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PROBLEM: Ammunition shipments from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not documented using proper supply procedures. The shipments are processed in the same manner as issues, using a DA Form 581 instead of a Transportation Cargo Manifest Document (TCMD).

RESULT: This short-cut creates a potential void in the audit trail.

Techniques:

1. Ammunition shipped from the FASP should be processed using a TCMD (DA Form 1348-1).
2. Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP) personnel should use the DA Form 581 to issue the ammunition to the requesting unit.
3. Make this part of the unit's SOP and train it at Home Station.

(TA.7.5.1.1 Conduct Terminal Operations)

TREND 13: Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

PROBLEM: Ammunition convoys moving forward from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not clear concerning the location of the Brigade Support Area's (BSA's) Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

RESULT: This delays establishment of the ATP and ultimately delays receipt of ammunition by the customer.

Techniques:

1. Convoy commanders must be clear on their exact destination and who to contact when there is a link-up problem.
2. All personnel involved in the operation, to include the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Support Operations Officer (SPO) and ATP personnel, must know when to expect the convoy to arrive.

(TA.7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel)

TREND 14: MI Company sustainment and support.

PROBLEMS:

1. An increasing number of MI companies are deploying to the NTC without the requisite amount of logistical support to sustain themselves.
2. In an attempt to provide inexpensive IEW support, units deploy without organic recovery or refueling vehicles or fail to draw them.
3. Units rely on the brigade HHC to fulfill these requirements for them.

RESULTS:

1. MI companies are employed across a large brigade battle space and burdened logistically.
2. Brigade HHCs are stretched past their ability to support.

Procedure: Follow doctrine and use MI battalion logistic slices to support MI companies.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 15: Management of Class IV and V barrier material.

PROBLEM: Units have difficulty establishing various responsibilities for the management of Class IV and V barrier material.

RESULTS:

1. Efforts fall short of having the right materials at the right place at the right time.
2. Engineer battalions and maneuver brigades have no accurate status of Class IV and V quantities and locations.

Techniques:

1. Units must be able to accurately account for Class IV and V barrier material from when it enters the brigade sector through it's emplacement in an obstacle.
2. The maneuver brigade should take responsibility of the Class IV and V delivery as it enters the brigade sector on echelon above brigade (EAB) transportation assets as stated in FM 71-3. Engineers have a vested interest in this event and should monitor the planning and execution closely.
3. The brigade should plan and coordinate for a logistics release point (LRP) vicinity of brigade rear area where EAB trucks are broken down into task force (TF) convoys.
   • No materials are downloaded/transloaded at this point.
   • The engineer battalion should have a representative there who knows the brigade obstacle resourcing plan and priorities so he can quickly break the vehicles down.
   • TF representatives linkup at this point to escort the EAB transportation assets forward to the TF Class IV/V point.
4. From the LRP area forward, the TF is responsible for escorting the transport assets.
   • Once the trucks are guided to the TF IV/V point, they are quickly downloaded and returned to their LRP for release.
   • Based on METT-T, the materials are either unbanded and uncrated at the TF Class IV/V point, or transloaded onto TF or FSB assets be placed to mine dumps supporting individual obstacle groups.
5. Engineer/TF cooperation is the key. The TF owns the Class IV/V point but the engineers must have a representative there to ensure the following:
   • Materials are used IAW TF Commander countermobility priorities.
   • Materials are accurately tracked and status forwarded to the engineer company TOC.
   • TF soldiers used as labor augmentees understand the mine handling/preparation tasks.
6. The Palletized Loading System (PLS) offers units the advantage of moving flat racks directly to the mine dumps supporting obstacle groups. If this method is used, the TF uncrating/ prep details are needed there. Transportation and life support issues must be planned in advance to maximize the output of this labor force. The TF labor details have four functions at the Class IV/V point/mine dump:
   • Uncrate
   • Inspect/prep mines
   • Organize into minefield (MF) or strip feeder packs
   • Palletize/band excess materials for retrograde
7. At the obstacle group mine dumps, engineer platoons must accurately track and forward quantities used and remaining when they leave that area. This information must be reported to the company TOC and forwarded to the TF S4 so he can arrange for assets to pickup unused materials and flat racks if the PLS system is used.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 16: Field Artillery battalion management of Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Field artillery battalions do not normally properly plan, prepare, and execute Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.
2. Battalion staffs identify R3SP requirements but do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.
3. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

RESULTS:

1. The lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.
2. Poor or untimely ammunition guidance from the S3, and the lack of an effective timeline and/or trigger, impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (Class III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.
3. An R3SP often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.
5. Poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC causes delays and confusion during the operation.

Techniques:

1. R3SP mission: The R3SP's principle mission is rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies.
2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.
   • The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution.
   • It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection.
   • Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.
3. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.
   • The S4, considering battery ammunition statuses, remaining mission requirements (estimate) and the battalion's on hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who in turn begins configuring ammunition.
   • The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders. Special munitions (i.e. FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.
   • The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.
4. The Ammunition Platoon Sergeant configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.
   • Crisis Action Team (CAT) assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used, but if they are used they must be resupplied, reconfigured or replaced immediately.
   • Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.
5. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.
   • Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.
   • Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.
   • The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.
6. The S4, CAT commander or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications check, and establishing the R3SP prior to units arriving.
   • The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.
   • Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.
   • Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.
7. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations: refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.
   • The Recon Survey Officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.
   • The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to linkup with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.
8. Include the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP.
   • The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, time lines, pre-R3SP advance party linkup checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.
9. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 17: Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) requisitioning and tracking.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units poorly track on-hand and requisitioned CDE, and normally arrive in theater (NTC) without any idea of what they have.
2. When units deploy, they do not consider the threat when determining exactly what to bring.
3. Most units arrive with significant CDE shortages, and the Chemical Officer/NCO, S4, and the commander are not aware of these shortages.
4. There is zero tracking of CDE during the course of the campaign. Units rarely order replacements for CDE that has been used as a result of fighting on a dirty battlefield.

