Military

4. The entire course of the battle is influenced by the S-2's analysis of the enemy.

5. It is established that S-2s are competent, and their products are important to decisionmaking, so why is there a problem with application and staff integration of their products?

- Commander and staff are not assertively involved in getting the products properly completed and integrated into the decision-making process.

- Lack of sufficient involvement in the intelligence planning effort is indication that the commanders and staffs have different priorities for intelligence information than are outlined in intelligence doctrinal manuals.

6. O/Cs report inadequate time given to the S-2s to complete their products.

7. The problems the S-2s are experiencing with staff integration during planning and preparation are not unique to the Intelligence BOS, but are reported across all BOS. Improper conduct of the MDMP is the root of a high percentage of failures at execution. See TA.4: Command and Control, for a discussion of staff integration problems associated with the MDMP.

III. INDIVIDUAL TRENDS ANALYSES

Positive Performance

1. S-2 terrain analysis (NTC Priority Trends (Compendium) pg. P-1 / PT-1)

This is a trend reversal. Give credit to increased availability and use of TERRA BASE and good O/C coaching. Reported trends on this subject prior to 3QFY95 were negative (TA.5 Negative Trend 5: Terrain analysis). O/C recommendations for the negative trends were:
(1) take time to produce a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO), and, (2) use the TERRA BASE program. S-2s are now using TERRA BASE and are now taking time necessary to produce an accurate MCOO (prior to 3QFY95 S-2 focus was limited to topographical restrictions).

2. Use of TERRA BASE program (Compendium, pg. P-2 / PT-1)

TERRA BASE is proving a valuable tool in reversing what was previously a problem trend in S-2 terrain analysis (see also TA.5 Positive Trend 1: S-2 terrain analysis, and TA.5 Negative Trend 5: Terrain analysis). Use of TERRA BASE should be pushed to S-2 sections as key to successful detailed terrain analysis on the modern battlefield.

3. Understanding the IPB process (Compendium, pg. P-2 / PT-1)

Although S-2s may have a conceptual understanding of the IPB process and know what products are needed and when, O/Cs are also reporting a huge breakdown in the application and communication of the IPB products within the military decision making process (MDMP). This is a problem that points to a need for more training at Home Station that focuses on staff integration of the IPB process between commanders, the S-2 section, S-3 section and all staff elements. Commanders must articulate their needs and expectations during Home Station training. (See also TA.5 Negative Trend 2: The IPB process and application).

Needs Emphasis

1. R&S Plan development (Compendium, pg. N-1-3 / NT-1-2)

R&S plan development and execution is the intelligence BOS number one problem based on number of times reported during the last seven quarters. In addition, the Commander, Operations Group (COG) has designated R&S as NTC's number six priority for trend reversal. According to the O/C reports, the task force commander and staff are not sufficiently involved in the R&S planning effort. After the OPORD is issued and it's time to deploy the scout platoons, the staff looks to the S-2 as the guilty party when CSS is not in place, fires are not cleared, long-range comms are not set up, and supporting assets are not tasked.

As with so many other planning deficiencies, inadequate staff integration/coordination is the issue here. All staff elements must be involved in the detailed planning of R&S to ensure all tactical and logistical support requirements are addressed and redirecting/repositioning provisions are made. To be successful, R&S must be planned and executed by combined efforts of the S2 and S3; however, someone must be in charge. The O/Cs recommend that the commander designate someone responsible for R&S operations. A likely candidate is the S3, because R&S is an operation.

O/Cs recommend developing the R&S plan as an "order". The five-paragraph, combat operation order format is a technique that would indeed foster staff integration because of the procedures inherent in the orders development process. Units that revise their SOPs to reflect "R&S OPORD" development procedures would likely see great improvement in attention to detail and proper staff coordination of the entire R&S planning effort.

If this proposed change in focus from a "plan" to an "order" is deemed a viable solution, it has doctrinal change implications that could lead to FM 34-series rewrites.

2. The IPB process and application (Compendium, pg. N-3-5 / NT-2,3)

O/Cs acknowledge that S-2s understand the concept and the products needed at the various steps of the military decision-making process (MDMP), and are familiar with the logical flow of templates and the uses of each (TA.5 Positive Trend 3: Understanding the IPB process). Yet numerous reports of problems with the application of IPB process, products, timelines, and staff integration responsibilities have permeated the intelligence and command and control BOSs throughout the last seven quarters.

If S-2s understand the IPB process, and know how to produce IPB products but "staff integration of IPB products at task force/squadron level is poor"...and..."commanders and staffs do not follow processes outlined in FM 34-130", then the source of the application problem points not toward the S-2, but toward the battle staff and the MDMP. The entire battle staff, not the S-2, must be responsible for integrating all pertinent BOSs into the IPB process and all IPB products into the MDMP. This is a training problem. Good how-to references on the IPB process and procedures are available. The battle staff must train and exercise the process at Home Station until they can in a timely manner develop templates, weather and terrain analyses, and enemy COAs that are sufficiently detailed and fully support the MDMP.

3. Threat evaluation and ECOA development (Compendium, pg. N-5-6 / NT-3,4)

The reported trend states there are too many S-2s deploying to the NTC without first referencing threat doctrinal TTPs and equipment capabilities or developing valid threat models with High Value Targets.

This trend also states:

• "..situation templates produced by brigade S-2s are rarely complete."

• S-2s seldom produce "an event template with a matrix" or "a critical events list."

• S-2s often design enemy COAs that are "..checklist solutions.." rather than "..dynamic..plans."

