SECTION
II
TA.6
MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC) BOS
NBC
Positive Performance
6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems
* Decontamination operations: Often executed in adequate time and to standard. Decon platoons know how to conduct their part of deliberate decon. Positioning of the decon platoon usually supported the scheme of maneuver. Deliberate decon sites and linkup points were identified in the OPORD. TECHNIQUE: Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem. Rarely were specific elements, such as MPs, engineer, or medical tasked to reinforce decon operations with personnel and equipment. The key to a particularly successful decon operation was the proper augmentation and support provided by the brigade staff and the contaminated unit.
Need Emphasis
6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment
* Reaction to and detection of chemical attacks: Units respond slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas. Soldiers solely depend on M256 kits and place no emphasis on the use of M8/M9 paper. TECHNIQUE: M256 kits detect only vapor hazards, while M8/M9 paper detects liquid contamination. The failure to use all detection techniques results in false readings, or no reading, which leads to unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.
6.3.3.1 Employ Physical deception
* Smoke and obscurants: Unless smoke is "wargamed" at the brigade level prior to assigning a task organization, smoke assets will not be usefully missioned When brigade retains control of the mechanized smoke platoon, it seldom issues a smoke plan to adjacent units or units subject to the smoke effects on the battlefield. When the smoke platoon is attached below the brigade level, a similar failure to disseminate plans occurs. RESULT: Miscued smoke missions; fratricide of smoke vehicles by BLUFOR elements not expecting friendly vehicles forward.
M/CM/S
Positive Performance
6.1 Provide Mobility
* Standardization of breach lane marking: Brigade unit SOPs and the engineer execution of breach lane marking are generally IAW FM 90-13-1. PROCEDURE: All unit SOPs must have breach lane marking IAW change 1 to FM 90-13-1.
6.1.1 Breach Obstacles
* MICLIC-tank plow breaching drill: TECHNIQUE: One of the most consistently effective drills is the combined use of the MICLIC and the tank plow. A MICLIC and tank wait in a covered position for the unit to achieve suppression and obscuration of the breach site. The tank plow then drives forward to the minefield, with the MICLIC close behind. Once in position, the MICLIC fires over the top of the tank plow for an explosive breach of the minefield. The tank plow then moves forward to proof the lane.
6.2 Provide Countermobility
* Volcano Mine System: Units make effective use of the system's rapid ability to emplace large and lethal tactical minefields during the defense. This quarter, Volcano minefields accounted for more meters of minefield frontage, with greater effect and greater OPFOR BDA than conventionally emplaced minefields.
Need Emphasis
6. M/CM/S
* Engagement areas: Not built in coordination with the maneuver commander, the engineer commander, and the fire support coordinator. EAs are not identified prior to positioning of obstacle belts at the brigade level. Direct fire analysis is often not conducted, and obstacles are poorly positioned to achieve the maneuver commander's intent. Construction of obstacles begins prior to the establishment of Target Reference Points (TRPs), and are not covered by direct or indirect fire. TECHNIQUE: Engagement areas should be jointly sited on the ground with the maneuver commander, the supporting engineer and the fire support coordinator. Mini-rehearsals need to be conducted to ensure direct fire coverage of obstacles. Construct obstacles IAW FM 20-32 to ensure achievement of the maneuver commander's intent.
* Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA): Too many engineer company XOs do not understand the EBA process and how the planning factors relate to the task force fight. TECHNIQUE: EBA helps the engineer visualize the terrain, enemy engineer efforts, and his own capabilities. With these planning factors, the engineer can tell the task force commander how many holes he can dig; number of breaches his sappers can perform; number of minefields sappers can emplace, etc. This information is need by the task force commander up front to assist in planning for the fight.
6.1 Provide Mobility
* Obstacle intelligence: Seldom received in time for brigade rehearsals. Reconnaissance elements too often do not obtain critical obstacle information, while being discovered and destroyed by the enemy. While engineers are becoming more integrated into the reconnaissance effort, they generally do not have sufficient communication equipment to provide timely intelligence. Obstacles that are breached are not always identified as NAIs or included in the brigade R & S plan.
* Combined arms breach operations: Brigades fail to plan deliberate breach operations even when mission analysis clearly indicates that it is appropriate. Breaching tenets are seldom addressed in planning. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction are not fully addressed in OPORDs, or during brigade or task force level rehearsals. Rehearsals often become an extension of planning because of inadequate wargaming. Few units conduct mounted combined arms breaching rehearsals. Redundancy of breaching assets and a recovery capability to remove damaged vehicles from the breach lane are seldom considered. The support force is often not positioned to suppress enemy fire. The obscuration plan is generally not synchronized with the overall breach plan. Lack of obstacle intelligence contributes to failed missions. TECHNIQUE: The tenets of breaching (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breach organization, mass and synchronization) must be considered in all breaching operation and wargamed as part of the planning process. Combined arms breaching rehearsals must be conducted with strict attention to the breaching fundamentals: suppression, obscuration, security, reduction. Combat power must be focused at a defined point of penetration with detailed synchronization of all battlefield operating systems.
6.2 Provide Countermobility
* FASCAM planning: FASCAM intent and execution criteria are often not established, included in OPORDs, properly synchronized, or on a decision support matrix. Artillery is often not in position to deliver due to synchronization problems stemming from poor wargaming. Planned targets are often not executed or are executed too late to achieve the effect/intent desired. In many cases, targets are not supported with observed indirect fire. TECHNIQUE: FASCAM targets need to be event, rather than time, driven and synchronized with the field artillery fire support and the maneuver plan. Emplacement must be tied to an observer for indirect fire support.
6.3 Enhance Survivability
* Survivability positions: Over 75% of vehicle fighting positions do not meet standards prescribed in FM 5-103. Some of the common problems are siting of positions; use of available terrain; spread of spoil; ramp grades; firing platform depth; width of positions. RESULT: positions not shootable or survivable.
Table
of Contents
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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