• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL (cont)

This is a training issue. O/Cs have reported improvement in the battle tracking ability of FSB TOCs for the past five quarters (TA.4 Positive Trend 3: Forward Support Battalion TOC operations). The O/Cs attribute this improvement to training. In fact, their recommended technique is simply, "Continue to train FSB TOC operations with emphasis on battle tracking."

Whatever training techniques the FSB Commanders are doing at Home Station to enhance the TOC's battle tracking skills is working, and should be documented and provided in training support packages for task force TOC training at Home Station.

6. Employ tactical C2W (Compendium, pg. N-52,53 / NT-26,27)

Recommend the techniques described in the Compendium be included in training support packages to company commanders and EW/ES platoon/team leaders for training at Home Station. The techniques are recommended by O/Cs because the O/Cs have seen improved performance by units that employ them.

O/Cs report that company commanders and platoon leaders are not going forward on the battlefield on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and to gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers. This is a leader development issue. Troop leading skills should be trained and practiced in conjunction with combat skills at Home Station.

7. Battle staff mission analysis (Compendium, pg. N-53,54 / NT-27,28)

Recommend the technique presented in the Compendium for a standard agenda during mission analysis be provided in training support packages for use in Home Station training.

Battle staff integration is a problem at all stages of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), including the IPB, mission analysis, COA development, wargaming, and OPORD preparation. Commanders and battle staffs must train and practice the MDMP as an integrated process at Home Station.

8. OPORD and FRAGO preparation (Compendium, pg. N-54,55 / NT-28)

The O/Cs report in this trend that "...battle staff training levels are low, and the roles and responsibilities of each staff officer/NCO are not clearly defined." They go on to state, "...it is evident that these same staffs are not well drilled and therefore cannot produce detailed plans quickly." This is obviously a training issue, and the result of this lack of training is: "Plans (which) lack adequate detail, are not well integrated and therefore have little chance of success."

The integration problem keeps coming up, over and over again, all through the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). There are numerous reports that battle staffs cannot integrate their planning efforts during the IPB, or during mission analysis, or COA development, wargaming, or OPORD preparation. The O/Cs report that "task force staffs have a good understanding of the doctrinal planning process," but understanding a process and being able to successfully perform the functions within that process are two very different things.

The recommendations presented in the Compendium for task force commanders to develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs which establish proficiency in the deliberate process, and then progress to more time constrained execution of the military decision making process (MDMP) are key to reversing the staff integration problem. Commanders must take charge of the problem and train their people at Home Station. Commanders and battle staffs must learn to talk to each other and fully coordinate their requirements in order to produce the level of detail, maintain focus on commander's intent and achieve synchronization on the battlefield.

9. Enemy COA development (Compendium, pg. N-55,56 / NT-28,29)

Enemy COA development problems are also addressed at TA.5 Negative Trend 3: Threat evaluation and Enemy COA development, which states that S-2s often design enemy COAs that are "..checklist solutions.." rather than "..dynamic..plans", and that S-2s do not develop different "possible enemy COAs" in response to "different friendly COAs". The analysis of the TA.5 trend refers to this trend, and includes a discussion on the limited amount of time given to the S-2 to complete all required intelligence products, including ECOAs. This trend states "S-2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy COAs", and because units go rapidly through the military decision making process (MDMP) and limit time for mission analysis, "the S-2 does not complete realistic, detailed enemy COAs until COA analysis/wargaming, or even until rehearsal." The problem does not emanate solely from the S-2, but with the entire battle staff during the MDMP.

The most critical problem resulting from inadequate development and wargaming of more than one ECOA comes at mission execution, when task forces are unprepared to adjust/react to another enemy COA during the battle because there are no adequate contingency plans or decision support products to react to them. The result is piecemealed commitment of the task force, confusion on the battlefield, and unnecessary loss of lives.

