Military

RESULT: Value of the entire staff expertise and analysis is lost.

PROBLEM 4-2: Repeat of Problem 4-1, PLUS: Brigades lack the detailed analysis and total staff integration to develop a synchronization plan.

1. Participation of the entire staff in COA development and wargaming is rare.
2. Wargaming key events of the various COAs or the chosen COA seldom occurs.
3. Wargaming often turns into a pro forma planning step, rather than a thought provoking interactive session which identifies blemishes and flaws in a basic concept.

PROBLEM 4-3:

1. Task force XOs and S-3s tend to focus on the maneuver fight without considering enemy reactions.
2. CS and CSS are typically addressed at the end of the process and are never truly integrated or synchronized.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 4-4: Wargaming is not universally understood and conducted by staffs to the degree and level necessary to ensure success.

1. Wargaming detail is inadequate to support collection planning and targeting.
2. In some cases no wargaming is conducted at all.
3. S2s do not routinely produce event templates to facilitate the action-reaction-counteraction process of wargaming.

RESULT: Decision Support Templates (DST) are not developed.

PROBLEM 4-5: Commanders and staffs do not thoroughly wargame the reserve fight.

1. The commander does not assign planning priorities.
2. The commander does not protect the reserve from being piecemealed by "911" missions.
3. Staffs fail to conduct serious analysis of time/space requirements and the trigger points for reserve commitment.
4. A separate element to handle QRF/TCF missions is often not designated.

RESULT: Task force reserve often treated as a reaction force.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 4-6: Battalions do not structure search and attack plans using the find-fix-finish concept. Units find the enemy, but task forces are not task organizing, wargaming nor conducting detailed coordination to guarantee the successful employment of the finish force.

RESULT: Without a finishing force; ie., Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or the designated reserve, task forces are incapable of influencing search and attack operations.

PROBLEM 4-7: Staffs do not thoroughly analyze the courses of action using wargaming techniques.

PROBLEM 4-8: Units frequently develop courses of action that are not supported by a thorough IPB, especially during search and attack operations.

PROBLEM 4-9:

1. Lack of complete course of action concept sketches/statements.
2. Poor staff estimate input.
3. Difficulty determining decisive points crucial to focusing combat power.
4. Subordinate unit efforts not integrated or coordinated
5. Lack of a clear task organization.

RESULT: Failure to develop a focused course of action.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 4-10: Repeat of Problem 4-9.

PROBLEM 4-11: S-3s and commanders tend to disregard their S-2s during the course of action development and wargaming process.

1. S-2s are seldom prepared for wargaming sessions and rehearsals.
2. Fail to prepare products and information for wargaming sessions and rehearsals:
   - updated SITEMP, EVENTEMP and R&S plan.
   - inventory of assets available to detect and assess and priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

   S-2s do not present the free-thinking uncooperative enemy commander when opposing the friendly COAs during wargaming.

1. Incorporate all slice elements in COA development and wargaming.
2. Conduct detailed planning exercises.
   - identify staff planning responsibilities
   - hone the skills of the staff members
   - helps refine the planning procedures used in a field environment.

   Keep a record of key decisions made during the wargaming sessions.

   Encourage thought and dialog. Establish and enforce a time standard. Do not allow wargaming turn into a "good idea" session.

   Focus wargaming on critical events, actions, reactions and counter-reactions.

   As additional information becomes available, reassemble the staff and wargame key brigade decision points and "moving pieces" to ensure they are fully synchronized.

   Effective wargaming tests a selected COA and ensures the entire staff has a clear vision of how the COA will most likely unfold.

   Identify critical events early to focus the staff effort.

   Commanders must provide definitive guidance and establish priorities for planning.

   Record the wargaming results on a wargame worksheet or synchronization matrix:

   - facilitates orders preparation

   - serves as a rehearsal tool

   - serves as a draft execution matrix

   Practice wargaming during Home Station training to develop discipline.

   Integrate IPB into each phase of the decision making process.

   Establish a clear, task organization based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T).

   - maximize the combat power of the main and supporting efforts.

