Services (CHS)

4QFY94

PROBLEM 6-1: Most medical companies are unable to provide X-ray capability.

1. Equipment is frequently not properly maintained
2. Equipment is seldom inspected as part of pre-combat checks.
3. Most units experience a film/developer incompatibility.
4. X-ray specialists are not proficient with their equipment.

PROBLEM 6-2: Units are unprepared to decontaminate and treat chemical casualties.

1. Soldiers and medical officers are unfamiliar with current chemical casualty care protocols.
2. Chemical treatment sets are not properly stocked.
3. Medical materiel is not safeguarded prior to anticipated chemical attack.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 6-3: Repeat of Problem 6-2.

4QFY95/1QFY95

PROBLEM 6-4:

1. Units often execute the three tenets of CHS inadequately:
   - treatment
   - evacuation and command
   - control and communications.

   Client units do not integrate CHS plans with tactical plans.

1. Establish and employ the field X-ray during FTXs and sick call.
2. Develop a situational training exercise (STX) based on ARTEP task 8-2-0314.
3. Update unit treatment protocols.
4. Ensure CHS plans consider:
   - timely arrival of treatment assets
   - adequate evacuation
   - C3 for each phase of the operation.

   Appoint a single individual (most likely the brigade surgeon or the brigade S-1) to act as CINC MEDEVAC.

   - ensures units conduct comprehensive CHS planning, preparation and integration.

   Treat CHS as a combat operation requiring detailed rehearsals.

   Include CHS wargaming, coordination meetings and rehearsals in the brigade timeline.

   CINC MEDEVAC must coordinate the attendance of key participants at each major event on the timeline.

   Make sure the brigade signal officer participates in designing the CHS communications architecture.

   Doctrinal references: FM 8-10-7 and "Medical management of Chemical Casualties" Handbook (Aug 93).

TA.7 Negative Trend 7: Maintenance

4QFY94

PROBLEM 7-1: Many 60mm and 81mm mortars are not maintained to TM-10 and -20 standards.

1. A large percentage of mortar sections show up without DA Form 2804-4 and required section equipment.
2. Many 60mm mortars fail to fire in the drop mode, forcing the gunner to use the trigger.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 7-2: Maintenance units frequently lack updated Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).

PROBLEM 7-3: Aviation maintenance (AVIM) slices sent in support of maintenance operations for a battalion size operation are typically too small.

1. The current AVIM ratio is 11-15 mechanics and one or two shops to support 40 airframes.
2. The AVIM is often improperly equipped to repair the components for every aircraft assigned to the Task Force.
   -Many AVIMs arrive without the capability to perform many simple tasks such as pressing bearings or making hydraulic lines.

PROBLEM 7-4: Maintenance commanders are frequently not prepared to conduct downed aircraft recovery and repair(DARRT) operations.

1. Units arrive with no battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) kits, manuals, or trained personnel.
2. Units combine search and rescue (SAR) and DARRT operations.
3. Units do not designate an aircraft specifically for DARRT

RESULT: Wasted time preparing a different aircraft every time DARRT is required.

1. Assign one maintenance unit the responsibility of:
   - reporting status to the Task Force Commander
   - managing the maintenance flow for the entire Task Force.
   - writing an SOP which outlines TF maintenance procedures.
   - distributing the published SOP to other maintenance slices within the TF.

   Include SOP for the maintenance unit responsible to support TF aircraft.

   Ensure the SOP contains procedures for reporting aircraft status and oil samples.

   Ensure aviation maintenance (AVIM) units are trained to support the rotational unit.

   Doctrinal references:

   - FM 1-500. Examples of tactical SOPs.

   - FM 1-513, FM 1-500, and FM 20-30.

TA.7 Negative Trend 8: CSS Integration

4QFY94

PROBLEM 8-1: Brigade staffs frequently do not integrate the brigade S-1, S-4, and FSB support operations into the staff planning process.

RESULT: The logistics plan is not tied into the tactical plan.

1. The S-1, S-4 and FSB staff have difficulty tracking the battle.
2. Prevents anticipating requirements.
3. Inhibits providing proactive logistical support.
4. Hinders use of FSB as an alternate brigade TOC.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 8-2: Heavy teams either lack logistical SOPs or do not effectively use them.

1. Typically the heavy team deploys without a working logistical tracking, reporting or requesting system.
2. The link from the heavy team to the brigade ALOC lacks the appropriate coordination and planning to be effective.

PROBLEM 8-3: Repeat of Problem 8-1.

Table of Contents
TA. 7, Part 1