One O/C-recommended technique that could allow the S-2 more time to present a full set of COAs available to the enemy is to conduct parallel planning; maintain effective liaison with the higher headquarters, thus getting a "head start" on his development of ECOAs.

Another O/C-recommended technique: "staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to be able to quickly wargame the most likely enemy COA and leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies" is a good one, but addresses only a fraction of the problem. Staffs must become proficient not only in ECOA development and wargaming, but in all tasks within the MDMP. Commanders and staffs together must train and exercise the entire process at Home Station until they can produce complete products, integrate all BOS, conduct focused wargames, plan contingencies, issue detailed orders and synchronize the battle, in an extremely time-constrained environment. Experience at the CTCs indicates that all unit elements struggle with the MDMP when time is limited. MDMP Home Station training is crucial to success on the battlefield.

10. Timelines and time management (Compendium, pg. N-56,57 / NT-29)

This is a Home Station training problem. Sub-paragraph 1 of "Techniques" at pg. NT-29 of the Compendium says it well, and is worth repeating:

"The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that must be developed and practiced at Home Station. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the military decision making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency."

At Home Station, commanders and their entire staffs should use the recommended techniques described in the Compendium, and practice the various tasks required during the Military Decision-making Process (MDMP) to determine realistic timelines for their unit. Also refer to TA.4 Positive Trend 5: Adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule.

11. Employment and integration of a reserve (Compendium, pg. N-57,58 / NT-29,30)

Failure by brigades to plan for reserve forces is tantamount to forgetting to plan fire support or air defense. It is hard to believe that brigade commanders and staffs do not assertively bring the reserve commander into the planning process or require him to give briefbacks and participate in brigade rehearsals. Reserve operations should be planned into brigade COAs for decisive action to achieve a goal, not merely used for reinforcements when unforseen problems develop. The O/C-documented requirement to treat the reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning should be included in unit SOPs and stressed in leader training at Home Station.

12. Pre-combat checks / Pre-combat inspections (Compendium, pg. N-58 / NT-30)

Troop leading procedures, including the detailed PCCs/PCIs must be strictly enforced by the chain of command. Commanders and leaders must ensure that their units comply with applicable SOPs and that their subordinates conduct thorough checks and inspections before each mission. Conducting thorough PCCs/PCIs must be drilled at Home Station.

13. Planning for deep operations (Compendium, pg. N-58,59 / NT-30)

The level of detail shown in the example on pg. NT-30 of the Compendium must be achieved during wargaming for not just the deep fight, but for the close and rear fights as well. The problems units have with developing detailed COAs and completing the wargaming process (TA.4 Negative Trend 1: Course of Action development and wargaming) are the source of this problem. COA development and wargaming processes are integral to the MDMP, the doctrinal methodology for planning for battle. Units must become proficient in planning and preparation to be able to produce the level of detail needed in wargaming the deep, close and rear fights. This is a training problem. Units must practice COA development and wargaming, with a view of the battlefield framework (deep/close/rear) during MDMP training exercises at Home Station.

IV. SPECIFIC DTLOMS IMPLICATIONS

DOCTRINE:

1. Decision-Making Process. Units struggle with the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), especially when time is limited. Current published doctrine does not provide specific techniques for abbreviating the planning process. The Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP) and Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP) described in CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning" are abbreviated decision-making techniques that units can implement to alleviate some of the common problems associated with the MDMP. The abbreviated process is also included in Chapter 5 of the latest revised draft of FM 101-5.

2. Risk assessment. If no good technical or field manuals exist, recommend TTPs for conducting effective risk assessment, developing control measures and communicating both to subordinate elements be written and provided to field units. Refer also to CALL Newsletter 95-9, Risk Management for Brigades and Battalions.

HOME STATION TRAINING:

1. Command Post locations/operations. O/Cs report substantial improvement in the division of responsibilities between the TOC, TAC, and command group during the battle. Develop an SOP which outlines specific division of responsibilities and provide it to field units for use during Home Station training.

