Military

PROBLEM 3-2:

1. Unit logistical planners fail to coordinate or publish resupply plans.
2. Unit commanders have no feel for the type or amount of supplies they can expect to receive.
3. Logistical personnel fail to track the flow of supplies to the battalion and subordinate units.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 3-3: Air defense battery commanders seldom conduct effective mission analysis during the brigade planning process.

1. Commanders fail to identify all specified and implied tasks.
2. Degraded ability to allocate forces in the brigade task organization and identify subordinate units tasks.
3. Force allocations do not reflect critical tasks nor the commander's priorities.
4. Air defense commanders do not identify subordinates to command and control fire units which are detached from their platoons to provide general support air defense for brigade elements.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 3-4: Air defense asset task organization is often developed and executed without proper analysis.

1. Units task organize in a vacuum. They seldom consider:
   - IPB
   - air defense priorities
   - the supported unit's scheme of maneuver

   In multi-phase operations, little thought is given to potential task organization changes for each phase.

PROBLEM 3-5:

1. Lack of coordination between the lifted unit and the aviation task force.
2. The initial air mission coordination meeting rarely includes any of the leaders.
   - primary players are usually the infantry S-3 Air and the pilots from the assault helicopter company.

   Initial involvement for the infantry battalion and aviation task force commanders is the Air Mission Briefing (AMB).

RESULT: The AMB turns into a coordination meeting, often changing the entire plan at the last minute.

PROBLEM 3-6:

1. Aviation is seldom integrated into the brigade scheme of maneuver.
2. If integrated, aviation is often an afterthought to fill gaps in the brigade plan.
3. Failure to integrate is often identified during the brigade rehearsal.
   - by then it is too late to make major changes to the plan.

RESULTS:

1. Lack of synchronization during mission execution.
2. Inability to mass critical combat power at a decisive point on the battlefield.

PROBLEM 3-7: Air defense personnel do not routinely attend key synchronization events.

1. Air defense mission analysis and OPORD are often conducted in isolation.
2. End product submitted directly to the S-3.

RESULT: The air defense plan is not synchronized with the supported commander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEM 3-8:

1. Commanders and engineers plan individual obstacles rather than obstacle groups.
2. Direct and indirect fires are not well integrated
3. Units do not template nor disseminate the location of scatterable mines.
4. When units do attempt to plan direct and indirect fires on obstacle groups, the priorities are not clear on where and when to fire on the enemy.
5. Overwatch of tactical and protective obstacles is limited by poor obstacle sighting and poor line of sight for the overwatching element.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 3-9:

1. The brigade targeting process often lacks focus and fails to orient collection efforts and supporting fires.
2. Participants come to targeting meetings unprepared.
3. Outcome is uncertain.
4. Intelligence, operations and fire support personnel do not focus on all elements (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) of the targeting process.
5. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPTs).
6. Units frequently do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus on:
   - collection plans
   - tasking specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest
   - tasking and synchronizing delivery
   - assessing assets.

PROBLEM 3-10:

1. S-2s do not understand their role in the targeting process.
   - decide, detect, deliver, assess doctrine set forth in FM 6-20-10
   - application of the IPB process
   - products or information they must provide at the targeting meeting.

   Battle staffs do not understand targeting.

   - lack experience using the targeting process.

PROBLEM 3-11: During the conduct of a brigade defense, the aviation task force is often tasked to be the security zone command and control headquarters. Augmented with ground assets to include mechanized forces and dismounted observation posts, the aviation task force is expected to screen the entire brigade front.

1. Failure to conduct the required IPB
2. Does not effectively employ all its assets.
3. Indequate planning of the rearward passage of lines for the ground forces.

RESULT: The aviation task force frequently proves incapable of controlling the fight.

PROBLEM 3-12: During the conduct of the brigade attack, the aviation task force is often diverted from conducting its primary mission of conducting a zone reconnaissance to support an infantry element in contact.

RESULT: Diversions preclude completion of a comprehensive zone reconnaissance.

