Military

DISCUSSION:

1. The command and control BOS is where commanders and staffs plan and prepare for battle. The methodology for planning and preparing for battle, which also incorporates most functions of the command and control BOS, is the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. O/Cs attribute unsatisfactory execution of MDMP to a lack of focus which begins at Home Station. Because of their different levels of experience, training, and backgrounds, battle staff members do not have a common understanding of the MDMP. There is no standard MDMP training program. In addition, the variable of time in the equation: TASK, CONDITION, STANDARD with performance measures is the key variable. Too many commanders and Battle Staffs lose sight of the fact that MDMP is a problem-solving tool. The problems to solve involve maneuver warfare, so the stakes are high.

III. INDIVIDUAL TRENDS ANALYSES

Positive Performance

1. Command posts locations and operations (Compendium, pg. P-5,6 / PT--3)

The selection of CP locations was reported as a problem trend one time in 2QFY95, and as a positive trend in the same quarter and each quarter since then. The 2QFY95 problem trend states, "The positioning of command and control nodes frequently does not adequately support the fight throughout the depth or extent of the brigade sector or zone. Positioning generally supports the initial fight, but as the battle progresses the TAC and Main CPs are not in position to adequately control the fight, or are displacing during critical stages of the battle. CP repositioning is not thoroughly planned, wargamed or synchronized." The contradicting positive trend, reported in that same quarter (2QFY95), states, "Generally command post locations are adequately planned and executed, and their movements included in the wargame process." Because in subsequent quarters O/Cs continued to report improvement in selection of command post locations with respect to communications, and better planning of CP movements during wargaming, this continued improvement is considered a trend reversal.

O/Cs report substantial improvement in the work division between the TOC, TAC, and command group during the battle in 2, 3, and 4QFY95, but did not report it as a problem prior to that time. There is no documentation of the specific problem and subsequent techniques used to resolve the problem. Suggest specific recommended work division be written up and provided to field units for use during Home Station training.

2. Engineer Bn OPORDS and CSS integration (Compendium, pg. P-6,7 / PT-4)

CSS integration is the CSS BOS number one problem area based on number of negative trends reported for the last seven quarters. (See TA.7 Negative Trend 1: Logistics estimates/CSS planning & integration.)

It is good to know that Engineer battalions integrate the S-1 and S-4 in the planning process. It is even better to know that the results of their integration are CSS annexes that provide critical information to line companies and clearer pictures of a commander's ability to support a particular coarse of action. We have proof of principle here that when the staff is integrated into the planning process, the result is synchronized, successful execution. The positive impact of CSS staff integration within the Engineer battalion is an excellent example of the potential large-scale positive impact that staff integration at all planning levels of the military decision-making process (MDMP) could have on synchronization of the entire battle.

3. Forward Support Battalion TOC operations (Compendium, pg. P-7 / PT-4)

Improved battle tracking ability of FSB TOCs, making them able to function as the information center for the BSA, has been reported for the past five quarters. They must be getting very good at it after more than a year of improvement. If FSB TOCs are good at battle tracking, they are a unique animal, because O/Cs also report that effective battle tracking is a problem for most task force staffs and command posts. In fact, battle tracking and predictive analysis were reported as task force problems a total of seven times during the past six quarters (see TA.4 Negative Trend 5: Battle tracking and predictive analysis). Note also the negative side of this positive trend; the BSA could not take over as alternate TOC if the FSB TOC was disabled. (In addition, the integration of rear CPs in battle tracking functions is weak.)

What are FSB TOCs doing that no one else does? Perhaps FSB commanders do conduct special battle tracking skills training at Home Station. Knowing the FSB TOC must provide battle tracking information for the entire BSA, FSB commanders may schedule special soldier combat skills training to insure their soldiers are proficient and ready to perform this function in a combat environment. Focused training promotes focused skills. Whatever they are doing, it should continue because the O/Cs are reporting good results.

The BSA alternate TOC is a contingency operation, a secondary requirement that does not currently get the training attention needed at Home Station. Commanders must include battle tracking and BSA alternate TOC training during Home Station exercises to provide for smooth continuity of command if the FSB TOC location is disabled.

4. Risk assessment (Compendium, pg. P-7,8 / PT-4)

Note that this "positive performance" trend was reported in 1st and 2nd quarters FY95; not before or since. It has not been mentioned in the last four quarters and is apparently no longer a trend, or at least no longer bears enough significance to warrant an O/C report.

The technique given here for risk assessment is not a technique, but a mere restatement of the trend. Recommend references to technical or field manuals that will provide good TTPs for conducting risk assessments, developing control measures and communicating both to subordinate elements.

5. Adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule (Compendium, pg. P-8 / PT-4)

Through 2QFY95, O/Cs reported the following as problem trends: "Task force staffs do not understand how to develop a timeline"..."Task force timelines normally contain basic items and are not effectively disseminated; frequently not even posted"..."Most units do not effectively manage time, and often produce inadequate timelines. Despite unit commanders and staffs acknowledging the importance of time management and adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, the majority of units fail to properly manage their time." (See TA.4 Negative Trend 10: Timelines and time management.) Then in the following quarters (3-4QFY95), O/Cs reported the following as a positive performance trend: "Company/team commanders are making a good effort to meet the 1/3 - 2/3 planning time frame. This is providing the platoon more time for their own planning and critical preparation for upcoming missions."

