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Positive Performance

TREND 1: Understanding of brigade CSS standard operating procedures (SOPs). Brigade SOPs for conduct of maintenance meetings, LOGSTAT reports, and CSS rehearsals have improved brigade combat team (BCT) CSS operations. The single most positive aspect is the depth of understanding on the part of all units. Personnel arrive at the maintenance meeting, for example, prepared to discuss details of support and status.

Procedure: Develop SOPs for the conduct of routine operations. Ensure dissemination of procedures two levels down. Rehearse SOP tasks as a part of Home Station train up.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 2: Electronic Attack mission planning and execution. During electronic warfare (EW) mission planning and execution, improvement has been observed in tailoring electronic attack (EA) missions to maneuver plans.

Techniques:

1. Reduce the number of EA missions, while also conducting EA missions that produce the most effects.
2. Do not conduct saturation jamming of OPFOR nets. The OPFOR will jump frequencies and generally work through the jamming. This is counterproductive to the overall intelligence effort because the limited EW systems available in brigades do not allow EA and voice collection missions to be conducted simultaneously. RESULT: When EA missions are conducted in this more specific manner, the brigade benefits from good voice collection operations, and more voice collection contributes to a more situationally aware brigade.
3. Sustain Home Station training where Analysis and Control Teams (ACTs) interact with brigade planners. The ability to conduct good EA missions is most prevalent when EW planners have a thorough understanding of both the potential threat and the supported brigade.

(TA.4.5 Employ Tactical C2W)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Transcription and Analysis (TA) team battle tracking.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most TA teams and Analysis Control Teams (ACTs), are unable to share a common picture of events on the battlefield. This lack of situational awareness makes it difficult for the TA team to keep their subordinate Electronic Warfare teams informed and synchronized with operations.
2. The TA team misses triggers for planned Electronic Attack missions and fails to trigger Electronic Support (ES) operations to answer PIRs. This condition is more pronounced in ACTs that are unsure of their role and responsibilities vice the TA team.

Techniques:

1. The ACT and the TA team need to get together and develop a thorough SOP that clearly identifies roles and responsibilities of each element.
   • Identify what type of information the TA team requires and how often information is required to keep EW teams adequately informed.
   • Use a battle tracking checklist as a guide in this process.
2. Include the exchange of battle tracking information as part of staff battle drills in CPXs at Home Station. This will require that the TA team participate in exercises with the ACT and the Brigade that it supports at Home Station.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 2: Maintain information on friendly unit locations. Military Police (MP) teams are victims of an excessive number of near fratricide situations.

PROBLEM: MP teams are encountering near fratricide situations involving MP contact with other brigade combat team (BCT) units, and even MP internal situations. These encounters normally occur during low visibility conditions and are a direct result of poor information dissemination during orders issue and information updates.

Techniques:

1. Platoon leaders must provide detailed information to subordinates on friendly unit locations.
2. MP Squad and Team Leaders must seek information and report unit locations/movements when conducting patrol operations.
3. Train these techniques to standard at Home Station to increase situational awareness and improve force protection:
   • Ensure subordinate leaders maintain updated graphics on overlays.
   • Ensure that MP teams are aware of all missions that the platoon is conducting.
   • Follow/establish far and near recognition (commo, visual) signals to be used when approaching units.
   • When appropriate, use established challenging procedures.
   • Establish engagement criteria for hostile situations.
   • Know the Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status.
   • Ensure soldiers are trained on threat vehicle and aircraft recognition.
   • When feasible, use pre-announcement procedures when making contact with units.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 3: Brigade command post (CP) battle tracking. Battle Tracking in Brigade Command Post too often fails to function in terms of how they perform actions, make decisions, and provide recommendations to the commander.

PROBLEM: Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight it must know what is happening at the company/team level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance, but time, requires the company/team details.

