UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)

TREND 15: Brigade XO roles and responsibilities in the brigade battle staff. The Brigade XO is often a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the Bde S3.
    • Brigade XOs tends not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).
    • The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.
    • No Chief-of-Staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.
    • Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.
    RESULT: The unit deploys to the NTC without a clear picture of the roles and requirements of the brigade XO.
  2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as Chief-of-Staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS."
    • As the orders process progresses, the S3 and Cdr. get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiency integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.
    • The XO is caught up with:
      • moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment
      • working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3
      • trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.
    • Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive, and is resisted by both S3 and commander.
    RESULT: The order fails to synchronize the BOS, fails to consider any sort of TLP timeline for the task forces, and is executed from the brigade main CP by an XO that knows very little about the plan.
  3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the Chief-of-Staff for the orders process.
    • The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.
    • The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.
    • The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.
    RESULT: This is a slow learning process for the XO, but with practice, the brigade's orders process gets on the right track.
  4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.
    • Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an over-grown BMO.
    • The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.
    • The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a Chief-of-Staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at home station -- S3 get me an order out as fast as possible -- we will work the details at the rehearsal."
    • The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at home station -- task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts."

RESULTS:

  1. Any systems established, developed, or grown during the rotation do not get a chance to mature.
  2. The unit leaves at the end of the rotation with a lot of knowledge and ideas of how to do things better, but no ideas or experience on how to make it work.
  3. The orders process and maintenance system are broken and stay broken.
  4. The brigade returns home to pass on to the next rotational unit "how to win at the NTC", and nothing to do with:
    • learning the orders process
    • developing and training a maintenance system that works
    • using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his Chief-of-Staff function.
  5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process, and best kept at the BSA.

Techniques:

  1. The brigade XO must be the right hand man to the commander with all the authority and responsibilities that position requires to execute. The brigade commander must clearly make the brigade XO the Chief-of-Staff for the brigade.
  2. The S3 must work for the XO in garrison as well as the field.
  3. During train-up, all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrated into every level of training.
    • FCXs designed to stress and exercise logistical consideration must be trained.
    • Logistics exercises must be executed by the full battle staff, to include S3.
  4. The XO needs to be drilled by the brigade commander in the role of Chief-of-Staff to include heading up the orders process.
  5. The FSB commander, task force XOs, and task force BMOs need to be held responsible for their jobs and should not have the brigade XO as their safety valve. (Part of the task force BMO's responsibility is developing and drilling a system of keeping the task force Chief-of-Staff informed of maintenance issues.)
  6. Task force XO needs to maintain a system that keeps the brigade XO informed.
  7. The BMOs needs to be trained not to make every meeting with the XO a decision meeting.
  8. When maintenance becomes an issue at the NTC, do not strip the Chief-of-Staff out of the task force and brigade to try and put a bandage on the problem.
    • Give the O/Cs a chance to work with the maintenance staff to get them through the problem areas.
    • If the brigade is having that many problems in maintenance that the O/Cs cannot help, the FSB commander needs to be brought forward.
      • The FSB and additional maintenance assets can surge on a task force to get OR up.
      • Do not strip the front lines to fix the support elements.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 16: Task force S2 completion of products for the decision-making process.

PROBLEM: Task Forces often rush mission analysis, not giving the S2 time to complete his products.

RESULTS:

  1. Task Force S2s normally brief only one enemy Course of Action (COA).
  2. S2s often do not assist the rest of the battle staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight using all the combat multipliers and the terrain.

Techniques:

  1. Battle staff must understand that mission analysis is one of the most important steps in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
  2. S2s must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so the process can be completed in a timely fashion.
  3. The Brigade S2 must produce and disseminate products to the Task Force early to allow parallel planning.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: Engineer Integration in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

PROBLEMS:

  1. Often the task force (TF) engineer plan is buried in an annex to the OPORD and does not get read by non-engineers; this can be disastrous when it includes specified tasks to non-engineer subordinate units.
  2. Mobility and survivability tasks are not engineer unit specific.
  3. Engineer tasks must be addressed in Paragraph 3, Execution, of the OPORD where all maneuver elements will see them.