2. FSB TOC operations. The BSA alternate TOC is a contingency operation, a secondary requirement that does not currently get the training attention needed at Home Station. Commanders must include battle tracking and BSA alternate TOC training during Home Station exercises to provide for smooth continuity of command if the FSB TOC location is disabled.

3. Communications center node jumps. Insure communications unit commanders are notified in train-up packets that they should plan to execute frequent node center jumps to support the brigade's maneuver. Keys to successful planning and execution include coordination with the Division ADSO, Brigade Signal officer, affected subscribers, plus site and route reconnaissance, and setting realistic timelines for execution.

4. COA development and wargaming. Based on O/C reports, units that do not fully develop and wargame COAs will, at execution, probably have no scheme of maneuver or critical events list, have forces not appropriately arrayed or equipped, have products not usable for critical tactical decisions, and will deploy company/teams with no knowledge of their mission. Using the O/C- provided techniques and references described on pg. NT-21,22 of the Compendium, units must practice COA development and wargaming during MDMP training exercises at Home Station. Units must be consistently successful planners before they can be confident of success in battle.

5. Task Force Rehearsals. Units continue having problems conducting effective rehearsals. Despite available doctrinal references and the techniques provided in CALL Newsletter No.91-1 and other CALL publications, O/Cs continue to report numerous incidents of unsatisfactory rehearsals. Units must train at Home Station; however, there is no system in place for training evaluation and feedback. Because "not everyone agrees on what an effective rehearsal is," a standard for measuring the effectiveness of Home Station rehearsal training must be established, and rehearsals should be evaluated and critiqued to that standard. Unless an ongoing system of evaluation and feedback exists, rehearsal training that is not to standard will continue indefinitely, and the problem will continue to show up at rotation.

6. Communications and signal operations. Units must train the MDMP at Home Station using the techniques recommended with this trend (pg. NT-24,25 of the Compendium) to ensure communications requirements are considered, guidance on the use of nets is included in paragraph 5 of the OPORD, and a communications annex to the OPORD is written to provide a clear picture of communications support to task force members. Signal units must also train situational awareness at Home Station. Practice battle tracking and disseminating information down to the level of the individual soldier.

7. Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Vigorous and immediate Home Station training on the proper conduct of the MDMP is essential to achieving organization and synchronization on the battlefield. Commanders and their Battle Staffs at brigade and battalion/task force level should consider initiating an Officer Professional Development training program similar to the TRADOC small group approach used to teach MDMP at the schoolhouses.

An example of this methodology is at Appendix A. It teaches MDMP in a freeze frame - regular speed - fast forward mode. Such training would ideally be conducted prior to a major field training exercise, i.e., part of a building block OPD program. As the Battle Staff moves from freeze frame to fast forward, then they should apply their newly acquired MDMP skills in conjunction with an FTX or CPX.

8. Battle tracking and predictive analysis. Task force TOCs have difficulty with battle tracking and predictive analysis, with the exception of FSB TOCs. O/Cs have reported improvement in the battle tracking ability of FSB TOCs for the past five quarters. The O/Cs attribute this improvement to training. In fact, their recommended technique is simply, "Continue to train FSB TOC operations with emphasis on battle tracking." Whatever training techniques the FSB Commanders are doing at Home Station to enhance the TOC's battle tracking skills is working, and should be documented and provided in training support packages for task force TOC training at Home Station.

9. Electronic Warfare/Surveillance. Recommend the techniques provided at pg. NT-26,27 of the Compendium be included in training support packages to company commanders and EW/ES platoon/team leaders for training at Home Station. The techniques are recommended by O/Cs because the O/Cs have seen improved performance by units that employ them.

10. Mission analysis. Recommend the following technique for a standard agenda during mission analysis be provided in training support packages for use in Home Station training.