1. Prepare and publish a resupply plan that is supportable, usable, and meets minimum requirements. - developed by logistical planners in coordination with the support operations officer of the forward support battalion (FSB).
2. The air defense battery commander must develop his plan concurrently with the brigade plan.
3. Teams providing air defense for brigade rear area elements must know the chain of command and reporting channels for the elements they support.
4. Total integration of the heavy team CSS personnel into the brigade area logistics operation center (ALOC) planning process is essential to ensure continuous and responsive support forward.
5. Continued coordination between the heavy team and the brigade ensures
   - developing the appropriate plans for tracking, reporting and requesting support for the heavy force
   - continuous communications with CSS LNOs.

   Task organize air defense assets based on IPB, the supported commander's air defense priorities and the scheme of maneuver.

   Involve infantry and aviation task force commanders and S-3s early in the planning process.

   - ensures the proper use of aviation assets during all phases of the battle.

   Reconnoiter landing zone (LZs) to ensure suitability early in the planning process.

   Provide a knowledgeable liaison officer (LNO) to the infantry battalion.

   - LNO keeps the aviation S-3 and commander informed.

   Conduct the air mission brief (AMB) at least 24 hours prior to H-hour.

   Rehearse all phases of the air assault at least 12 hours prior to H-hour.

   The aviation fire support officer (FSO) must the understand suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan.

   During wargaming, address aviation under each of the following BOSs:

   - intelligence

   - maneuver

   - fire support

   - logistics

   - command and control

   Conduct lateral coordination with the infantry battalions:

   - aviation will be required to operate throughout the brigade sector

   - ensures complete integration of the total tactical plan.

   The air defense officer (ADO) must synchronize his planning efforts with brigade.

   Proactively discuss air defense efforts with the brigade S-3 and commander to ensure the brigade's maneuver operations are not degraded by enemy air operations.

   Send scatterable mine warnings (SCATMINWARNs) task force and brigade TOCs

   Conduct reconnaissance. Adjust obstacle placement to support the maneuver force's ability to integrate with direct and indirect fires.

   Ensure necessary personnel prepare for and attend the targeting meeting.

   - The S-2 should present:

   - a current analysis of the enemy situation

   - current high value targets.

   - an analysis of enemy courses of action for the time period discussed at the targeting meeting (24-36 hours out)

   - the high value targets for this time period.

   - The S-3 should:

   - discuss updated guidance from the commander

   - highlight changes to the commander's intent.

   - present the current friendly situation.

   - describe future operations.

   - At the conclusion of the meeting

   - S-3 should cut a FRAGO

   - S-2 should update the R & S plan.

   - FSO/Targeting Officer

   - coordinate w/S-2 to develop HPTs

   - continually coordinate with all brigade elements to obtain the most accurate data for proposed targets.

   S-2s should develop high value targets (HVTs) as part of IPB and the

   Battlestaff should refine some HVTs to produce HPTs.

   The production of the HPTs is the decide process.

   The S-2

   - develops the R&S plan to detect where HPTs are likely to appear on the battlefield.

   - supports the assess portion of targeting with the R&S assets.

   - updates the following prior to the targeting meeting:

   - priority intelligence requirements (PIR)

   - high value target list (HVTL)

   - reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan

   - situation template (SITEMP)

   - event template (EVENTEM)

   Ensure that mission priority reflects the commander's intent

   Minimize distracters

   Maximize the capabilities of forward Army air defense command, control and intelligence (FAAD C2I) by routinely training operational procedures at Home Station.

   Doctrinal references:

   - FM 24-16, Communications-Electronics Operations, Orders, Record and Reports

   - for developing planning tools.

   - FM 44-100, Appendix B

   - for the air defense estimate process.

   - FM 44-100, U.S. Army Air Defense Operations, Chapters 4-6 and Appendix B. - FM 90-4.

   - FM 44-100 US. Army Air Defense Operations, Chapter 6 and Appendix B.

   - FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process, with emphasis on chapters 2 and 5. For a better understanding of the targeting process.

   - FM 6-20-10, chapters 1-4, 7, and 8.

   - FM 17-95, Cavalry Operation.

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TA. 4, Part 2
TA. 4, Part 4