• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military Police (MP) knowledge of weapons capabilities and maintenance. Military Police leaders and soldiers consistently demonstrate superior knowledge of weapons capabilities and maintenance. Most platoons have several soldiers who have undergone formal training as armorers. This is significant to note because MP platoons must use M2 .50 cal machine guns during National Training Center rotations, even though these weapons are not, normally, organic to their units.

Technique: Continue the solid weapons training at Home Station. Most platoons do not receive an unusual amount of "wet fire" training at their units; they do, however, receive intensive pre-marksmanship instruction (PMI). Continued leader emphasis on weapons training will ensure that this trend continues.

(TA.7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Resupply of argon for the Avenger weapons system. Units too often do not deploy to the NTC with argon supply bottles or an argon pumping unit for resupply.

RESULT: Argon is as important as Class III or V. Without argon, the Avenger system is not mission capable (NMC).

Techniques:

1. As Avenger platoons are "sliced" to Gun Batteries (i.e. BSFV/Stinger) during Home Station training and prior to deployment to the NTC, the platoon should come with all equipment necessary to sustain combat operations.
2. Since the Avenger MILES FOFT (trainer system) requires argon for operation, it is very important that units come prepared to pump argon.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Task force preparation of the maintenance estimate.

PROBLEMS:

1. Maintenance estimates are not generally conducted or not conducted to standard.
2. Maintenance estimates are not fully integrated into the logistics estimate.
3. Task force commanders generally do not ask for nor do they receive a briefing on the maintenance status of the task force.

RESULT: The task force does not know its maintenance status or expected requirements.

Techniques:

1. In Home Station training, include:
   • the preparation of a maintenance estimate IAW FM 43-5
   • the integration of the maintenance estimate into the logistics estimate by the task force CSS planners IAW FM 71-2 Chapter 7
2. Task force logistical planners must make a concerted effort to include the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) in the planning process, specifically COA development and analysis.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 3: Task force maintenance platoon task organization. The Task force maintenance platoon sometimes has problems with task organization.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units are insufficiently staffed with tank and Bradley system mechanics and turret mechanics to maintain the vehicle fleet.
2. Although shortages of required personnel are known at Home Station, most units wait until after arriving at NTC to develop a plan to minimize the impact of their personnel shortages.

Techniques:

1. Clearly identify maintenance support needs of the task force (vice battalion) and structure our field organization accordingly.
2. Clearly identify the support requirements of all task force equipment and meet those support requirements.
3. If a shortage of maintenance personnel exists, centralize control of the limited personnel asset and prioritize units to be supported. The maintenance personnel then work on the unit's vehicles in unit order of priority.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 4: Task force control of unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) traffic.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).
2. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.
3. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

Techniques:

1. The UMCP should be given enough class IV material to create a "fence" with one exit/entrance.
2. UMCP leaders should designate a "gate guard" to control traffic in and out of the UMCP. 3. The task force leadership should take an active interest in controlling the link-up of repaired vehicles with their units. Too often, the only parties involved in the linkup are the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and the individual vehicle commanders.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 5: Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS).

PROBLEMS:

1. The average unit at NTC accomplishes PMCS in 48-72 hours. The desired turn-around time on PMCS of combat systems is 24 hours. This goal is accomplished by less than 10% of the units that arrive at the NTC.
2. Crews do not have a system of turning in combat systems for PMCS.
3. 1SGs and Platoon SGTs, are not involved in the planning of LOGPAC synchronization.
4. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) and XO establish a plan during RSOI only when coached, and NCOs basically execute on constantly-changing guidance from the task force XO.
5. The PMCS system is not tested in garrison or during field training exercises (FTXs) prior to deployment, and are therefore setting the conditions for failure.
6. DA Forms 2404 are often submitted with signatures/administrative data missing and/or identified faults having no corrective action taken.
7. Due to a shortage of experienced mechanics, units are not using the diagnostic equipment (breakout boxes/STE-ICE) available to them to determine all vehicle faults. Consequently, installing parts does not always correct the deficiency and vehicles remain in a "C" status for extended periods of time.