• higher HQ situation

• enemy situation

• mission

• task organization/forces available

• operations/maneuver

  • tasks (specified, implied, essential)
  • significant events
  • scheme of maneuver

• other BOS

• commander's guidance

11. OPORD and FRAGO preparation. O/Cs attribute the problems with OPORD and FRAGO preparation to lack of staff integration. Task force commanders must develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs which establish proficiency in the military decision making process (MDMP) to reverse the staff integration problem. Commanders must take charge of the problem and train their people at Home Station. Commanders and battle staffs must learn to talk to each other and fully coordinate their requirements in order to produce the level of detail, maintain focus on commander's intent and achieve synchronization on the battlefield.

12. Enemy COA development. Staffs must train to become proficient not only in ECOA development and wargaming, but in all tasks within the MDMP. Commanders and staffs together must train and exercise the entire process at Home Station until they can produce complete products, integrate all BOS, conduct focused wargames, plan contingencies, issue detailed orders and synchronize the battle, in an extremely time-constrained environment.

13. Timelines and time management. This is a Home Station training problem. I quote the following NTC O/C analysis: "The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that must be developed and practiced at Home Station. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the military decision making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency." At Home Station, commanders and their entire staffs should use the techniques recommended with this trend (pg. NT-29 of the Compendium) and practice the various tasks required during the Military Decision-making Process (MDMP) to determine realistic timelines for their unit.

14. Planning for deep operations. Units are not achieving the level of detail needed in wargaming the deep fight (nor the close and rear fights). The source of the problem is an inability to develop detailed COAs or complete the wargaming process. COA development and wargaming processes are integral to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Units must practice COA development and wargaming, with a view of the battlefield framework (deep/close/rear) during MDMP training exercises at Home Station.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT:

1. Troop leading/command presence. The report that company commanders and platoon leaders are not going forward on the battlefield on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and to gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers (pg. N-52-53 and NT-27 of the Compendium) is a leader training issue. Troop leading skills should be trained and practiced in conjunction with combat skills at Home Station.

2. Reserve Commander participation in planning. Reserve operations should be planned into brigade COAs for decisive action to achieve a goal, not merely used for reinforcements when unforseen problems develop. A requirement to treat the reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning should be included in unit SOPs and stressed in leader training at Home Station.

3. Leadership responsibility for PCCs and PCIs. Troop leading procedures, including the detailed PCCs/PCIs must be strictly enforced by the chain of command. Commanders and leaders must ensure units comply with applicable SOPs and that they and their subordinates conduct thorough checks and inspections before each mission. Conducting thorough PCCs/PCIs must be drilled at Home Station.

MATERIEL:

ALOC/BSOC work area. The following recommendation for improving the working area of the ALOC/BSOC should be disseminated to field units for implementation as appropriate:

• Rebuild the back of the truck with a shelter of the approximate dimensions of the old M-109 van.

• build in shelves for the communications systems

• use filing cabinets (or drawers) for the Personnel and Administration Center (PAC) and the S-4 shop to use for day-to-day field operations.

• use cabinets/drawers to store office supplies

• establish some work space for radio telephone operators (RTOs) and officers in charge (OICs) to function.

TREND REVERSAL:

1. Command Post locations/operations. In 2QFY95, O/Cs reported a problem trend stating, "CP repositioning is not thoroughly planned, wargamed or synchronized." In the same and subsequent quarters, O/Cs reported improvement in selection of command post locations with respect to communications, and better planning of CP movements during wargaming. This continued improvement is considered a trend reversal.

2. FA Battalion technical rehearsals. The improvements in the FA battalion technical rehearsal and unit SOPs reported in 3-4QFY95 and again in 1-2QFY96 indicate a reversal of the problem discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 95-6. Recommend continued emphasis on the techniques provided with this trend (pg. PT-5 of the Compendium) to keep the trend at its current positive level.

Table of Contents

TA.4 Command and Control, Part 1

TA.5 Intelligence Operations