RESULT: Poor guidance before deployment and poor tracking at Home Station result in units not able to sustain operations on a contaminated battlefield.

(NOTE: Units often voice "lack of funding" as the primary reason that equipment is not on hand. Although limited funding is a viable issue at Home Station, it cannot be the excuse given for casualties brought on by chemical or biological agents on the battlefield.)

Techniques:

1. Chemical Officers/NCOs at all levels must visit their NBC rooms regularly.
2. Establish a program of quarterly inspections and reward the best NBC NCOs.
3. Have units submit their CDE reports with their unit status report (USR), and include:
   • MTOE
   • CTA 50-970 items
   • roll-ups of scheduled services
   • distinction between training and contingency stocks
   • identification of shelf-life issues
   • roll-ups of NBC PLL on-hand in the NBC rooms
4. Make CDE a part of the Logistics Review (LR) process. Identify:
   • deadlined items
   • due-in status
   • funds issues
   • maintenance advisory messages
   • new equipment fielding
5. Before operations, issue specific guidance in the deployment order on with exactly what the units are to deploy.
6. Consider the threat with respect to all three aspects of NBC.
7. During operations, include CDE in logistics reports or create a separate report for Chemical NCOs. Bottom line -- the Chemical NCO must actively track the CDE at all levels, ensure equipment is on order, and track the status through unit S4s.

(TA.7.5.2.1 Request Supplies)

TREND 18: Ammunition Support Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units often have great storage plans but execute them poorly once the ammunition begins arriving at the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP). This usually occurs because the plan, although good, is not disseminated to the soldiers who must execute it.
2. Missiles are often positioned so that the warhead is aimed at other ammunition pads instead of outside the FASP towards a hill mass.

RESULT: Increased compatibility/distance violations and ultimately more work for the unit as the ammunition must be repositioned.

Techniques:

1. Ammunition storage plans, as with all plans, must be disseminated to the lowest level responsible for its execution.
2. Storage operations should be a part of the unit's SOP and must be familiar to all members of the unit.

(TA.7.5.2.5 Store Supplies)

TREND 19: Forward Support Battalion (FSB) coordination of refueling operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Forward Support Battalion (FSB) support operations officer (SPOs) do not look from line of departure (LD) backwards when planning to top off maneuver tankers after LOGPAC operations.
2. SPOs do not coordinate for refuel windows with supported units.
3. SPOs fail to establish a system to receive an updated fuel on-hand report from Company A prior to LD.

RESULTS:

1. Supported units show up at their convenience.
2. FSBs are not often able to achieve a 90% (green) status in their bulk fuelers at LD.

Techniques:

1. Establish post-LOGPAC windows that are rigidly enforced by the FSB SPO. Maneuver units must top off after LOGPAC operations and not at their convenience the next morning.
2. Main Support Battalions (MSBs) must push fuel at night, normally after units LOGPACs have returned and topped off (2200-0200 hours).
3. FSB SPOs must establish a disciplined reporting procedure with the Company A to constantly report maneuver unit top-off times to the SPO. At least one hour prior to LD, Company A should report to the support operations the current on-hand in bulk fuelers. This information should be briefed to the battalion commander at the pre-battle update.

(TA.7.5.2.8 Issue Supplies)

TREND 20: Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and refugee control operations. Maneuver planners, CSS planners, and Military Police (MP) platoon leaders do not coordinate effectively in planning for EPW and refugee control operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Planners seldom assess the affect which EPWs and refugees have on brigade operations.
2. EPW collecting points and refugee control points are planned as collocated operations, which is doctrinally incorrect, or are located at locations which do not provide for the best support of brigade missions.
3. MPs are not tasked with the control of such personnel, which produces a coordinating vacuum that leaves supporting units at a loss of what to do next when EPWs and refugees are under their control.
4. Direct support MP platoon leaders hesitate to employ their soldiers in such static missions. Thus, EPW operations are normally not trained to standard at MP Home Station units.

Techniques:

1. During the staff planning process, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) planners and MPs must plan the method of control for EPW and refugee operations.
   • Include the best locations for the EPW collecting point and refugee control point.
   • Plan evacuation routes.
2. Forward MP acceptance of EPWs from combat troops is a basic principle listed in FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons. This is normally conducted at forward collecting points.
3. Host nation support with respect to refugee control operations must be known and articulated in brigade orders. Establish forward collecting points to ensure that brigade commanders comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention as soon as possible.
4. Proper planning can mitigate the "drag" effect EPWs and refugees have on maneuver and mobility.

(TA.7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)

Table of Contents

Combat Service Support BOS, Part 1

Command and Control BOS