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TA. 6 MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY (cont)

TA. 6 Negative Trend 3: Mine Detection/Clearance

4QFY94

PROBLEM 3-1:

1. Commanders and staffs underestimate the significance of the enemy mine threat.
2. Soldiers lack mine awareness.
3. Engineers are not proficient at detecting buried mines.
4. Battalion task forces do not conduct route clearance as a combined arms operation.
   - They do not include the deployment and use of M9 mine rollers as a part of the combined arms approach to route clearance.

   Brigade and battalion task forces do not apply the five breaching tenets to route clearance operations.

   Engineer leaders do not have systems to track enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL).

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 3-2: Repeat of Problem 3-1.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 3-3: Units are consistently weak in the proper use of mine detectors.

1. Soldiers often sweep randomly and haphazardly.
2. They fail to mark the left or right limits of their sweeps, often missing antitank (AT) and antipersonnel (AP) mines.

PROBLEM 3-4: Brigades do not develop a continuous route clearance plan to support their sector of responsibility.

RESULT: Units resort to detection by detonation, as personnel move freely about the brigade sector.

PROBLEM 3-5: As they prepare and execute defensive operations, task force engineers establish mine dumps to support their obstacle emplacement in sector.

1. The mine dumps are not centrally located to ensure minimal travel time and reduce security requirements.
2. Platoons make minimal effort to properly camouflage and protect the critical mine supply dumps.
3. Units have digging assets available, but do not use them to dig in mine dumps.
4. Engineers are often given the responsibility to operate the mine dumps.
   - detracts from available engineers for obstacle emplacement.

1. Train soldiers to gain and maintain mine awareness.
2. Use Home Station training opportunities to train route clearance as a combined arms operation.
3. Modify the SALUTE report to include more detailed information on enemy obstacles.
4. Train mine detector operators IAW the applicable TM. Develop squad level minesweep SOPs.
5. The assistant brigade engineer and the engineer company commander must synchronize and develop an enemy obstacle template to assist in the IPB analysis and in the development of a combined arms route clearance plan.
6. Integrate the Deployable Intelligence Support Element capabilities into the analysis.
7. The brigade engineer must work with S-2 and S-3 to develop an R&S plan to confirm or deny the enemy obstacle template.
8. TF engineers must properly conceal and protect their primary means of obstacle supply (Class V, mines).
9. Task forces must develop a Class IV/V supply point and mine dump SOP for defensive operations.
10. Use bde or higher level haul assets to transport mines to the mine dump and nodes.
11. Establish a mine dump for each obstacle group.
12. Maneuver units must provide support personnel to uncrate, inspect, configure and transport the mines for emplacement by the engineers.
13. Doctrinal reference: FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, Chapter 2, pg. 2-33 thru 2-41.

Develop and implement an enemy obstacle marking SOP.

TA.6 Negative Trend 4: Breaching Operations

4QFY94

PROBLEM 4-1:

1. Commanders and staffs do not apply all five breaching tenets.
2. Engineers rarely receive enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL).
3. Task forces neither mass nor synchronize their breach/assault efforts at the objective.
4. Task forces do not conduct effective reverse sequence planning-- from the objective to local assembly areas.
5. The combined arms team does not conduct full force rehearsals.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 4-2: Repeat of Problem 4-1.

1. Implement the five breaching tenets:
   - intelligence
   - breaching fundamentals
   - breaching organization
   - mass
   - synchronization.

   Develop and implement a combined arms breach training program in accordance with FM 90-13-1, chapter 7, "Combined Arms Breaching Operations."

TA.6 Negative Trend 5: Battle tracking/Reporting

4QFY94

PROBLEM 5-1: Engineer leaders usually lack an established system to track engineer operations.

1. Reporting is untimely and incomplete or inaccurate.
2. Problems are compounded by the lack of communications hardware between the brigade engineer and the task force engineers.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2: Repeat of Problem 5-1.

1. Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision making process.
   - Review TACSOPs
   - Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.

   Doctrinal reference: FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations, Chapter 2.

TA.6 Negative Trend 6: Combined Arms Obstacle Integration

4QFY94

PROBLEM 6-1: Commanders and staffs do not understand the echelons of obstacle planning and execution.

1. Obstacle plans are generally ineffective.
   - do not attack the enemy's ability to maneuver
   - do not multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

   Engineers continue to emplace point obstacles which the enemy easily bypasses.

   Staffs do not understand mine supply operations.

   Insufficient specific guidance to engineer platoon leaders about the location of obstacles as planned by battalion.

RESULTS:

1. Critical resources are seldom delivered on time at the right location.
2. Task forces continue to plan situational obstacles (MOPMS, Volcano, ADAM/RAAMS) as time driven execution instead of event driven.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 6-2: Repeat of Problem 6-1 PLUS:

1. Engineers continue to emplace point obstacles which the enemy easily bypasses.
2. Commanders and staffs do not understand the detailed planning process required to execute reserve obstacles.

1. Engineers must train the combined arms team leaders on obstacle integration.
   - Focus on echelons of obstacle planning and execution

   Task forces must conduct situational obstacle planning and execution (MOPMS, Volcano, and ADAM/RAAMS).

   Engineers must emplace linear obstacles where appropriate

   - do not rely on just point obstacles.

   Task forces must conduct detailed planning for reserve obstacle groups.

   Doctrinal reference: FM 90-7"Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, chapter 3 and chapter 6, 7 and 8.

TA.6 Negative Trend 7: Improve BSA Defense

4QFY94

PROBLEM 7-1: Most FSBs do not plan or execute a brigade support area (BSA) defense operations efficiently.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 7-2: Most FSBs do not plan or execute BSA defense operations efficiently.

NOTE: review JRTC's "Defense of the BSA" video tape. See ordering information at the back of this publication.

1. Initiate planning the defense immediately upon arrival at the new site.
2. Forward support battalions (FSBs) and tenant units should conduct combined security sweeps and establish hasty security to receive the main body.
3. Begin to establish the brigade support area (BSA) commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.
4. Continue to improve and upgrade the defense based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).
5. Ensure all units and soldiers within the BSA are familiarize with the FSB's TSOP.
6. Maximize use of available weapon systems to enhance the defense of BSA tenants. (e.g., integrate tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFVs] into the plan. If a tank is waiting for mobility parts, but the gun system functions, that tank can be factored into a static defense plan.)

TA.6 Negative Trend 8: PSYOP Integration

4QFY94

PROBLEM 8-1: In brigades where PSYOP is not integrated, the brigade PSYOP element (BPSE) is often on the periphery of brigade operations. It strives to execute its mission without understanding what the maneuver unit wants or needs to accomplish with PSYOP.

PROBLEM 8-2: Command, control and communications by the BPSE of its PSYOP assets is a recurring weakness mainly caused by poor communications.