SECTION
II
TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
Positive Performance
7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities
* Religious support - unit ministry communications: Unit ministry teams are communicating better on the battlefield. For the most part they have been issued radios. Some unit ministry teams even arrive equipped with SINGARS, which works even better. Unit ministry teams are demonstrating improvement in providing ministry to casualties on the battlefield.
Need Emphasis
7. Combat Service Support
* Logistics estimate: Not prepared IAW 6-20-1. Units are not synchronizing CSS planning with the OPLAN. RESULT: CSS staff officers are reacting, rather than acting to support requirements. S4s and or S1s continually operate independently from any input from the HHC commander, BMO, and the task force XO. Logistics reports are continuously submitted without on-hand quantities. RESULT: S4s cannot track resources nor have a systematic process to collect these resource/logistic factors. S4s and S3s do not integrate the CSS plan into the wargaming process for operations. Without this integration, the CSS plan becomes unsynchronized and does not help to weight the main effort. PROCEDURE: Battalion logisticians must gather and analyze information and prepare a logistics estimate. Participation in the wargaming process allows CSS personnel to anticipate mission requirements and establish "triggers" for resupply.
* CSS rehearsals: Typically turn into briefings of the maneuver and CSS plan with no focus on rehearsing the concept of support. 1SGs arrive without knowing the Co/Tm's task and purpose and cannot participate in the rehearsal. TF XOs and CSMs fail to participate in the rehearsal, as well as attached combat support elements. TFs conduct CSS rehearsals only 50% of the time because of conflicts in the TF timeline and LOGPAC operations.
* CSS planning and integration: TF S4s normally are not prepared to provide the TF commander and staff with the current logistical status of the TF prior to COA selection. S4s do not routinely use informal estimates or receive estimates from the key CSS leaders in the TF. Once wargaming does begin, S4s are normally not included and are left to produce the CSS plan without the benefit of BOS synchronization. RESULT: Maneuver plan that does not consider the current logistical status and a CSS plan that does not support TF maneuver.
* CSS plan dissemination: TF CSS plans are normally produced late; not fully disseminated; not rehearsed. RESULT: CSS plan not understood by the CSS executors prior to the mission. TF CSS graphics are normally not ready to be issued to Co/Tm commanders at the TF OPORD brief because Tfs fail to include CSS graphics in their OPORD production system. RESULT: S4 has difficulty disseminating the graphics prior to any CSS rehearsal. If CSS graphics are issued to Co/Tm commanders at the OPORD, a breakdown normally occurs at Co/Tm level, where either the commander fails to give the CSS graphics to the 1SG, or the 1SG fails to post them on his map.
* Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) operations: CTCPs are not routinely organized to function as an effective command post during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of a mission. They do not track the status of the TF as it builds combat power, nor do they maintain updated status on the supply classes at TF and Co/Tm level. During mission execution, 1SGs generally report adequate information to the CTCP. S4s do nothing with this information other than compile it into a TF report and send it higher. S4s rarely analyze information they receive to allocate resources to critical areas of the battlefield, update the key CSS leaders on TF status, or anticipate future TF CSS requirements.
* Protecting the force: CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense. Initial quartering party actions lack thoroughness. Base cluster defenses often are founded on poor quality fighting positions; no sector sketches; weak coordination between supporting elements.
* S4/S1 - mission analysis: S4s/S1s do not routinely brief assets available during the mission analysis brief to the commander. (see CSS planning and integration)
* Echelon training concepts: S4s continually supersede or bypass the HHC commander in the interface with the FSB. TECHNIQUE: The S4/S1 must primarily plan for the current battle and operations forward in the task force area of operations. Any interface and coordination with the FSB is strictly a mission for the HHC commander. If S4s/S1s bypass this doctrinal relationship, their efficiency in performing current operations, and planning for future operations will be severely degraded.
