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Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most NBC staffs arrive at NTC without an NBC TACSOP-1.
2. Task Forces arrive at NTC without standard procedures for NBC avoidance (FM 3-3), protection (FM 3-4), decontamination (FM 3-5), or defense (FM 3-100).
3. Task forces do not understand how to plan or execute NBC operations, smoke operations, or respond to chemical attacks.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not report chemical attacks in a timely manner.
2. Operational and thorough decon operations are not resourced and executed to standard.
3. Patient decon operations are inadequate due to lack of trained crews and equipment.
4. Smoke operations are not planned, prepared, and executed IAW FM 3-50.
5. M8 alarms are placed next to the defensive perimeter instead of 150 meters out for early warning.
6. Soldiers arrive without MOPP gear and do not understand the different levels of MOPP.
7. There is inadequate cross talk between the different levels of the NBC staff.
8. There are inadequate and ineffective command and control/support relationships between TF and chemical assets.

Techniques:

1. Produce, implement, and validate a workable NBC TACSOP at Home Station.
   • References:
     • FM 3-3 (chemical/biological contamination avoidance)
     • FM 3-4 (NBC Protection)
     • FM 3-5 (NBC decontamination)
     • FM 3-100 (NBC defense, chemical warfare, smoke and flame operations)
     • FM 3-101 (chemical staffs and units).

2. Create an NBC working environment IAW FM 3-101, page 5-3 (Chemical staff considerations). Chemical staffs at TF force level should:
   • identify the NBC threat
   • determine if current chemical force is sufficient
   • monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the TF
   • monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force
   • develop training plans to correct NBC defense training deficiencies
   • develop chemical support plans to support current operations
   • develop NBC defense plans to protect the force
   • monitor the NBC situation
   • monitor the status of chemical units
   • recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation
   • coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary
   • continuously update the commander on all NBC operations
   • remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they relate to the TF mission

3. Improve cross talk between company and battalion NBC personnel. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discuss NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts.

(TA.6.3 Enhance Survivability)

TREND 2: Control of marked contaminated areas. Units that identify contaminated areas are continuing to have problems keeping follow-on forces out of the contamination.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units will usually put out the NBC-1 Report over O/I net even though most tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) say to put it out over command nets.
2. M93 FOX vehicles that conduct NBC recon will mark the contaminated area, but the markers used by FOX crews are often not seen, and other vehicles run right over them.
3. Units coming into the contamination have the NBC-1 Report plotted on their maps, but their situational awareness is so poor, they do not realize where they are.

RESULT: Follow-on forces continue to pile into the contamination, violating the principal of contamination avoidance.

Techniques:

1. Use available assets to assist in the control of the site.
   • Use MPs as traffic control posts (TCPs) to ensure vehicles do not enter the contamination.
   • Make the FOX vehicle the last to go to decon and assist the MPs to keep vehicles out.
   Everyone recognizes a FOX and knows what it does. This should be an indicator for any unsuspecting vehicles/soldiers.
2. Ensure the NBC reports go out on the right nets as stated in the unit TACSOP.
3. Use other visual signals to aid in the identification of the contamination such as purple smoke. The FOX crews can carry the smoke and use it when vehicles approach.

(TA.6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)

TREND 3: Electronic Warfare (EW) team survivability.

PROBLEMS:

1. Electronic Warfare teams are too often not taking the appropriate actions to ensure their system's survivability.
2. They are failing to pull security during site reconnaissance and occupation.
3. They are not locating their OP/LPS where they have good 360 degree visibility of the area around their system.
4. They fail to ensure that they have a communications link (either a TA-312 or PRC-119) between the OP/LP and the system hut.
5. They do not employ an M8 chemical agent detector and alarm, or they employ the M8 in the wrong location.
6. They are not using camouflage netting to conceal their Electronic Warfare systems.
7. They are not cleaning or maintaining their individual and crew served weapons to ensure that they are prepared to defend themselves, if required.

Techniques:

1. NCOs must supervise their subordinates and enforce the standards in their unit's SOPs.
2. Electronic Warfare team leaders and platoon sergeants should conduct thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs) to ensure that teams have all the necessary equipment on hand and in a serviceable condition.
   • Use a checklist that includes such items as communications gear, M8 alarm, batteries for all equipment, camouflage netting, and weapons cleaning supplies.
   • Continuously supervise teams to ensure they are taking all appropriate security measures.
   • Use a site occupation and security checklist.
3. Teams should include the above security measures in their crew drills, and they must drill these survivability skills at home station in FTXs and during
4. routine crew drills.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 4: Medical company's role in defense of the brigade support area (BSA). The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

PROBLEMS:

1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area, but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.
2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

Techniques:

1. Develop a standard survivability position for each soldier assigned in the vicinity of their work area. This will ensure each soldier has a protected position in the event of indirect fires.
2. Determine the total Class IV requirement for the company and establish load plans.
3. The medical company commander obtains from the S2/S3 the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. Fighting positions are prepared based on this information to enable massing of the fires he has available.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) squad preparation of fighting positions. BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions.