• S-2s do not develop different "possible enemy COAs" in response to "different friendly COAs."

The deficiencies quoted above might lead the reader to believe the S-2s/analysts are not trained to required standards and therefore are not competent to successfully complete their mission. Other O/C reports, however, do not support that conclusion. For example, the trend at TA.4 Negative Trend 9: Enemy COA development, states:

• "S-2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy COAs."..."Brief mission analysis only when S-2 has completed enemy COA development."

• Because units go rapidly through the military decision making process (MDMP) and limit time for mission analysis, "the S-2 does not complete realistic, detailed enemy COAs until COA analysis/wargaming, or even until rehearsal."

• Because of time, "task force S-2s develop the enemy most-likely COA." Only one enemy COA is wargamed against the task force plan.

• Staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to...leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies."

These comments suggest that the S-2 could produce complete products if given adequate time., and the battle staffs could use the products during the MDMP if they allowed enough time.

Producing complete products is very difficult in a time-constrained environment, and experience at the CTCs indicates that all units elements struggle with the MDMP when time is limited.

4. S-2 SITEMP development (Compendium, pg. N-7,8 / NT-4)

The problem presented here is generally the same as TA.5 Negative Trend 3, above, i.e., incomplete S-2 products, with a focus on the SITEMP. S-2s must practice at Home Station to improve their enemy SITEMPs, threat models, enemy COAs, and the speed and efficiency with which they are completed. At the same time, commanders and staffs must integrate, coordinate, and synchronize these products during the MDMP.

5. Terrain analysis (Compendium, pg. N-9 / NT-4)

Both positive and negative trends are reported by O/Cs on S-2 terrain analysis during the period 4QFY94 through 2QFY95. After 2QFY95, however, there were no negative reports, only positive. After 2QFY95, O/Cs report widespread use of TERRA BASE and production and employment of the MCOO, which has improved S-2 terrain analysis (see TA.5 Positive Trend 1: S-2 terrain analysis). S-2s are better at articulating how the terrain will impact threat COAs and assisting the commander in determining friendly COAs that exploit terrain opportunities. Availability and use of TERRA BASE has improved, as has coordination with supporting elements.

6. S-2 analysis and reporting (Compendium, pg. N-10 / NT-5,6)

The importance of the enemy critical events matrix technique and use of separate overlays is discussed here and in two other reported trends (TA.5 Negative Trend 3: Threat evaluation and Enemy COA development; and TA.5 Negative Trend 7: Event template / event matrix). O/Cs usually recommend certain techniques after they have witnessed success by units that used those techniques. The frequency of these recommended techniques would bring one to the conclusion that the enemy critical events matrix and the use of two separate overlays (described on pg. NT-5,6 of the Compendium) are key to the S-2's successful synchronization of enemy events with critical fire support tasks (CFSTs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and force protection measures (FPMs). FM 34-130 gives an example of an event matrix, but does not describe the techniques discussed here for the enemy critical events matrix or the use of separate overlays. Units should immediately incorporate these techniques in their unit SOPs and use them during Home Station training.

7. Event template / event matrix (Compendium, pg. N-10,11 / NT-6)

Analysis: The techniques described in this and the previous trend are strong candidates for incorporation in FM 34-series updates. Units should consider incorporating these techniques in their unit SOPs and use them during Home Station training. See analysis of TA.5 Negative Trend 6: S-2 analysis and reporting.

IV. SPECIFIC DTLOMS IMPLICATIONS

DOCTRINE:

1. R&S planning. R&S planning is a problem for S-2s because of inadequate staff integration and coordination, and because no person (or the wrong person) is in charge of the operation. O/Cs propose a technique of handling the R&S plan as an R&S order (Compendium, pg. NT-1,2). While this technique may ultimately become a doctrinal procedure, at this point the intent of the technique is to foster staff integration and concurrently exercise R&S planning with the same thoroughness that is supposed to be inherent in the total MDMP. If more units successfully execute the R&S plan as an R&S OPORD, then consideration should be given to incorporating the technique doctrinally.

2. S-2 analysis and reporting - the event template and event matrix. The techniques using the enemy critical events matrix and use of separate overlays for current situation and analytical work (Compendium, pg. NT-5-6) are not addressed in FM 34-130, and are candidates for incorporation in FM 34-series updates. This has potential doctrinal implication. In the interim, units should incorporate these techniques as appropriate in their unit SOPs and use them during Home Station training.

HOME STATION TRAINING:

1. IPB process. Problems the S-2s are experiencing with the IPB process are attributed to a breakdown in the application of the IPB products within the military decision-making process (MDMP). The source of the problem appears to be a Home Station training deficiency in commander and staff conduct of the MDMP.

2. Threat evaluation, Enemy COA and SITEMP development. S-2s are cited for incomplete or inadequate templates, matrices and enemy COAs, and inability to accurately portray the enemy during wargaming. This is a training deficiency, primarily with commanders and staffs. S-2s must practice at Home Station to improve their enemy SITEMPs, threat models, enemy COAs, and the speed and efficiency with which they are completed. Commanders and staffs must train at Home Station to become proficient in integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing these products during the MDMP.

TREND REVERSAL:

S-2 terrain analysis. The terrain analysis problem reversed because of increased availability and use of the TERRA BASE program. Promote the use of TERRA BASE to S-2 sections as key to successful detailed terrain analysis on the modern battlefield.

Table of Contents

TA.4 Command and Control Operations

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability/NBC Operations