Techniques:

1. The brigade main CP must know the situation at the front
   • Who is in contact
   • How much combat power remains
   • Status of ammunition
   • Who needs to come out of the fight to refuel, etc. to be able to make decision and recommendations to the commander on
     • Who gets priority of fires
     • Where to commit the reserve
     • Where to put CAS
     • What critical CSS assets need to be moving and where
2. FM 71-3 identifies 11 task for the brigade main CP to perform. Seven of these require detailed level of information.
   • Assist the brigade and task force commanders
   • Plan future operations
   • Coordinate operations throughout the depth of the AO
   • Synchronize CS and CSS assets
   • Monitor the close fight
   • Maintain continuous operations for extended periods
   • Assume command and control if the TAC is destroyed.
3. The building and tracking of combat power must be a units SOP for training as well as for deployment.
4. JANIS exercises must stress brigade main CP to track this level of detail and demand that they become an active player in employment of CAS, artillery, reserve forces, to include tracking and informing the commander of impending decision points, critical friendly and enemy events and the movement and priority of CS and CSS support throughout the brigade sector.
5. Brigade mains need standard tracking charts and SOP reports that include subordinate leaders using proper spot reports, commander SITREPs, BDA, and current combat power. With an established SOP for use of the Command and O/I frequencies, this level of information can be passed quickly without tying up the nets during the fight.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4: Battle Command.

PROBLEM:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively battletrack during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
2. TF TOCs setup during the plan and prep for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

RESULT:

1. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.
2. Critical information concerning R&S effort and "hard" intelligence passed from brigade often never reached the hands of the S-3, Battle Captain or other BOS elements.
3. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) items are not proactively tracked inhibiting the staffs ability to accurately visualize the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

Techniques:

1. TF TOCs should establish a central node, similar to the one used during the fight and track the preparation for combat and re-prioritize efforts (Battle Command-Seeing Ourselves).
2. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked .
3. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions during home station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.
4. CALL Newsletter 95-7 (Tactical Operations Center) provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.
5. The chief of staff must identify what information to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections. The commander should be able to go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of his TF in preparation for combat operations.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5: Medical company command post (CP) battle tracking. Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

PROBLEMS:

1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.
2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

Techniques:

1. The medical company commander should develop a system to capture the critical information that needs to be available to him regularly. The information to track may include:
   • Maintenance status of the company's vehicles, and those of supported units
   • Critical medical equipment readiness
   • On-hand balance of critical Class VIII items, for the company and for supported units
   • Status of critical general supplies, and orders for supplies that are due in
   • Current tactical situation
2. Place the information on boards that are hung along the walls of the CP to facilitate quick visual reference.
3. Tracking the medical company's resources and the tactical situation are essential for situational awareness and accurate decisions on the placement of medical assets in the brigade area.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6: Fire support battle tracking and situation awareness to reduce fratricide risk.

PROBLEM: In almost every case of indirect fire fratricide at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that accurate battle tracking is maintained before and during the battle.
2. Implement an all-station net call prior to execution to exchange information and verify NFAs.
3. During the battle, company/team fire support teams (FISTs) need to come up on the net to update the FSO so everyone else can hear what is going on and track unit locations.

(TA.4.2.1 Review Current Situation)

TREND 7: Planning for Class IV barrier material.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units do not plan for and forecast Class IV, barrier material based on anticipated requirements.
2. Units fail to include required Class IV in load plans and movement calculations.
3. Leaders do not supervise and inspect protective obstacles.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not have sufficient material to construct required protective obstacles based on METT-T or their internal tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP).
2. Obstacles are seldom constructed to standard in the required place.

Techniques:

1. Routine barrier material planning should be based on requirements established in the unit TACSOP.
   • The TACSOP requirement should be developed from the type, size, and number of obstacles each unit is expected to routinely erect.
   • Adjustments to the routine TACSOP Class IV requirements be made according to METT-T and the commanders assessment.
2. FM 5-102, appendix D stipulates about one 2 ½ ton truck load of material for 300 meters of triple stand concertina.
3. Limited transportation assets and manpower for construction of obstacles may dictate that barriers be used to canalize enemy forces rather than provide perimeter security.
4. Leaders must define the standard for emplacement of obstacles, communicate the standard (TACSOP), and enforce the standard.

(TA.4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

Table of Contents

Combat Service Support BOS, Part 2

Command and Control BOS, Part 2