Military

PROBLEM 1-3: Brigade task forces rarely have a clear picture of the readiness status of their NBC and Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE).

Task force TSOPs usually lack a report mechanism to enable brigade and battalion staffs to maintain a status of critical NBC equipment except for the organic unit's initial report at home station.

PROBLEM 1-4: Most chemical related missions, such as smoke or decontamination, are performed under hasty conditions.

1. Results from ineffective planning and coordination by the supported units.
2. There is usually sufficient time to put together an effective plan and disseminate it to soldiers.
   - Platoon and squad leaders are not using this time effectively.

   Insufficient training and inadequate SOPs require leaders to spend time training tasks their soldiers should already know.

   - Junior NCOs are unfamiliar with the procedure to turn a mission concept into a viable plan. (e.g., action on contact, ambushes, etc.)

PROBLEM 1-5: The chemical staff rarely coordinates with other than the S-2 and S-3.

PROBLEM 1-6: Chemical platoons continue to have problems with the task of securing and defending the unit position.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 1-7: Repeat of Problem 1-1.

PROBLEM 1-9: Repeat of Problem 1-3.

PROBLEM 1-10: Repeat of Problem 1-4.

PROBLEM 1-11: Repeat of Problem 1-5.

PROBLEM 1-12: Chemical units demonstrate difficulty in securing and defending unit positions:

1. Poorly selected fighting positions
2. Improperly constructed fighting positions
3. Wire obstacles not emplaced
4. Early warning devices not emplaced..

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 1-13: Units frequently have no Chemical Casualty plans outlined in their SOPs.

1. BDE/BN Task Forces often are not prepared to counter the chemical threat.
   - No SOPs
   - No plans in lieu of SOPs

   Patient decon sites are usually collocated with the thorough decontamination sites.

   - The conventional casualty evacuation process does not support this operation.

   Early segregation and decontamination of contaminated casualties are rarelyperformed at the company level.

   Battalion sized elements are not trained, organized nor equipped to perform patient decontamination.

   The BN TF does not use its existing casualty evacuation system to evacuate chemical casualties.

   - They rely on BDE to develop a separate chemical casualty evacuation plan.

   Medical companies in the brigade support area (BSA) are insufficiently equipped to accommodate a chemical mass casualty event.

   BDE/BN chemical staff members do not interface with the medical community for casualty estimation, logistic, evacuation, treatment, or other management concerns.

RESULTS:

1. Delays in evacuation of casualties.
2. A large number of personnel die of wounds before medical treatment is performed.

1. Chemical units must train with the task force and its subordinate elements at Home Station.
2. Chemical platoon leaders should attend brigade training meetings.
3. Division chemical officers need to take a more active role in chemical unit training, while aggressively training brigade chemical officers on how best to use attached assets.
4. Brigade and battalion XOs and S-3s must ensure early integration of chemical assets into the decision making process.
5. Chemical sections must ensure that the staff is aware of what information the chemical officer should review before the information is filed away.
6. The chemical officer should routinely examine the staff log and regularly confer with his higher counterpart.
7. Battalion and company sections should not assume that "no news is good news."
8. Home Station training:
   - use critical chemical defense equipment (CDE) such as M8A1 alarms, protective clothing, chemical decontamination equipment, etc.
   - equipment familiarity and the consistent exercise of the reporting system
   - improved mission execution
   - more accurate status reporting.
   - platoon and squad leaders should devise hasty planning techniques for smoke and decontamination missions.
   - for instance, the platoon leader can save time by briefing the entire platoon instead of the squad leaders prior to mission execution.

   Teach troop leading procedures down to the junior NCO level.

   Platoon sergeants should ensure that squad leaders conduct effective pre-combat inspections.

   Leaders at platoon level must take force protection seriously.

   - Commanders must establish the standard and allocate time and resources. NCOs must enforce the standards to train the following task at Home Station IAW applicable MTPs:

   - occupation and security of assembly areas

   - perimeter defense

   Use non-standard evacuation methods and ambulance exchange points to transport uncontaminated casualties to the medical support units.

1. Chemical company commanders must ensure preparation of a TSOP which contains all possible platoon battle drills.
2. Establish a standard report which can be updated daily by chemical staffs at all levels.
3. Include chemical defense equipment (CDE) on daily LOGSTAT reports.

TA.6 Negative Trend 2: Force Protection

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Leaders are not taking necessary measures to protect soldiers.

1. Lack of observation posts (OPs) and security patrols
2. Improper movement techniques
3. Inadequate fighting positions
4. Insufficient dispersion, both during movement and in static position
5. Poor noise, light and litter discipline
6. No passive air defense

RESULT: Lack of force protection costs many units unnecessary casualties.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 2-2: Aviation units are habitually weak in force protection.

1. Chains of command fail to ensure that fighting positions have overlapping fields of fire, range cards, clear fields of fire, and appropriate locations.
2. Crew-served weapon positions are not constructed to standard to protect from indirect fire.
3. Crew-served weapon positions are frequently not camouflaged.
4. Most units do not properly utilize Class IV and early warning devices.
5. First sergeants fail to establish a sergeant of the guard.
   - soldiers fall asleep in their positions.