   Define decisive points. Focus subordinate units towards those points.

   S-2s must portray a difficult enemy.

   S-2s should present an uncooperative, doctrinally correct OPFOR that realistically challenges each friendly COA.

   S-2s must arrive at wargaming sessions and rehearsals with at least

   - situation template (SITEMP)

   - event template (EVENTEMP)

   - modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO)

   - high value target list HVTL

   - a draft reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

   Doctrinal references:

   - ST 100-9 - CALL Newsletter 95-12 Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning

TA.4 Negative Trend 5: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Operations

4QFY94

PROBLEM 5-1: TOC personnel are generally not trained in TOC management and internal organization, displacement, set-up procedures, security operations and maintenance.

1. Most battle staffs do not clearly understand individual duties and responsibilities
   - roles of NCOs and officers undefined.

   The physical layout of the TOC is not rehearsed

   No SOP exists.

   In some cases, the CTC rotation is the first time the battle staff has set up the TOC with the entire slice.

   Units are unclear on assumption of C2 between the tactical CP and TOC

   SOPs often inadequately address TOC operations.

RESULT:

1. Ineffective TOC operations
2. loss of adequate C2 during critical periods.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2: Battalion TOCs are often not organized and controlled to facilitate the exchange and analysis of information.

1. TOC personnel fail to enforce the duties and responsibilities in unit TACSOPs.
2. Radio telephone operators (RTOs) are frequently used to do other tasks.
3. TOC standards are not enforced
   - unnecessary equipment in the TOC
   - weapons and load bearing equipment (LBE) placed any place available
   - sleeping in the TOC.

   TOCs frequently become too loud to work in effectively.

   - unnecessary and uncontrolled personnel in the TOC

   - TOC personnel feel the need to raise their voices to be heard.

RESULTS:

1. Routine tasks, such as map board posting, radio checks, and basic information flow are not always conducted and supervised.
2. The operations (OPS) sergeant becomes an RTO and the battle captain has to do the OPS sergeant's job as well as his own.

PROBLEM 5-3: Brigades continue to use recent advanced course graduates as battle captains.

1. Do not understand their roles and responsibilities.
2. Lack experience and training to
   - function as the information manager in the brigade TOC
   - battle track the brigade fight
   - lead the TOC in staff battle drills.

   Battle captains seldom have a working knowledge of all the BOS and "slice" elements employed in the TOC.

   Most battle captains receive and pass information without analyzing the information in relation to commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

   Most NCOs in the TOC are underutilized.

   - often relegated to RTO duty

   - their experience is not utilized in analyzing and processing information.

   Most battle captains do not know what their responsibilities are.

PROBLEM 5-4:

1. Shift change briefings are not routinely conducted.
2. If conducted, they are frequently interrupted and difficult to focus on because of distractions in the TOC.
3. Shift change briefings do not follow established formats.
4. Key personnel are either not present to brief, or do not use their own aids (maps, overlays) to facilitate effective communications.
5. Shift change briefings too often are "one-on-one" sessions between the two battle captains.

PROBLEM 5-5: Units frequently experience degraded effectiveness of command and control during continuous combat operations due to fatigue.

1. The battalion XO does not consistently check or focus staff effort.
2. Key battle staff members do not have defined roles in mission preparation and execution.
3. Staffs do not follow up or supervise the resolution of issues and problems discovered by the battalion commander.
4. Staffs rarely keep pace with the battalion commander throughout all operations.

RESULTS:

1. Lack of quality control of staff products and timeliness.
2. Critical tasks are not performed and routinely checked.

PROBLEM 5-6: Rest periods are not planned into the time schedule.

1. Extremely long planning processes and frequent changes to plans keep leaders from resting.
2. Efforts to organize TOCs into shifts
   - rarely include key leaders.

   Key leaders tend to "go down" at the same time

   - no senior leadership in the TOC for extended period of time.

PROBLEM 5-7: Individual staff officers generally do not have the discipline to use the tools for planning and executing operations contained in the unit C2 SOP.

