• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

PROBLEMS:

1. Many FSB XOs are not aware that there are three methods of the MDMP, based on available planning time.
2. They have difficulty with the orders process because they do not fully understand the components of that process; the least understood area is the estimate of the situation.
3. Mission analysis is not conducted properly.
4. COA development and COA analysis is not conducted properly.

RESULTS:

1. Published orders are not coordinated and synchronized.
2. Typically, orders are published without a clear intent, no risk assessment, no BOS annexes, and no BOS overlays.

Techniques:

1. XOs must become knowledgeable of the MDMP using the following guides:
   • ST 101-5
   • FM 101-5
   • CALL Newsletter 95-12.
2. XOs should inculcate the MDMP process in all training events to include CPX, FTX, and battle simulation exercises. Only by religiously using the MDMP will they develop the proficiency and expertise required to successfully execute this portion of their duties as an XO.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 21: Infantry team direct fire planning. Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).
2. Unable to focus, distribute and shift fires in manners that are understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.
3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

Techniques:

1. Obtain and use Infantry School student handout on direct fire planning, SH 7-45.
2. Incorporate SH 7-45 in future editions of FM 71-1, FM 71-2 and FM 71-123.
3. Incorporate training on direct fire planning in Home Station training.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 22: Integration of mission analysis. Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated Battle Staff function.

PROBLEMS:

1. Battle Staff does not conduct parallel planning
   • Battle Staff assembles at task force (TF) command post (CP) while TF Commander, S-3, and FSO receive brigade order at brigade
   • Battle Staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs
2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

RESULT: TF planning does not fully identify specified, implied, and essential tasks for brief to commander.

Techniques:

1. Battle Staff conduct mission analysis integrating all key planners.
2. Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon their return, prior to writing the restated mission.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 23: Developing the Commander's intent. The Commander's intent as given at the conclusion of mission analysis is often vague, contradictory, or too complex.

Techniques:

1. Clear and concise planning guidance that addresses who, what, where, when, how, and why indirect fires will support the scheme of maneuver will effectively focus the concept for indirect fires.
2. Commander's intent should focus on critical events necessary to accomplish the mission. Include attack criteria and engagement criteria, priorities for target engagement, and guidance for special munitions.
3. Ensure all of the critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) are addressed in the scheme of fires. They must clearly communicate the commander's intent for fires as task, purpose, method, and end state.

(TA. 4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 24: Task force development and refinement of courses of action (COA). Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most S3s do not know how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop COAs that only provide an axis, a formation and a simple plan for actions on the objective.
3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.
4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective nor continuous reconnaissance.
5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.
6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

Procedure: Chapter 2, FM 7-20, is an excellent reference for developing a COA and scheme of maneuver. This chapter should be incorporated into future additions of FM 71-2 and FM 71-1.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 25: Task Force S3 understanding of course of action (COA) development.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force S3s often do not develop COAs based on the commander's decisive point and are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do.
2. COAs are frequently not developed with the S2's SITEMP or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

Procedures:

1. Commanders and staffs should become familiar with Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 for development of COAs.
2. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team tasks and purposes.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 26: Wargaming the CSS concept of support. The CSS concept of support most often focuses on maneuver unit COAs that begin with actions beyond the LD and culminate with action on objective. It seldom addresses support requirements for before and after the battle.

PROBLEMS:

1. During preparation for combat, the CSS concept of support seldom addresses such things as:
   • Where the aid stations are located
   • How much fuel/ammo will be consumed during rehearsals
   • A description of replenishment or services for operations before the LD if the brigade combat team (BCT) is moving.
2. As the brigade enters the after-combat phase, the CSS annex once again does not outline a concept of support.

RESULTS:

1. With regard to the after-combat phase, specific replenishment and services tasks are not addressed in respect to transitioning to future operations.
2. The brigade's ability to identify a culminating point is diminished. For example, if the future planners determine a minimum of 80% combat power in order to defend against a counter attack, specific criteria must be addressed in the CSS annex to ensure rapid regeneration as well as keeping the commander informed if the combat team begins to approach 80%.