PROBLEM: BSFV squads often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

Technique: BSFV squads should use interlocking layers of sandbags at least 18" deep. The sandbags increase the density and the stability of overhead cover (FM 5-103 Survivability, Chapter 3).

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 6: Logistics units' defensive operations. Logistics units experience difficulty in balancing their CSS missions with defensive operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most logistics leaders do not understand how to conduct a defense by squad, an essential building block to a cohesive defensive plan, and one of the Army's FY97 Common Task Testing (CTT) requirements.
   • During the past two quarters, out of 70 logistics NCOs questioned 65% did not know how to conduct a squad defense.
   • Most of these NCOs stated they did not take common task tests.
2. Forward Support Battalions' (FSBs) defenses have no depth to them and are not actively supervised by the officers or NCOs at battalion and company level.
3. Soldiers lack needed competency to succeed in defending the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

RESULTS:

1. Ad-hoc defensive operations leading to unorganized chaos on the battlefield during an attack.
2. Soldiers cause numerous fratricide incidents to one another.
3. The OPFOR reaches its end state either observing or destroying the BSA.

Techniques:

1. All officers and NCOs should be required to take CTT and exhibit the basic fundamental soldier skills required of a leader.
2. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access control points, and a quick-reaction force. These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the Battalion.

(TA.6.3.1.1.3 Prepare Protective Positions)

TREND 7: Employment of the M8A1 Alarm. M8A1 alarms are seldom employed to standard.

PROBLEMS:

1. Soldiers who are signed for and responsible for the M8A1 alarm are often not proficient in its employment, maintenance, and operation.
   • They are not placed upwind.
   • They are not place at the proper distance that would provide the unit early warning of chemical attack.
   • They do not put them out at all; they are more concerned about someone driving over it than providing early warning.
   • They do not know how to put the alarm into operation.
   • They do not deploy with enough batteries, maintenance kits, or wire to run the alarm.
2. Units often deploy to the training area with up to 25% of the alarms deadlined.

Techniques:

1. Develop a training plan for M8A1 operators.
2. Require units to certify their operators by attending a course that is given by the battalion chemical NCO.
   • Once certified, operators will be issued a training certificate.
   • The certification program will be part of the inspection program.
3. For those units that do have certification programs in place and do not train NBC on a frequent basis, develop a sustainment training program. This program should be quarterly and also added to the inspection program.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 8: Medical company use of M8A1 Alarms.

PROBLEMS:

1. The medical company has one of three authorized M8A1 Alarms but they do not often place it out in accordance with the latest down wind message.
2. When the alarm is placed properly, the power source is usually not hooked up and wire is not run to the alarm.

RESULTS:

1. During a chemical attack, the M8A1 Alarm does not go off warning company soldiers of the presence of nerve agents.
2. Determination of the type of agent that is present in the company area is delayed.

Procedure: Employ the M8A1 Alarm IAW procedures described in Chapter 3 of FM 3-3.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 9: Search and destroy enemy reconnaissance forces.

PROBLEMS:

1. Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counterrecon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of our AO.
2. Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.
3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought, once the base plan is developed.

Techniques:

1. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy recon forces throughout the depth of the AO. This may need to be a total combined arms force, integrating "lookers" other than just the thermal sights of M1s and M2s.
2. Give the counterrecon force no other mission.
3. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.

(TA.6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security and Readiness)

TREND 10: Security Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything they do observe.

RESULTS:

1. The Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful by confusing the shooters on identification of enemy vehicles especially beyond 1200 meters. The time that a potential enemy recon target is observed is often 3 to 5 minutes at most.
2. Confusion is created by similar looking vehicles, HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area.
3. Scouts behind the shooters cannot see as far as the shooters.

Techniques:

1. Security operations should not be given to company/teams alone.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing OPs behind the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, this limits scouts to destruction with indirect fires which is more effective against large formations than individual vehicles.
4. Integration of mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force to include the availability and positioning of mortars and artillery.

(TA.6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security and Readiness)

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Air Defense BOS

Combat Service Support BOS