Military

RESULTS:

1. Companies do not receive adequate supplies.
2. Unnecessary casualties and engineer equipment remaining idle over long periods of time because of no security and a lack of link up instructions.
3. Poor tracking of actual defensive preparation status.
4. Too often the TF engineer does not provide the TOC an obstacle plan, obstacle overlay or survivability matrix.
5. Operations overlays, including fire support and obstacle, are not used to check the synchronization of combat power.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 6-3: Brigade and battalion S-1s, S-4s, FSB support operations and the MPs continue to be omitted from the Tactical Decision Making Process.

1. Specifically, they are routinely omitted from:
   - personnel, casualty, and logistical estimate detailed briefings
   - COA development
   - wargaming

   MP platoons receive insufficient warning to conduct troop leading procedures and prepare to successfully accomplish their mission.

RESULT: Logistics, CHS and personnel considerations are not integrated and synchronized with the ground tactical plan.

PROBLEM 6-4: Staffs are not being integrated to produce a synchronized task force effort.

1. LOGPACs drive into minefields previously identified by unit engineers.
2. LOGPACs arrive too late to support companies crossing the line of departure.
3. Units conduct civil-military operations without incorporating attached civil affairs representatives into the planning process.
4. Units pushing Class IV for defensive operations with no plan on where to link up and drop the pallets.
5. Scouts are consistently sent on missions with no combat service support plan.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 6-5: The engineer and S-2 do not integrate their analyses to influence the effectiveness of current operations.

RESULT: Incomplete information on current enemy activity.

PROBLEM 6-6:

1. Aviation company fire support planning is almost nonexistent.
2. Seldom adjusted based upon the company commander's scheme of maneuver.
3. Aviation companies not resourced with a fire support team (FIST).

PROBLEM 6-7:

1. Units do not fully integrate coordinating and special staffs into a "Battle Staff" capable of operating as a team during the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) and mission execution.
2. Units which have not developed and trained as a combined staff often ignore several staff officers in staff estimates and orders development. (e.g.,civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), S-1, S-4, engineer (EN), air defense officer (ADO), brigade air liaison officer (BALO) and support arms liaison team officer (SALTO)

PROBLEM 6-8:

1. Insufficient coordination and integration between task organized units
2. Combined arms rock drill rehearsals at brigade and battalion level often exclude key BOS representation. .
3. Failure to achieve full scale rehearsals at company team and below.

RESULTS:

1. Extended amount of time on target.
2. Unsychronized execution.
3. Execution shortcomings such as timid and untimely deployment of forces, exposed flanks, no obscuration, and no attempt to secure the far side of unopposed point obstacles are common.

PROBLEM 6-9: Lack of planning and detailed coordination prior to occupation of positions.

RESULTS: Units consistently sacrifice available survivability effort.

PROBLEM 6-10: Units do not effectively synchronize all of their assets during combat operations.

RESULT: Subordinate units end up fighting separate fights instead of an integrated brigade fight.

1. Develop and rehearse TOC and combat train command post (CTCP) battle drills for recurring actions.
2. Train staff synchronization at Home Station.
   - conduct Home Station collective training using the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
   - integrate maneuver element staffs with CSS staffs and military police.
   - consider all Home Station training events as tactical missions.
   - Require the staff to develop a concept using the TDMP, produce an order and brief it.
   - Conduct multi-echelon training;
   - deploy the tactical CP or TOC and CTCP to train concurrently on staff/TOC SOPs
   - platoons and companies deploy to conduct internal training.

   Ensure synchronization of combat multipliers:

   - incorporate the entire staff including BOS representatives and attachments, into all aspects of TOC operations.

   - emphasize on wargaming, staff huddles, shift change-over briefings and targeting meetings.

   The company commander should coordinate with the TF fire support officer(FSO) for fire support.

   Battalion SOPs must address all members of the TOC. It must contain a clear and separate list of tasks to be accomplished by each individual.

   SOPs should describe how key personnel in the TOC should perform their duties. It must include attached special staff.

   Train the Battle Staff to work together as a team

   Plan to use the same personnel on the same shift.