PROBLEM 2-3: Air defense elements experience very high casualty rates primarily from direct, small arms fire and from minefields.

1. Air defense units are generally deficient in basic fieldcraft.
2. Ineffective coordination with supported and adjacent units.
3. General lack of situational awareness.

PROBLEM 2-4: Units generally fail to provide force protection against terrorists and subversives.

1. Easy access to brigade TOCs, traffic control points and base clusters/troop concentration areas along mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.
2. Checkpoints are often easy to bypass.
3. Checkpoints provide inadequate direct/indirect fire protection to guards and guard vehicles.
4. The outside of perimeter wire within hand grenade range of tents, vehicles, and positions is often not protected by early warning devices.

PROBLEM 2-5: Most signal units lack the training and equipment to adequately defend themselves from enemy attack. They generally require the following additional skill training:

1. Individual and element tactical movement.
2. Patrolling.
3. Preparation of individual and crew-served fighting positions.
4. Proper emplacement and operation of listening posts (LP)/observation posts (OP).
5. Planning, construction and maintenance of tactical and protective obstacles.

PROBLEM 2-6: Leaders and soldiers are not taking the proper steps to protect the force.

1. Improper movement techniques
2. Inadequate preparation of individual fighting positions
   - use of sector stakes, preparation of range cards, and use of sector sketches

   Poor dispersion during halts or in patrol bases

   Poor noise, light and litter discipline

   Inconsistent use of LP/OPs

   Local R&S patrolling not consistent with the enemy threat

   Lack of understanding of the tactical rules of engagement

   Inadequate use of passive/ active air defense measures

   Poor leader supervision of field hygiene.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: Repeat of Problem 2-6.

PROBLEM 2-8: Force protection continues to be a major shortcoming in the aviation assembly area.

1. Invariably a terrorist group conducts a level one terrorist attack which renders the aviation task force combat ineffective.
2. Aviation units know that they are an enemy high payoff target, but do little to reduce their risk.
   - Inadequate OPSEC.
   -- Terrorists develop their own intelligence using civilians on the battlefield or by simply observing the assembly area.
   - Perimeter defense needs improvement.
   - Efforts to prevent terrorists from entering assembly area unsuccessful.
   - Personnel remain unprotected.

1. Leaders should stress force protection in all training events.
2. Stress self-discipline. It is directly related to successful force protection.
3. Train elements how to establish and enforce OPSEC.
4. Integrate safety into the planning and execution of all operations.
5. Identify and prioritize asset protection. Key assets include the FARP, aircraft and command and control nodes.
6. Consider displacing key assets prior to the most likely time of enemy attack.
7. Obtain and integrate infantry support into the assembly area defense when possible.
8. Train force protection at Home Station at every opportunity.
9. Commanders must assess the threat and specify a level of force protection for the area of operations.
10. Focus on basic skills:
    - practice preparing individual fighting positions. Emphasize:
    - sector stakes
    - clearing fields of fire
    - drawing range cards and sector sketches (priorities of work).
    - focus on squad and platoon movement techniques.

    Treat every halt as a hasty defense.

    - If units halt more than 15 minutes, begin to prepare hasty fighting positions.

    Enforce disciplined response to hostile air.

    Use vignettes to drill the rules of engagement.

    Use reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrols

    - to confirm or deny enemy presence

    - to provide early warning and security.

    Focus on squad and platoon movement techniques consistent with desired speed, security, cover and concealment, fields of fire, dispersion, command and control, and the enemy threat.

    Strictly adhere to noise, light, and litter discipline.

    Leaders must enforce field hygiene.

    Limit observation. Use an active R&S plan employing observation posts (OPs), dismounted patrols and aviation assets.

    Preventing terrorists from entering the assembly area may be impossible. Limit the amount of damage once the terrorists are in the perimeter.

    - Conduct battle drills keyed on keeping the enemy away from their high payoff targets, the aircraft and the FARP.

    - Use a reaction force to combat the terrorists

    - Develop a fratricide prevention plan to protect the reaction force.

    Ensure that every person has a survivability position

    Doctrinal references:

    - FM 7-8, chapters 1 and 2 and FM 7-20, Appendix C.

    - FM 5-7-30, pages 5-1 thru 5-9. Guidance on developing and executing a brigade force protection plan.

    - FM 5-114, Appendix A. Guidance on countering potential threats.

    - FM 7-8, FM 21-75, FM 5-103 and FM 20-3.

    - GTA 7-6-1

    - STP 21 series

    - FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data. Construction of tactical and protective obstacles.

    - GTA 7-6-1, Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leaders' Reference Card. Construction of common types of individual and crew-served fighting positions.

    - FM 7-8, Chapters 1,2

    - FM 7-20, Appendix C

Table of Contents
TA. 5, Intelligence
TA. 6, Part 2