Techniques:

1. While the maneuver BOS focuses and wargames actions after the LD, the CSS community (planners) must wargame actions through all phases.
2. CSS wargaming cannot wait until the planning process formally addresses wargaming; rather, in the case of before operations, the CSS wargame must occur timely enough for the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to react.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 27: Wargaming. Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force executive officers (TF XOs) do not facilitate the process:
   • Staff loses focus on critical events
   • Relationship between events wargamed and decisive point
2. Wargame takes too long

RESULTS:

1. Only most aggressive participants provide input.
2. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

Techniques:

1. TF XO or S-3 take charge of wargaming; keep wargame focused on:
   • Critical events
   • Decisive point
2. Use synchronization matrix to record events wargamed by phase and BOS.
3. Use NTC "How To" video, Wargaming, to demonstrate "a way" to conduct the wargame process.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 28: Tactical maneuver decision point development.

PROBLEMS:

1. Development of decision point criteria (e.g. PIR, NAI, event) is too often not a function of the wargame.
2. Decision point development:
   • Lacks specific detail
   • Is often ineffective in providing timely execution of critical decisions during the fight
   • Are often made after line of departure (LD)
   • Criteria based on a single anticipated enemy COA

RESULTS:

1. Late or ineffective key decisions are made to maneuver and fight a flexible enemy with multiple COAs.
2. Trigger point development is done while forces are maneuvering on the battlefield.
3. Commanders are forced to react to enemy actions, hampered in executing timely decisions, developing hasty COAs, and issuing FRAGOs.
4. With only one anticipated enemy COA, the flexibility of the brigade plan in hindered.

Techniques:

1. Staffs must develop decision point criteria for multiple enemy COAs.
2. This process should be ongoing during the refinement and supervision phases of the planning process.
3. Decision points must be a result of the wargame and based on a comparison of multiple enemy COAs.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 29: Main Command Post standard operating procedures (SOP) for movement.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units do not have SOPs that establish priority of work during setup and tear down.
2. Main Command Posts (CPs) seldom have a REDCON system that helps posture the CP for movement based on mission requirements or increased enemy threat. The Main CP consists of two major functional areas:
   • The CP and operational support assets
   • The Life Support Area (LSA)

RESULT: Units are often ham-strung when it comes time to move.

Techniques:

1. Units should establish a simple REDCON level associated with the level and priority of work required based on the current METT-T of the situation. EXAMPLE:
   REDCON 1 - Ready to move/TOC broken down/march columns lined up.
   REDCON 2 - TOC ready to move in 15 Mins/RED TOC configuration/working off vehicle antennas/M-8 alarms out/
   REDCON 3 - TOC ready to move in 1 hr/Green TOC/antennas up/Life Support Area packed up/M8 Alarms out/no camouflage up/Quartering party departed to new site.
   REDCON 4 - TOC ready to move in 2 hrs/Green TOC/antennas up/LSA up/camouflage up/M8 Alarms out.

   This system will help establish priority of work when the unit pulls into a new site. The TOC goes from REDCON 1 to REDCON 3 and then based on duration of stay drops to a REDCON 4 status with full LSA up.

   When the situation requires the main to move:

   • The first break is the LSA, which brings you to REDCON 3 and the Quartering Party is ready to or is kicked out to new site. A modification to this is when you drop the Main's camouflage net.
   • REDCON 2 is a HOT TOC configuration with all major work completed but TOC is still functional. A course of action could be to kick the LSA vehicles out to the new site and link up with the Q-party.
   • Go to REDCON 1 would mean break and march column. Ready to move.

NOTE: This system was used during Desert Storm and was very effective. The Main CP was able to manage their personnel assets to remain functional until the last minute before jumping, and all personnel understood their priority of work once at the new site. When the division jumped into Iraq the D-Main never left the REDCON 3 configuration, and was ready to move in one hour notice. With the command "Go to REDCON 2," every section had developed their own drills to achieve that level of readiness. With every jump, there was very little decision- making required by key leaders as to what needed to be done. Soldiers did not stand around waiting to be told what to do.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

Table of Contents

Command and Control BOS, Part 3

Command and Control BOS, Part 5