   The Bn XO and S-3 should provide clear guidance and supervision for the accomplishment of duties and responsibilities.

   Use simple, well rehearsed, standard breach drills.

   Practice coordinating and integrating beyond the survivability execution matrix.

   Include integration of survivability requirements and link-up instructions with the quartering party in planning unit moves.

   Execute survivability operations prior to unit occupation.

   Designate a "synch dozer", usually a CSM or 1SG, to synchronize survivability assets and effort.

   Conduct targeting meetings,

   Develop synchronization matrices

   Prepare decision support templates, operational schedules (OPSKEDS), and execution checklists.

   Conduct war gaming and technical and combined arms rehearsals

   Doctrinal references:

   - FM 1-112

   - FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations with Change 1, Appendix D, Breaching Rehearsals and Chapter 3-6.

   - for all BOS leaders

1. Develop a staff/TOC SOP :
   - clearly defines the military decision making process (TMDM.)
   - articulates the duties and responsibilities of all associated staff members
   - include duties and responsibilities checklists for all battle staff members.
   - standardize the checklists
   - incorporate them in a staff officer "smart book"
   - include key planning tools and doctrinal excerpts.

   Include the TOC SOP in the unit SOP.

   Send NCOs to the NCO Battle Staff Course and then take them to the LTP prior to deployment.

TA.4 Negative Trend 7: Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP)

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1: Despite familiarity with the process, its intent and the products associated with each step, most battle staffs experience difficulty implementing TDMP.

1. Lack of clear focus for COA development and COA decision making.
   - leads to subsequent problems in OPORD development and issuance.

   Frequently S3 and the commander, with little help from the rest of the staff, develop one course of action and expect the staff to support it.

   Thorough analysis and wargaming of courses of action are rarely conducted.

   Steps in the decision making process are often omitted.

   Key personnel participation is intermittent as they are diverted to work other issues.

RESULT:

1. Poor integration of combat multipliers
2. Little or no synchronization.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 7-2:

1. Lack of detailed planning.
2. Lack of subordinate leader planning time.
   - Failure to apply the 1/3-2/3 rule.

   Weaknesses in the conduct of troop leading procedures.

   Few subordinate leaders clearly understand the mission and the commander's intent.

RESULTS:

1. Decentralized, unsynchronized planning.
2. Mission failure.

PROBLEM 7-3: The forward support battalion (FSB) staff does not plan nor manage security assets for the brigade support area (BSA).

1. Combat power of the BSA is unknown.
2. Available combat vehicles/systems are not used (e.g., mobility killed tanks, Bradleys, TOWs, etc,).
3. Generally not to standard:
   - fire support
   - Quick Reaction Force
   - observation posts(OPs)/listening posts (LPS)
   - survivability and fighting positions
   - anti-armor defenses

PROBLEM 7-4:

1. Most units fail to properly plan combat observation and lasing team (COLT) employment.
2. Little consideration is given to the COLT as an observer or target designation asset for Copperhead, OH 58Ds, Close Air Support, or Naval Gunfire.
3. COLTs are often handed off to subordinate units at the last minute with little planning or coordination time for either unit.

PROBLEM 7-5: FSB staffs routinely fail to execute or poorly execute the TDMP.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 7-6: Initial Field Artillery Support Plans (FASP) do a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control

1. Survey support diminishes after the firing batteries and radar are complete.
2. Units fail to consider assets in the task force i.e., 81 mm mortars, OH-58D, COLTS, targets, routes, and obstacles.

PROBLEM 7-7:

1. Aviation staffs have difficulty understanding the importance of following the sequence of the steps in the TDMP.
2. Staffs typically attempt to execute an abbreviated planning process.
3. Lack a sound understanding of the deliberate decision making process
4. Failure to continuously update products
5. Typically waste time, when time is short.

RESULTS:

1. Plans not coordinated or synchronized either internally or externally
2. No clear guidance to subordinate commanders
3. Rehearsals omitted.
4. Numerous minor details must be fixed to correct the overall problem.
5. Executive officers, who normally focus on logistical issues, must become the "chief" of staff and fulfill the staff leadership duties IAW ST 101-5.