Because we went from negative (through 2QFY95) to positive performance (3-4QFY95), our initial conclusion might be trend reversal. But in fact, it is not trend reversal, because the reports are all saying the same thing. Commanders know the importance of time management and make effort to meet the 1/3 - 2/3 planning time frame (positive), but even though they are provided "more time for their own planning.." the units do not know how to manage their time (negative).

The problems Engineer commanders experience with level of detail in scheme of maneuver/fires and actions on contact are not unique to engineers. Refer to TA.1 Negative Trend 4: Direct fire planning and execution, and TA.1 Negative Trend 3: Actions on contact.

6. Communications center node jumps (Compendium, pg. P-8 / PT-4)

Insure communications unit commanders are notified in train-up packets that they should plan to execute frequent node center jumps to support the brigade's maneuver. Keys to successful planning and execution include coordination with the Division ADSO, Brigade Signal officer, affected subscribers, plus site and route reconnaissance, and setting realistic timelines for execution.

7. FA Battalion technical rehearsals (Compendium, pg. P-9 / PT-5)

CALL Newsletter No. 95-6, May 95, National Training Center's "Fighting with Fires" presents the following observation and discussion: "FA battalion technical rehearsals lack the details and standards required to ensure responsive fire support in battle...The goal of a technical rehearsal is to verify that crews can complete all tasks at the lowest level ...before the start of the brigade's fire support rehearsal. The technical rehearsal allows the FA battalion to correctly represent its capabilities during the fire support rehearsal."

The improvements in the FA battalion technical rehearsal and unit SOPs reported in 3-4QFY95 and again in 1-2QFY96 indicate a reversal of the problem discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 95-6. Recommend continued emphasis on the techniques listed above to keep the trend at its current positive level.

Needs Emphasis

1. Course of Action development and wargaming (Compendium, pg. N-40-43 / NT-21,22)

COA development and wargaming is the command and control BOS #1 problem based on number of times reported during the last seven quarters.

Experience has shown overwhelmingly that failures during mission planning and preparation result in failures in mission execution. This is demonstrated repeatedly here in the reported COA development and wargaming problems and results:

COA development and wargaming processes are integral to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The MDMP is the doctrinal methodology for planning and preparing for battle. The purpose of the MDMP is to provide a step-by-step process for gathering needed information, organizing it into usable formats, making integrated decisions with all the right participants, disseminating the decisions to the right places, at the right time, and preparing orders that have complete information for execution.

Based on O/C reports, units that do not fully develop and wargame COAs will at execution probably have no scheme of maneuver or critical events list, have forces not appropriately arrayed or equipped, have products not usable for critical tactical decisions, and will deploy company/teams with no knowledge of their mission. Reverse analogy: Units that at execution have no scheme of maneuver or critical events list, have forces not appropriately arrayed or equipped, have products not usable for critical tactical decisions, and deploy company/teams with no knowledge of their mission, probably did not fully develop and wargame COAs during MDMP. Success in execution is evidence of success in planning.

This is a training problem. Using the O/C-provided techniques and references described above, units must practice COA development and wargaming during MDMP training exercises at Home Station. Units must be consistently successful planners before they can be confident of success in battle. See TA.4 Negative Trend 4: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) for further discussion on MDMP problems. Also see TA.2 Negative Trend 1: Close Air Support (CAS) for a discussion on deficiencies in planning for CAS.

2. Task Force Rehearsals (Compendium, pg. N-4-453 / NT-22,23)

Rehearsals at all levels are key to ensuring understanding of the concept of operation, verifying specific responsibilities, making adjustments, timing actions, and establishing backup procedures to help synchronize unit operations.

CALL Newsletter No. 91-1 was published in April 1991. This newsletter provides combat-relevant rehearsal lessons derived primarily from long-term issues and observations taken from all the CTCs, and from Operation JUST CAUSE. The newsletter contains valuable (because they work) rehearsal tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). It includes information on the rehearsal sequence, principles of rehearsals, types of rehearsals, synchronization, training aids and expedients, plus two real-world examples of successful rehearsals. The following excerpt from the Preface of this publication describes the rehearsal problem that is still prevalent at NTC today:

"Almost everyone agrees that rehearsals enhance battlefield success. Unfortunately, not everyone agrees on what an effective rehearsal is. Consequently, units regularly fail to conduct effective rehearsals during Home Station training, on exercises or at the CTCs. Often the units that felt they conducted effective rehearsals actually failed in their missions."

Despite the training support techniques provided in doctrinal references, CALL Newsletter No.91-1, other CALL publications, O/Cs continue to report unsatisfactory rehearsals. This is a training problem. Units have techniques available to train with, but there is no system in place for training evaluation and feedback. Because "not everyone agrees on what an effective rehearsal is", a standard for measuring the effectiveness of Home Station rehearsal training must be established, and rehearsals should be evaluated and critiqued to that standard. Unless an ongoing system of evaluation and feedback exists, rehearsal training that is not to standard will continue indefinitely, and the problem will continue to show up at rotation.

