Military

PROBLEM 2-3: Repeat of Problem 2-2, PLUS:

1. Exact location uncertain.
2. Frequent mismarking of boundary between companies
   - inadvertently creates gaps between elements which the enemy can exploit.

PROBLEM 2-4: Minefield tracking is still ineffective.

1. Frequent failure to track both friendly and enemy minefields on overlays and SIGACTS boards.
2. Lack of established techniques and procedures to disseminate this information.

PROBLEM 2-5: Units continue to experience difficulty in maintaining a clear picture of unit locations and status.

1. Inconsistent tracking of unit locations down to platoon and slice element levels.
2. Development of complex task organizations which are difficult to track.
3. Inability to understand command and support relationships in the task organization.
4. Lack of visibility on CS and CSS assets.
5. The TOC and combat trains command post (CTCP) rarely communicate with and provide one another essential information to permit effective battle tracking.

RESULT: Units rarely have an accurate picture of the task force's current combat power.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 2-6: Units are unable to maintain an overall situational awareness of the battlefield.

1. Inconsistent tracking of elements down to platoon level
2. Infrequent posting of unit locations to platoon level on the operations map board
3. Random posting of the unit scheme of maneuver on the operations map
4. Most of the information available in a TOC is inaccurate and incomplete
   - inaccurate reporting
   - failure to follow up on reports
   - improper information flow
   - no Battle Staff cross-checking.

PROBLEM 2-7: Heavy teams continue to experience difficulty in the command and control of subordinate elements on a decentralized battlefield.

1. Heavy teams often perform Quick Reaction Force (QRF) missions for the light brigade task force
2. The heavy team command post (CP) is often unable to communicate with all elements on the battlefield while fighting the battle.
3. Fail to maintain a current situation map and plan/wargame for future battles.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: Engineers do not effectively integrate themselves into the information flow for route and obstacle status, breaching capability, and combat power.

1. Units report information as raw data, but rarely follow through with hard copies of the minefield record.
2. Units accept the minimum information received in SALUTE format, and track this as raw data.

PROBLEM 2-9:

1. Units too often fail to follow their SOPs on how information should be relayed from the field.
2. Too many units fail to use brevity codes.
3. Units lack the equipment to perform target acquisition and damage assessment.
4. Units do not train for damage assessment.
5. Long range surveillance (LRS) coordination habitually suffers during and after LRS missions.
6. Coordination information is often late, incomplete, or inaccurate.
7. Brigades routinely plan maneuver operations with no idea if or where LRS is operating in their area.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 2-10: Commanders habitually request clarification of reports.

1. Leaders do not enforce the use of standard reporting.
2. Spot report information is either incomplete or inaccurate.
3. Radio transmissions become lengthy as commanders try to extract information from observers to clarify information.

PROBLEM 2-11: Battle tracking charts frequently become useless as decision making tools for commanders.

1. Aviation TOCs do not accurately and systematically battle track their own assets or the assets of brigade
2. Infrequent updating of friendly locations makes air to ground integration difficult.
3. TOC battle tracking charts are not routinely updated.
4. Logs are poorly maintained.
5. Lack of procedures to track ongoing, critical and incomplete entries.
6. Graphics are not updated to reflect the latest changes.
   - often differ among units
   - causes command and control problems.

RESULT: Task force commanders often resort to seeking information directly from subordinate commanders.

PROBLEM 2-12: Repeat of Problem 2-6.

PROBLEM 2-13: Units tend to gravitate into a "you call, we haul" mentality as the operations tempo increases.

1. Unable to conduct current operations and plan future operations simultaneously.
2. Pass missions to subordinate commanders with incomplete mission analysis.

PROBLEM 2-14:

1. Failure to establish daily events
2. Inabiltiy to take into account all new available information
3. Lack of focus on future operations.

RESULTS:

1. No synchronizing of the battle
2. Subordinate units unfocused

The operations map must be the focal point for the entire Battle Staff and all Battle Staff sections should update their information from it.

1. Identify the critical information (commander's critical information requirements - CCIR) the commander and staff must have to make decisions early.
2. The battle captain must know all information requirements, report times and the impact of information on subordinate units.
3. Designate one person to check the graphics for accuracy prior to distribution.
4. Establish and enforce minimum battle tracking requirements for battle staffs.
5. Update information frequently.
6. Display information in a logical and useful manner.
7. The information should include:
   - tracking and posting units down to platoon level,
   - smaller elements such as Stinger teams, engineer elements, and MI teams.

   Emphasize:

   - tracking obstacles

   - chemical contamination

   - enemy activities critical to battlefield circulation

   - casualty evacuation

   - rapid decision making.

   Include all staff sections.

   Follow through.

   - request specific details to assist in the subsequent allocation of forces, assets, and in overall information dissemination.

   Improve staff coordination with the S-2 for:

   - obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL)

   - intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

   - reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning for engineer squads.

   Exercise SOPs during training exercises.

   - refine procedures based on how well they worked.

   Incorporate HF and FM communications during training exercises.

   Use brevity codes to reduce transmission time and to clarify information transmitted.

   Use tactical satellite (TACSAT) as a back-up to normal HF systems:

   - TACSAT does not require a huge antenna field. Reduces signature.

   - TACSAT is more reliable, weighs less, and sets up faster than HF systems.

   Use laser range finders (LRF) and night optical devises (NOD) to aid target acquisition.

   Train to perform damage assessment:

   - condition of targets

   - crater analysis

   - personnel casualty rates

   Designate a long range surveillance (LRS) LNO to operate out of the division G-2 or the brigade TOC.

   Use the standard SALUTE (Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) format when transmitting spot reports to higher headquarters.

   Modify the report using the SALT (Size, Activity, Location, Time) format to save radio transmission times.

   Use pre-formatted report forms to ensure that observers provide all required information.

   Leaders must ruthlessly enforce reporting formats.

   Practice and enforce sending reports in the proper format during training exercises.

   Empower the battle captain to make decisions while the rest of the battle staff plans future operations.

   Train battle captains and TOC NCOs to execute current operations and maintain situational awareness while the remainder of the staff focuses at least 24 hours out.

   Conduct scheduled briefings such as Battle Staff huddles, battlefield updates, and targeting meetings.

   Establish an agenda that:

   - updates estimates

   - provides visibility to significant acts

   - integrates the Battle Staff and TOC shift

   Conduct CPXs to refine C2 procedures and to train TOC personnel.

   Doctrinal reference:

   - FM 7-20, Section V

   - for guidance on the use and integration of engineers.

   - FM 90-7, Appendix B

   - for reporting and recording obstacle information.

   - STP 21-2 SMCT, task 071-331-0803.

1. Focus on preparing good SOPs
2. Use the TSOP to:
   - establish the required level of detailed information needed
   - specify times to transmit, collate and post the information.
   - identify who will track and post the information as part of their duties.

   Ensure enforcement by the TOC NCOs.

Table of Contents
TA. 4, Part 1
TA. 4, Part 3