UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

SECTION II

SECTION N - NEEDS EMPHASIS

TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE

TA. 5 Negative Trend 1: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

Observation frequency:4QFY941-3QFY954QFY95 / 1QFY962-3QFY96
1122

4QFY94

PROBLEM 1-1: Initial IPB products are generally satisfactory. But many intelligence sections fail to continue and complete the process.

EXAMPLES:

  1. Failure to update terrain by receiving, plotting, and disseminating lines of communication (LOCs) or crossing points that were not initially identified on the maps.
  2. Failure to incorporate weather changes and their effects on terrain, as reflected in the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).
  3. Event templates are usually not developed.

RESULT: S-2s fail to explore all of the courses of action available to the enemy.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 1-2: Commanders and S-2s often do not thoroughly develop commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) for priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that support intelligence gathering for the maneuver plan.

  1. Reconnaissance and surveillance (R& plans fail to focus the intelligence gathering effort.
  2. Subordinate units are not tasked with specific named areas of interest (NAIs).
  3. S-2s do not have standard debriefing procedures or standard procedures for reviewing gun tapes (aviation units).

RESULTS:

  1. missed intelligence
  2. poor analysis
  3. failure to update the R&S plan because of a lack of information

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3: Units develop two separate IPB products:

  1. The brigade S-2 develops a "ground" IPB
  2. The air defense officer develops the air IPB.

RESULT: Products are disseminated with no integration or synchronization.

PROBLEM 1-4:

  1. Chemical staffs rarely prepare NBC IPB. They apparently lack understanding of the process, the resultant products, and the potential impact on the scheme of maneuver.
  2. Chemical staffs frequently fail to coordinate with S-2s or other staff sections which impact on NBC operations.
  3. Chemical staffs are too often unfamiliar with area studies, enemy order of battle and intelligence handbooks for the area of operations.

RESULT: Chemical staffs cannot effectively integrate into the Tactical Decision Making Process.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 1-5: Repeat of Problem 1-1 PLUS:

  1. Inability to assess enemy's intentions.
  2. Failure to establish a pattern in the enemy's employment of air assets.
  3. Inability to predict enemy actions and confirm or deny templated enemy positions.
  4. Early warning tracks of aircraft are not immediately analyzed.

RESULT: Early warning tracks are not used to target resupply aircraft with other brigade weapon systems while they are still on the landing zone.

PROBLEM 1-6: Aviation S-2s are not familiar with the steps and importance of the IPB process. S-2s produce the initial products required by defining the battlefield environment and describing the battlefield effects but do not integrate these products with the rest of the staff during the decision making process.

  1. S-2 normally produces only one situational template based on the enemy's most probable course of action.
  2. After the unit begins executing a mission, the S-2 does not continuously update all the IPB products and focuses only on a situation map.

RESULTS:

  1. Lack necessary enemy courses of action (COAs) to conduct wargaming.
  2. Most dangerous course of action generally ignored.
  3. Battlefield information is not analyzed
  4. Products not distributed to subordinate commanders.

TECHNIQUES
  1. Battalion commanders must issue clear guidance and ensure that all staff officers and subordinate commanders participate in the IPB process.
  2. Task subordinate units with specific intelligence gathering requirements.
  3. Aviation units - develop aircrew and ground patrol debriefing checklists to ensure all information is available to continue to update IPB products.
  4. Develop only one set of IPB products with an integrated ground/air focus.
    - provides the brigade commander and staff a total picture
    - highlights how the enemy intends to synchronize his air and ground scheme of maneuver.
  5. Make an IPB checklist. Use it in performing required actions.
  6. Learn what information the S-2, S-3, air defense officer, fire support officer and higher headquarters can provide.
  7. Use appropriate information for terrain analysis, weather analysis, and threat and vulnerability analysis.
  8. Base the chemical support plan on the IPB results.
  9. Immediately analyze early warning tracks to determine if the enemy's current intentions are stable or if they are changing.
  10. Use historical early warning tracks for predictive analysis.
  11. S-2 must become familiar with IPB process and its integration into the decision making process.
  12. The XO should conduct Home Station training on the decision making process.
    - to train the entire battlestaff on IPB
    - to stress the importance of S-2 products.
  13. Doctrinal References: - FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units, Appendix D, E
    - TC 3-4, Chemical Battle Staff Handbook Chapter 8
    - FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
    - ST 101-5


