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PROBLEM: Brigades will template PCHEM and then plan their axis of advance or a battle position (BP) right through or in the middle of it without any concern for its effects on their scheme of maneuver.

RESULTS:

1. Initial or planned schemes of maneuver prove to be inflexible.
2. Increased delays when units encounter the contamination, thus causing additional attrition to a stagnant force.
3. Units must assume MOPP Level 4 in response to the attack when they could have avoided it all together.

Techniques:

1. If a route or BP is so critical to the selected course of action (COA) that it will not be changed, at least develop contingency routes and actions based upon the location of the templated PCHEM. Contingency routes can be as easy as selecting on-order routes based upon confirmation of the template by the S2.
2. Key to success is situational awareness of how the new routes will effect the scheme of maneuver and a discussion of those contingencies.
3. Contingency actions can include, but are not limited to:
   • Increase MOPP level
   • Ensure M8A1 alarms are employed
   • Ppre-inspect NBC equipment
   • Pre-position battalion decontamination assets

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 9: Engineer force development of decision points for changing situations. Engineer commanders and staffs do not consistently develop decision points with supporting criteria to ensure continued support to the brigade in a fluid environment.

PROBLEM: In nearly every brigade mission there are both opportunities and requirements to change the task and purpose of engineer units with a corresponding change in task organization and/or change in priorities. While commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all these situations, the tendency is to issue an incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary order during execution vice addressing the most likely contingencies during the initial planning process.

RESULT: The fragmentary order method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and difficulties in command, control, and support to the executing unit.

Techniques:

1. Commanders and staffs must develop clear decision points with a pre-established plan to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision-making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare and execute the mission to standard.
2. Identify the requirement during planning.
3. Tie the required adjustment to a decision point with both friendly and enemy criteria.
4. Establish a command and control framework to execute.
5. Addressing the following potential situations during brigade level course of action development and synchronize the adjustment with required command and control plan during wargaming:
   • Transition from task force to brigade deliberate breach operations.
   • Culmination of lead task force with follow and assume/support task force becoming the main effort.
   • Loss of engineers in the breach force.
   • Success of lead task force in breaching main defensive belt causing future mobility requirements at the existing breach site to be in support of brigade level maneuver.
   • Adjusting the SCATMINE system allocation based upon success or failure of the conventional effort.
   • Transferring blade assets and platoons from one unit sector to another.
   • Ending brigade level CM/S effort to initiate task force level effort.
   • Disengaging engineer units and assets.
   • Changing type of survivability positions based on progress.

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 10: Predictive analysis. The main CP is often not able to provide the TF commander with a predictive analysis during the fight.

PROBLEMS: The main CP does not consistently:

1. Analyze information received.
2. Provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next.
3. Recommend future friendly actions.

RESULT: The commander does not receive predictive analysis from his CP.

Techniques:

1. TF XO, S-2, S-3 Air, and FSE need to track the battle at the main CP map board and "think one step ahead" of both enemy and friendly forces.
   • They need to delegate routine administrative duties to others in their sections as much as possible.
   • They should also eliminate unnecessary functions from their sections and even the CP itself.
2. Battle Staff regularly provide the commander with predictive analysis products and recommendation(s) based upon those products for future actions:
   • Event matrix
   • Updated situation template
   • Decision support matrix

(TA.4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change)

TREND 11: Brigade planning for multiple enemy courses of action (COAs). Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.
2. Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

RESULTS:

1. Inflexible execution when the enemy reacts differently than anticipated.
2. Does not provide the maneuver commander the necessary flexibility to adjust the brigade's plan; we often fight the plan, not the enemy.
3. Synchronization of the force is often unhinged when required to react to unplanned "push-to-talk" operations.
4. Uncoordinated effort.

Techniques:

1. Address multiple enemy COAs early in the planning process to allow each BOS to synchronize and plan to support the development of decision points and triggers to defeat an uncooperative enemy.
2. Although the result of branch planning is not often a written product (CONPLAN), it should result in graphic control measures to facilitate its rapid execution based on the commander's decision.
3. Brigade plans must be flexible and address multiple enemy COAs.
4. Develop standard "plays" at Home Station that are well rehearsed by subordinate units to provide a foundation for execution of base plans. Time during the planning process can then be spent on development of branches and sequels of the base plan.
5. The revision and supervision phases of troop leading procedures must be utilized by the commanders and staff to build on decision points and sequels based on intelligence gathering and changing situations. Simply, the planning process and staff responsibilities do not end with issuing the order.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 12: Integration of target analysis into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Brigade Combat Team (BCT) target analysis and synchronization meetings are often not linked to the entire planning process.

RESULT: Brigade is unable to determine the High Payoff Targets (HPTs) and how and when to best attack them.

Techniques:

1. S2s begin the process before mission analysis and use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Target Value Analysis (TVA) to identify HPTs within the enemy formation and why they are important to that formation. In other words, identify enemy vulnerabilities.
2. The Fire Support Officer (FSO), Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), and other battlefield operating systems must assist the S2 in this process.
3. The Brigade Commander provides additional guidance and focuses the effort as he gives his intent for fires and maneuver.
4. The FSO must then sequence available assets to find and attack the HPTs to meet the Commander's guidance -- the Concept of Fires.
5. The concept of fires is then included into each course of action (COA) and is developed into a detailed scheme of fires during wargaming.

(TA..4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 13: Brigade planning for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) operations. Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

PROBLEMS:

1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.
2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs) have improved during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their survival skills (fieldcraft) and tactical knowledge in movement techniques, camouflage, reporting, and knowledge of the enemy.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staff planning must include:
   • How the COLTs will conduct a forward passage of lines
   • Routes
   • Resupply operations
   • Communication requirements for retrans operations
   • Insertion operations by ground and air
   • Casualty evacuation
2. The COLTs exist to support the brigade's fight and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff.
3. Planning for COLT operations begins as early as high value targets are identified and refined as course of action is developed and finalized during the wargaming. Suggested areas for staff planning:
   • S2. Determine the requirements for COLTs. Identify target areas of interest and named areas of interest for the purpose of providing intel and destroying high payoff targets.
   • S2/Engineer. Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts by using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.
   • S3. Allocate resources for the mission (Air Force ETACs/SAPPERs/IEW personnel/aircraft/scout augmentees for security/additional communications equipment/UAV. etc.). Plan for the insertion/extraction. Plan like any other operation to include determining infiltration methods, plan routes, checkpoints, pickup, landing zones, false insertions, forward and rearward passage of lines, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retrans vehicles, and terrain management.
   • S4. Support the infiltration/extraction. Plan resupply, casualty evacuation, and if applicable caches.
   • FSO/COLT platoon leader. Prepare order, backbriefs to the commander, conduct PCCs/PCIs, and rehearsals.
   • S2/S3/FSO. Execution - provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 14: Decontamination planning at Task Force level.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task Forces (TFs) do minimal planning for Operational Decontamination.
2. Most TFs have the M17 SANATOR that enables them to conduct Operational Decon, but seldom consider its use to aid them in sustaining their combat power.
3. Communication with the M17 crew is nonexistent, and the crew is usually in the BSA or combat trains.
4. There is often no water plan to support the Operational Decontamination; no consideration is given whether to use available assets from the TF, or request to higher for support.
5. Selection of possible link-up points and C2 issues are never planned.

Procedure: Chemical Staffs must plan for Operational Decontamination.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

Table of Contents

Command and Control BOS, Part 1

Command and Control BOS, Part 3