1. Staff members are not well organized to perform their specific function.
2. Staff members fail to ensure functional integration with other staff members.

RESULT: Unstructured efforts and lack of common staff procedures waste time.

PROBLEM 5-8: TOC soldiers seldom perform their duties without having to be told to do so or continuously supervised.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 5-9: Battalion subordinate elements often go for days without basic graphics such as unit boundaries.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 5-10:

1. TOCs organize too slowly
   - impedes command and control and Battle Staff integration.

   TOC personnel do not understand their specific duties and responsibilities as outlined in FM 7-20 and in unit SOPs.

   Non-standard map boards, maps, and overlays.

   TOC charts are ineffective as tools to manage and display critical information..

PROBLEM 5-11:

1. Battle Captains and Battle NCOs are not proficient in directing staff battle drills.
2. Staffs rarely train at home on executing staff battle drills.

RESULTS:

1. Unecesssarily large amounts of reaction time required for the staff to deal with certain foreseeable situations.
2. The brigade does not stay within the enemy's decision cycle.

1. Set up the TOC and tactical Command Post (CP) monthly at home station. Exercise all the systems in the TOC.
2. Practice different configurations for different situations and conditions to determine what works best in any given circumstance.
3. Develop a shift change checklist and practice shift change briefings with the entire battle staff.
4. Use dedicated radio telephone operators (RTOs).
5. Enforce TOC standards.
6. Post information as it is received.
7. Make sure charts display essential information in an easy to see/read format (particularly combat power).
8. Ensure that personnel perform the TACSOP duties as listed.
9. Conduct CPXs, TOCEXs, etc. at Home Station to train TOC personnel and to exercise the C2 systems.
10. Conduct AARs after each training exercise to learn from the mistakes made.
11. Assign a battle captain who has completed command.
12. Make sure SOPs outline the battle captain's duties and responsibilities.
13. Conduct exercises to drill the analysis process the battle captain should use as he receives information.
14. Train the battle captain to conduct staff battle drills.
15. TOC NCOs should supervise radio telephone operators (RTOs).
16. Integrate TOC NCOs into TOC operations.
    - clearly define their duties

    The XO/S3 should clearly define the battle captains' duties and responsibilities.

    For shift change briefs:

    - Enforce briefing formats and aids.

    - Require BOS OICs or their representatives to attend.

    Direct all staff personnel to develop and use battle books.

    Require staff members to use and maintain BOS checklists, tracking charts and easy reference planning charts

    - streamlines the decision making process

    - facilitates updating the commander.

    Weather-proof the battle books. Make them small enough to be deployable with the TOC as well as the TAC.

    Publish the standard for battlebooks in the TACSOP.

    - battalion XO reviews and approves each staff officer battle book to ensure completeness, conformity and unity of effort.

    Ensure cross-talk occurs between staff sections.

    Techniques for graphics dissemination:

    - Establish a courier system.

    - Use LOGPACs.

    - Take advantage of battlefield circulation by the command group.

    Develop and enforce specific duties and responsibilities for all TOC personnel including "slice" personnel.

    Prepare an SOP that describes the echelon/displacement and composition, by vehicle and personnel, of the TOC and TAC.

    Ensure map placement on map boards and overlays is standardized for all Battle Staff sections and slice elements operating in the TOC prior to deployment.

    Fully integrate slice elements into the TOC by providing a workspace and standardized maps.

    Ensure charts are routinely updated.

    Train the battlestaff on basic TOC drills

    Focus the principal staff on future operations

1. Standardize all maps and overlays for primary and special staff sections.
2. Develop tactical CP and TOC pre-combat inspection checklists.
   - Include load plans and vehicle manning.

   Define the role of the HHC chain of command in TOC and tactical CP management

   - emphasis on security, maintenance and movement.

   TOC SOP should be part of TSOP.

   The battalion XO and TOC NCOIC must develop and enforce the rest plan, shift changes and maintenance of the staff.

   - Update TACSOPs to include this plan.

   - Train and execute the rest plan during all field exercises.

Table of Contents
TA. 4, Part 3
TA. 4, Part 5