TA.5 Negative Trend 2: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&

Observation frequency:4QFY941-3QFY954QFY95 / 1QFY962-3QFY96
32

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 2-1:

  1. Staffs do not use available assets to gain a clear picture of the battlefield.
  2. A perceived lack of planning time hinders reconnaissance efforts.
  3. Collection planning is weak. Units do not focus on named areas on interest (NAIs):
    - Usually too many NAIs identified.
    - Unclear taskings to subordinate elements.

PROBLEM 2-2:

  1. S-2s often to not issue specific start/stop times and specific information requirements (SIRs) to collectors as part of an R& Matrix and/or overlay.
  2. S-2s seldom consider all available collection assets.

RESULT: Wasted time.

PROBLEM 2-3:

  1. OPORD does not include R&S tasks in paragraph 3 (Tasks to Subordinate Units).
  2. Units do not brief R&S taskings during backbriefs or rehearsals.

RESULT: Subordinate units fail to execute R& plans.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 2-4: Commanders do not closely monitor the execution of R& plans. Despite adequate initial R& plans, S-3s and S-2s struggle with R& planning and execution.

  1. Slow to modify plans to reflect changing situation or requirements.
  2. Insufficient graphic R& overlays to augment the plan.
  3. Products limited to an R& matrix and distributing the information over FM voice.

RESULT: Commanders lose sight of their collection assets.

PROBLEM 2-5: Repeat of Problem 2-1 PLUS:
Brigades are not effectively using aviation assets as reconnaissance platforms.

TECHNIQUES
  1. Use all available assets to refine templates.
  2. Execute the collection plan. Track and analyze the follow-up reporting.
  3. Closely monitor the R& S execution. Adjust as necessary.
  4. Issue a FRAGO to revise the collection plan for every intelligence picture update.
  5. Produce overlays to accompany the R&S matrix.
  6. Develop only as many named areas of interest (NAIs) as collection assets can realistically cover.
  7. Modify and update the plan as changes in the situation occur.
  8. Monitor the R&S plan closely and strictly enforce accurate reporting.
  9. Disseminate R&S plans and graphics in hard-copy and brief collectors face-to-face during orders, rehearsals, etc.
  10. Use all available assets to refine the templates.
  11. Execute the collection plan as published.
  12. Track and analyze critical follow up reporting.
  13. Produce a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) to update the collection plan every time the intelligence picture is updated.

6. Doctrinal references:

- FM 34-2-1 defines the standards for R& planning
- FM 34-2 and FM 34-2-1 for specific R& planning techniques and procedures.
- FM 7-8, FM 7-10,FM 7-20 and FM 7-92


TA.5 Negative Trend 3: S-2 Analysis and Reporting

Observation frequency:4QFY941-3QFY954QFY95 / 1QFY962-3QFY96
31

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 3-1:

  1. S-2s often perform no analysis. They distribute all the raw information they receive.
  2. Division level SITEMPS rarely appear at brigade and battalion level.
  3. S-2s do not refine SITEMPS received from higher.
  4. S-2s fail to analyze information for patterns emerging from enemy activities.

RESULT: Subordinate units are overwhelmed with irrelevant information.

PROBLEM 3-2: S-2s do not clearly understand their role in the TDMP.:

  1. Prematurely dole out Intelligence Estimates piecemeal.
  2. Seldom provide complete and coherent intelligence estimate brief.
  3. Mission analysis:
    - Fail to identify the enemy's center of gravity.
    - Neglect to advise the commander whether the restated mission will produce the desired effects on the enemy.
  4. Do not recommend deception objectives/targets.
  5. Often do not prepare event templates or High Value Target Lists for wargaming sessions.
  6. Generally fail to present a stubborn and uncooperative enemy during wargaming.
  7. Frequently do not assist S-3s in preparing the Decision Support Template (DST).

PROBLEM 3-3: S-2s do not demonstrate an understanding of targeting methodology.