PROBLEM 7-8: Units frequently develop courses of action that are not supported by a thorough IPB, especially during search and attack operations.

PROBLEM 7-9 Inadequate execution of TDMP.

1. Failure to adhere to the process
2. Do not conduct consolidated staff estimates
3. Do not convene the complete Battle Staff for mission analysis, COA development, COA decision making, and OPORD development.
4. Battle Staff estimates often incomplete or lack detail.

PROBLEM 7-10:

1. The commander's guidance for fire support is frequently vague.
   - does not focus fire support assets
   - unsupportable with available fire support assets.

   Commanders frequently use non-standard terminology.

   Improper use of standard terminology

RESULT: Despite using correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.

1. Familiarize staff personnel with the process.
   - understand the products
   - participate fully in the process.

   The battalion XO is the staff coordinator responsible for the execution of the tactical decision making process.

   Develop a Battle Staff training program. Reinforce the Tactical Decision Making Process through realistic training

   Emphasize adherence to the 1/3-2/3 rule for planning.

   Practice Troop Leading Procedures during Home Station field training exercises to gain and sustain proficiency.

   Conduct brigade support area (BSA) security and defense actions in sequence:

   - Initiate defensive preparation immediately upon arrival.

   - FSBs, along with tenant units, conduct security sweeps.

   - Establish hasty security to receive the main body.

   - Begin establishment of the BSA commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.

   - Continue to improve the defense based on METT-T.

   - All units and soldiers in the BSA must be familiar with the FSB TACSOP in order to respond correctly to significant events.

   - General:

   - make maximum use of all available weapon systems. For example, use mobility kill vehicles, to augment the firepower of BSA tenants.

   - rehearse the plan with tenant units and soldiers to ensure the TACSOP is synchronized within the B SA.

   Employing combat observation and lasing team (COLT) requires early consideration in the planning process.

   - The COLT mission has expanded from maximizing the use of Laser Guided Munitions to encompass target acquisition (detect) assets.

   - Use COLTs to:

   - weight the main effort

   - overwatch obstacles

   - adjust fires on a critical target, such as an AD minefield

   - Include COLTs in rehearsals, incorporate COLT communication, fire and extraction plans.

   - Train COLTs to use stealth to survive.

   Conduct Home Station collective training exercising TDMP.

   Practice TDMP when planning routine garrison missions and daily operations.

   Ensure that the survey annex in the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) considers all assets in the task force that require survey.

   Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station.

   - focus on the importance of effective survey.

   The staff must train the deliberate decision making process at Home Station to the point of it being a battle drill.

   Integrate IPB into each phase of the decision making process, ensuring that the final product is a coordinated, intelligence driven order.

   Commit key references to Battle Staff battle books to ensure proper execution.

   The FSO must:

   - verify the commander's interpretations of fire support terminology

   - confirm the availability of sufficient assets to achieve the commander's attack guidance.

   - fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires.

   - translate this into clear, concise and understandable terms.

   Doctrinal references:

   - FM 7-20, Chapter 2, Section II, the Command and Control Process

   - ST 101-5

   - FM 7-10

   - CALL Newsletter 95-12 Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning

   - FM 6-20-50, Appendix J for COLT employment.

   - ST 101-5 Command and Staff Decision Processes

   - CALL JRTC Orders Trainers Support Package

   - FM 6-2, Chapter 14-2, 14-7 15, and figure 15-1 (FSCOORD checklist).

   - FM 7-20, Section II, the Command and Control Process, Chapter 2

   - FM 101-5, Command and Battle Staff Decision Process.

   - FM 6-71 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, pg. 3-5

   - FM 6-20-10

   - CALL Newsletter 93-3, "The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff", July 93

1. Ensure the TACSOP outlines procedures for both the deliberate and hasty planning processes.
2. Put useful extracts from key references into staff battle books.
3. Prepare SOPs that include procedures for assembling the staff and detailed instructions on conducting an abbreviated planning process.
4. Develop SOPs for timely dissemination of information (i.e. graphics order, matrix order, etc.)
5. Designate the TF XO as the Battle Staff coordinator responsible for executing this process.

Table of Contents
TA. 4, Part 4
TA. 4, Part 6