O/Cs recommend conducting rehearsals in conjunction with development of, or immediately after publication of the operations order (OPORD). Developing and publishing a detailed and effective OPORD is also a problem for units, because they do not conduct the military decision-making process (MDMP) effectively. Incomplete, uncoordinated OPORDs further intensifies the problem with rehearsals. Standards for measuring Home Station training on the entire MDMP, as well as rehearsals, must be established and implemented.

3. Communication and signal operations (Compendium, pg. N-45-47 / NT-24,25)

This is a training issue. O/Cs report inadequate integration of communications requirements into the military decision-making process (MDMP). Again, this problem is not unique to Signal operations. O/Cs report there is insufficient integration of all battlefield operating systems into the MDMP. Units must train the MDMP at Home Station using the techniques described in the Compendium to ensure communications requirements are considered, guidance on the use of nets is included in paragraph 5 of the OPORD, and a communications annex to the OPORD is written to provide a clear picture of communications support to task force members. Signal units must also train situational awareness at Home Station. Practice battle tracking and disseminating information down to the level of the individual soldier.

The recommended techniques for improving the working area of the ALOC/BSOC to the size of an M-109 van should be disseminated to field units for implementation as appropriate.

4. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) (Compendium, pg. N-48-50 / NT-25)

The MDMP is the methodology for implementing doctrine found in FM 101-5; the "how-to" for planning and preparing for battle. O/Cs report that units that know and follow the MDMP are better synchronized at execution and can make knowledgeable decisions during the battle. Using reverse analogy, we can also conclude in most cases that units which are not synchronized at execution and cannot make knowledgeable decisions during the battle either did not know or did not follow the MDMP. Success in execution is evidence of success in planning. The purpose of the MDMP is to provide a step-by-step process for gathering needed information, organizing it into usable formats, making integrated decisions with all the right participants, disseminating the decisions to the right places, at the right time, and preparing orders that have complete information for execution. Based on O/C reports during the past seven quarters, most units at rotation do not end MDMP with these results. What they do end up with is:

• Commanders who "dominate the staff planning process so it becomes the commander's process instead of a staff process."

• Brigade staffs that "do not follow the guidance outlined in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123"; and "do not synchronize between the battlefield operating systems."

• Battle staffs that "are not providing the commander a detailed mission analysis briefing and do not focus the wargaming effort on the critical points of the plan." (TA.4 Negative Trend 7: Battle staff mission analysis)

• S-2s that "do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy courses of action (ECOAs)...no realistic, detailed ECOAs until COA analysis/wargaming or even until rehearsal." (TA.4 Negative Trend 9: Enemy COA development)

• Brigade staffs that "do not use the six-step methodology to develop COAs" or wargame them "sufficiently to achieve effective synchronization." (TA.4 Negative Trend 1: Course of Action (COA) development and wargaming)

• Battalion staffs that "rarely conduct a full and complete orders process during the development of their OPORDs because of time constraints and apparent unfamiliarity with the doctrinal orders process."

• Company/teams that "do not produce OPORDs in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission." (TA.4 Negative Trend 8: OPORD and FRAGO preparation)

• Task force staffs that "do not understand how to develop a timeline, refine it as necessary, and effectively track and adhere to the established timeline." (TA.4 Negative Trend 10: Timelines and time management)

• Battalion Signal Officers that "are not generally integrated into the task force MDMP", producing "no clear picture of communications support that is available to task force members because it is not integrated into the task force plan." (TA.4 Negative Trend 3: Communication and signal operations)

• Brigade staffs that "delegate the entire responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2." (TA.5 Negative Trend 1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development)

• S-2s that cannot effectively influence the MDMP because "staff integration of IPB products at task force/squadron level is poor." (TA.5 Negative Trend 2: The IPB process and application)

• Dismounted infantry actions that are "seldom planned at task force or company/team level...not integrated with the scheme of maneuver." (TA.1 Negative Trend 2: Use of dismounted infantry)

• Company/teams that neglect to plan for specific actions on contact, resulting in units that "are often destroyed in platoon or company "sets" because they are unable to mass firepower." (TA.1 Negative Trend 3: Actions on contact)

• Brigades that "fail to plan deliberate breach operations even when mission analysis clearly indicates that it is appropriate."
  (TA.6 Negative Trend 1: Breaching operations)

• Units that "are not synchronizing CSS planning with the OPLAN." (TA.7 Negative Trend 1: Logistics estimates/CSS planning & integration)

This is a Home Station training issue. A suggested training program that can serve to bring brigade and battalion/task force commanders and their battle staffs to a mutual level of expertise, is an Officer Professional Development training program that replicates the small-group methodology used to teach MDMP within TRADOC schoolhouses. This methodology teaches MDMP in a freeze frame - regular speed - fast forward mode. An example of this teaching methodology is at Appendix A.

Table of Contents

TA.3 Air Defense Operations

TA.4, Part 2