Techniques:

1. Break the cycle of weekly PMCS while at Home Station. Test the PMCS system in garrison and during FTXs before deployment.
2. The task force leadership must place greater emphasis on the training and conduct of operator PMCS and troubleshooting IAW the appropriate -10/-20 manual.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 6: Evacuation of disabled equipment. Units typically do not use maintenance doctrine repair timelines to evacuate equipment out of the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP).

PROBLEMS:

1. Organizational maintenance drags combat systems around the battlefield until repaired.
2. In over 12 rotations, only 1 M119 Howitzer ( British light gun) has been evacuated to the Bravo Company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).
3. The Maintenance Support Teams (MSTs) repair as far forward as possible, but do not consider time a factor when repairing equipment.

RESULT:

1. The Bravo Company usually repairs only wheeled vehicles in the BSA.
2. The only workload that occurs in Bravo company from the task forces (TFs) are in radio repair.
3. The Bravo Company is never stressed from workload and manhours.

Procedure: Follow doctrinal timelines in order to test the long-term campaign tempo.

(TA.7.3.2.2 Recover)

TREND 7: Use of Simplified Test Equipment (STE) and Break-out Boxes (BOB). Units too often do not use Simplified Test Equipment (STE) or Break-out Boxes (BOB) in their troubleshooting (TS) procedures.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units usually swing-test fault diagnosis.
2. Units typically split the BOB into two parts - half forward, half back. Having the equipment in separate locations does not facilitate the use of the equipment.

Technique: Place the BOB either forward in the UMCP or field trains to facilitate its use.

(TA.7.3.2.3 Diagnose)

TREND 8: Employment of the chaplain assistant. Chaplain assistants are not often employed to the fullest extent possible.

PROBLEMS:

1. The work of the chaplain assistant covers a broad range of tasks in security, logistics, administration and, in lieu of the chaplain, ministry. Chaplain assistants frequently receive inadequate guidance from chaplains, and are therefore limited in the scope of their activities.
2. Unit Ministry Team (UMT) battle drills seldom occur, limiting the effectiveness of a chaplain assistant.
3. UMTs often arrive at the NTC with religious support plans that are not tailored specifically for current missions. This forces both chaplain and assistant to play 'catch up' rather than allowing them to immediately get into the mission planning process.

RESULT: The chaplain assistant ends up performing isolated tasks rather than assisting the chaplain in development and execution of a comprehensive religious support program.

Techniques:

1. Battle drills help UMTs organize specific tasks into logical sequences that utilize time and resources wisely.
2. Chaplains must assist their chaplain assistants by providing them with clear, and regular, guidance.
3. Chaplains and assistants must be conversant with their supported units' METL. Periodic and pre-deployment review of the METL will assist the chaplain in formulating guidance for the chaplain assistant. The chaplain assistant then can be empowered to develop battle drills (or UMT drills) which will assist both chaplain and assistant in providing comprehensive ministry to their supported unit.
4. Chaplain and assistant represent a 'duet' not two soloists. Regular guidance from the chaplain must include an overall vision (which will reflect the commander's intent for a given mission) which is communicated to the chaplain assistant. The chaplain and assistant should review the guidance together to insure that both understand it.

(TA.7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities)

TREND 9: Deployment of the medical company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

PROBLEM: Medical companies frequently do not utilize an established layout to employ their assets when they occupy a new area of operations.

RESULT: No coordinated traffic flow of vehicles through the company area or patients through the treatment facility.

Techniques:

1. Develop a standard template to assist in the layout of the company area.
2. Establish and enforce one route through the company area; adjust based on terrain, but do not change the one-route concept. Place along the established traffic route:
   • the command post
   • maintenance area
   • Class VIII resupply point
   • fuel point

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 10: Medical company management of maintenance and supplies. Medical company commanders do not have systems in place to manage and track the brigade's medical assets.