  1. Unit targeting meetings:
    - S-2s do not provide High Value Targets.
    - do not help select High Pay-off Targets from the High Value Target List.
  2. S-2s do not develop collection plans to support target damage assessment despite their role as the primary means of assessing the target effect of delivery systems.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 3-4: Sporadic transmission of battlefield information by air crews inhibits S-2's ability to conduct the analysis.

  1. Collection plans frequently do not focus on
    - answering priority intelligence requirements (PIR)
    - confirming or denying an enemy course of action (COA).
  2. During execution of the collection plan, air crew reporting and S-2 debriefs occur irregularly.

RESULT: Intelligence does not drive maneuver.

TECHNIQUES
  1. S-2s must learn to "step back" from the information and message traffic.
    - puts the information in perspective
    - enhances ability to recognize developing patterns
  2. Enforce compliance with existing SOPs that directly address reporting and debriefs.
  3. Ensure that S-2s develop an understanding of collection planning and the linkage to priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to confirm or deny enemy COAs.
  4. Doctrinal references:
    - FM 101-5, Operations and FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Doctrinal guidance on the S-2s responsibilities during each phase of the military decision making process (TMDM.).
    - FM 6-20-10, Targeting Techniques and Procedures.
    - FMs 34-3 and 34-7. Doctrinal analytical techniques and procedures.
    - CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning. Additional techniques and procedures.


TA.5 Negative Trend 4: Effective Use of Assets

Observation frequency:4QFY941-3QFY954QFY95 / 1QFY962-3QFY96
1 3

4QFY94

PROBLEM 4-1: Often Intelligence BOS personnel do not fully understand intelligence doctrine and the equipment available to execute it.

RESULT: Commanders often miss opportunities that would have been available if intel assets were used doctrinally.

EXAMPLES:

  1. Ineffective use of ground surveillance radar (GSR) to supplement call for fire during limited visibility
  2. Unwillingness to effectively use the Portable Monitoring System (PMS) of the remotely monitored battle sensor system (REMBASS).

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 4-2: MI Company commanders generally continue to fall short in asset integration and utilization.

  1. Lack of detailed collection plans.
  2. Inadequate or incomplete R&S plans.
  3. Lack of taskings to identify:
    - priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)
    - intelligence requirements (IRs)
    - special intelligence requirements (SIRs)
    - named areas of interest (NAIs)
    - the time period to observe.
  4. Failure to use available assets.
  5. Poor tracking of the R&S plan.

RESULTS:

  1. Collection assets lack focus, direction or guidance.
  2. Independent, uncoordinated collection efforts which fail to answer PIR.
  3. Poor tracking makes units reactive rather than proactive.

PROBLEM 4-3: S-2s do not routinely debrief scouts and patrols.

- Most units do not use the debriefing formats in the unit SOP.

PROBLEM 4-4: S-2s do not talk to adjacent unit S-2s. Nor do they seem to understand their own communications architecture.

  1. Failure to maximize use of available assets to communicate with higher, adjacent and subordinate elements.
    - ( e.g., mobile subscriber equipment [MSE], frequency modulated radio [FM], TACFlRE, liaison officers [LNOs], etc.)
  2. Battalion S-2s talk to the brigade S-2, but do not talk to each other.

RESULT: Maneuver battalion S-2s miss a wealth of information and intelligence available from the FSB, artillery, aviation and other maneuver S-2s.

TECHNIQUES
  1. Conduct training at Home Station to develop a better understanding between asset users and asset managers on how the integration process should work. BOS leaders should train each other under the intel asset managers lead.
    - Asset managers must ensure that all planners and users are familiar with where intel asset employment would best support mission accomplishment.
    - BOS leaders should understand the capabilities and limitations of each asset and how to integrate each asset to augment battlefield intelligence operations.
  2. The MI Company (MICO) commander and the brigade S-2 must team up to ensure maximum coverage and effective use of all available assets.
  3. Establish specific guidelines for mission planning and subsequent analysis.
  4. Specify command relationships and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support.
  5. S-2s should train at Home Station to become familiar with all available communication systems and proficient in their employment.
  6. Doctrinal references:
    - FM 34-1 and FM 34-3. Dissemination techniques.
    - Fm 34-10, FM 34-80 and FM 34-1.

Table of Contents
TA. 4, Command and Control
TA. 6, Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list