RESULTS:

  1. The engineer estimate mirrors the command estimate upon receipt of the mission.
  2. The meat of the Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) -- the essential tasks derived from the higher unit maneuver operations order -- must be in the TF OPORD.

Techniques:

  1. The engineer plans cell integrates into the maneuver Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and its associated staff members, the higher engineer command, and the engineer company for combined support of the maneuver TF, this effort directly influences the quality of future plans and the effective execution of engineer operations.
  2. The TF must allow the engineer planner to brief during both the mission analysis brief and the COA briefs so that critical mobility and survivability information is communicated to all elements of the TF.
  3. The engineer estimate allows the engineer planner to integrate his company's capabilities as a combat multiplier into the TF's plan.
  4. The TF engineer makes sure that required engineer missions and instructions and constraints and limitations are included in the appropriate part of the TF OPORD (not buried in the engineer annex).
  5. SOEO is refined during wargaming and is the basis for the engineer company order.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 18: Command Post Site Location and Displacement.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Command Post (CP) site location and displacement planning are not effectively integrated into the task force (TF) planning process.
  2. TF TOC jump plans are not incorporated into the TF planning process.

RESULTS:

  1. The Tactical Operations Center is unable to effectively command and control during critical points of the battle.
  2. Command and control nodes cannot support the TF, maintain situational awareness and effectively conduct predictive analysis and timely recommendations to the commander.

Techniques:

  1. During the planning process the battle staff must identify where the critical points on the battlefield will be located. This first step then allows the staff to backwards plan to determine where the TOC must be located at that point to facilitate command and control.
  2. Triggers/decision points must then be developed to determine when the TOC moves to ensure that they are set during these critical points.
  3. The TOC movement/displacement plan is not necessarily tied to the maneuver of the TF. The imperative is that it is set and ready to fight at these anticipated critical points.

(TA. 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 19: Combat Health Support (CHS) planning.

PROBLEMS:

  1. There is rarely a medical officer involved in the planning of brigade combat health support operations.
  2. The medical planning and the S1 are not considering the casualty estimate when developing the CHS plan.
  3. The medical planner is not integrated into the brigade's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

RESULTS:

  1. The CHS plan for placement of medical assets on the battlefield
    • Does not support the maneuver commander's plan
    • Fails to take into consideration time/distance factors in the evacuation and treatment of casualties.
  2. Insufficient evacuation platforms are at the right place and right time to support the casualties incurred.
  3. Brigade's medical assets are not able to acquire, treat and evacuate casualties in time to prevent them from dying of wounds.

Techniques:

  1. The Forward Support Medical Commander (FSMC) is currently the only technical expert available to the brigade. He must be included into the brigade's MDMP to ensure a technically sound plan that is synchronized with and integrated into the maneuver commander's plan.
    • This individual must bring to mission analysis the maintenance status of the brigades evacuation platforms and the status of Class VIII medical supplies and blood in the brigade.
    • The medical planner must have an understanding of the commander's intent and the course of action so that he/she is able to develop a medical support that supports the tactical plan.
    • The medical planner must be actively involved in the wargaming process to ensure that his/her plan ins synchronized and integrated with the rest of the BOS in the brigade.
  2. The medical planner and the brigade S1 must look carefully at the casualty estimate and the S2's situational template (SITEMP) to determine the densities of casualties during the different phases of the operation.
    • They must determine the required number of evacuation platforms to move these casualties.
    • They must determine if there is a requirement for additional nonstandard platforms to assist in the evacuation process.
    • The requirement for additional assets is then integrated into the CHS Annex as a specified task to subordinate units.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

btn_tabl.gif 1.21 kTable of Contents
btn_prev.gif 1.18 kCommand and Control BOS, Part 2
btn_next.gif 1.17 kCommand and Control BOS, Part 4



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list