RESULTS:

1. Medical evacuation platforms go into a non-mission capable (NMC) status and are not identified as such for up to 72 hours.
2. The medical company has ambulances available but does not react since they are unaware that evacuation platforms are NMC.
3. Task force medical platoons, company medics and unit combat lifesavers run out of medical supplies and are unable to care for casualties.
4. The medical company has additional Class VIII on hand but does not push it forward.

Technique: Work out a system between the medical platoons within the brigade combat team (BCT) and the medical company in the form of a brief standard report that gives their current status on maintenance and Class VIII.

• Design a simple report form that can be passed either by FM or ambulance messenger.
• The form must be easy and fast to promote its use by the platoon leaders.

(TA.7.4.4 Provide Health Services)

TREND 11: Training of Brigade Support Area quick-reaction forces (QRF). Soldiers are not trained to standard to be successful in Brigade Support Area (BSA) quick-reaction forces (QRF) live fires.

PROBLEMS:

1. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) has a problem defining the standard, communicating the standard, and enforcing the standard to its QRF.
2. No brief-backs conducted
3. No combat life savers in the QRF
4. Lack of medical evacuation plan
5. Lack of confirmation brief
6. No soldier and NCO knowledge of troop leading procedures
7. Incorrect defense mission conducted by QRF commanders (hasty defense vs deliberate defense)
8. Fighting positions not prepared to standard
9. No range cards, target reference points (TRPs), etc.
10. Soldiers not briefed on mission
11. Limited rehearsals
12. Limited communication--no field phones (hot loop)
13. PCIs not conducted IAW the SOP
14. QRF commander only has a copy of the tactical SOP (TACSOP)
15. Lack of numerous factors of METT-T
    • specified tasks
    • implied tasks
    • essential and restated mission and constraints in the mission factor
16. No soldier knowledge of how to identify the enemy or the enemy's strengths or capabilities
17. No controls for identification of friendly or enemy vehicles
18. Poor state of training in the troops available
19. Good morale
20. No analysis by the QRF leadership from both friendly and enemy point of view in the area of observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA)
21. MOPP suits left in the vehicles, not with the soldiers
22. No priority of work
23. No request to place an observation post forward when prepping the fighting position
24. No signal operation instructions (SOI) with the QRF
25. No disengagement actions planned
26. No knowledge of how to use close air support (CAS) or fire support in their missions
27. No soldier or NCO understanding of what a warning order is
28. Incorrect format reporting for spot reports, contact reports, etc.
29. The combat ratio specified in the order never achieved

Techniques:

1. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access controllers, and a quick reaction force. Call it the OP/QRF Certification Course.
   • These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the battalion.
   • The program should be conducted just like the combat lifesaver course.
   • Brief it at Quarterly Training Briefs.
   • The course should be demanding--soldiers who pass the course should be recognized with a military certificate to breed competition among soldiers
   RESULT: A quality standardized security element that the FSB can draw upon when deployed.
2. Soldiers must understand and visualize how to emplace an engagement area (EA).
3. The QRF must adhere to a pre-combat inspection check list.
4. The QRF must use target reference points and understand the importance of proofing an EA.
5. The commanders must become more aware of troop leading procedures, confirmation briefs, and briefbacks. The leadership of the FSB must hold individuals accountable for their lack of attention to detail.
6. At Home Station, the FSB must practice setting up EAs tied into the enemy's avenues of approach during MILES and live fire training opportunity.
7. The FSB must rehearse in the degraded mode moving from one position to the next.
8. All soldiers must be highly trained in calling for fire and bringing CAS on the enemy.
9. The FSB must understand the weapon capabilities that it has and the capability of the enemy systems.
10. Soldiers must practice target acquisition and must be able to differentiate between enemy and friendly forces and systems.
11. The FSB must ensure that the QRF's activities are fully covered in the FSB's TACSOP. EXAMPLE: The QRF withdrawing under enemy pressure, the MEDEVAC procedures, and the basic loads that the QRF can carry.
12. Personnel should be trained to superior standards on weapons.

(TA.7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

Table of Contents

Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC)

Combat Service Support BOS, Part 2