7.1 Arm
* Class V UBL: Most TFs do not know their Class V UBL by weapon system. Vehicle commanders do not know either their unconstrained UBL or the NTC issued combat load prior to moveout day. The same lack of knowledge exists at TF and Co/Tm level. S4s typically do not compare their UBLs with the NTC combat load in order to be able to tell the TF commander if there will be a Class V problem. Class V tracking is inaccurate with no identified start point. RESULT: Class V shortages within the TF because of poor tracking and management.
7.3 Fix
* Materiel readiness tracking: Units have difficulty transitioning the use of ULLS, SAMS 1/2, and SARSS from garrison to a field environment. RESULT: Units quickly lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperative; what parts are required; requisition status. Without an accurate and timely maintenance/repair parts management system in place, units struggle at maintaining readiness rates at or above 90% during intense operations. This quarter the EMC for M1 tanks was 71%; Bradleys were 69%.
7.3/7.4 Fix/Man the Force
* Personnel and logistics requirement reporting: The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness. Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements. RESULT: CSS units having difficulty accurately determining what will be required to support the fight.
7.3.1 Distribute
* Class IX management: This quarter, TFs had less than 15% of their Class IX part requisitions on valid status. WHY? 1) PLL clerks and maintenance managers did not reconcile their document registers with technical supply. 2) Units did not ensure that all requisitions were immediately read into the SARSS upon delivery of the ULLS. 3) Long delays in identifying disk/formatting problems. 4) Failure to follow-up requisitions that went longer than 48 - 72 hours without a valid status. 5) Units did not create a demand history for walk-thru requisitions by manually posting them in ULLS. 6) Some PLL clerks failed to use the status disk received from technical supply to update their parts status.
7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities
* Religious support - no chaplain assistant; chaplains with poor basic soldier skills; not integrated into plans/OPORDS; too few religious support plans in TSOPs.
7.4.4.2 Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC): Typical TF died of wounds (DOW) rate is seldom below 50%. By the end of a typical 14-day rotation, a TF kills itself off through improper CASEVAC three to four times. WHY? Wounded soldiers are not seen by Bn/TF medical assets in a timely manner. Tfs typically do not fix responsibility on one individual in the staff to effectively plan for CASEVAC. At times the S4 and CSM try to fix broken CASEVAC systems to no avail. PROCEDURE: The responsibility lies with the S1 and operations officer for planning, and unit 1SGs and the medical platoon for execution. The S1 must do a casualty estimate, including where the casualties will occur and in what numbers. The medical officer should then link medical assets available with the units projected to suffer casualties. Usually, the medical assets available fall short of the requirements to adequately treat projected casualties. Two aid stations in a Bn/TF are almost always inadequate to support a TF's combat missions. Experience shows that 15 to 20 casualties in one hour overwhelms the treatment capabilities of an aid station, which doctrinally constitutes a MASCAL situation. TECHNIQUE: CASEVAC planning is primarily a brigade issue, because that is where the assets exist to adequately treat the casualties a TF is likely to sustain. The Bn/TF staff must, through the estimate process, articulate the necessity to push brigade medical assets forward.
7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel
* Heavy/light integration - use of transportation assets: Light infantry units deploy with austere CSS assets. Trucks are the lifeblood of a light TF attached to a heavy brigade. The competing demands for the trucks include: 1) move troops 2) upload and deliver all classes of supply 3) assist with CASEVAC 4) transport all CPOGs and chemical decontamination apparatus 5) deliver soldiers' A and B bags. Most light battalions attach the HMWMVs (12 ea.) from the support platoon to Co/TM 1SGs and supply sergeants. RESULT: Support platoon leader left without the assets necessary to convoy LOGPACs. Then without a plan or SOP on how to use the truck platoon, the truck are used to move troops around the battlefield. RESULT: Works for the first battle, but soon leads to competing priorities, ie. trucks needed for movement of defensive barrier materiels + the need to still move soldiers, etc. RESULT: Truck platoon soon decimated by too many missions for too few trucks; maintenance losses soon mount, leaving the TF with no truck assets at all.
Table
of Contents
TA.6
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability BOS Narrative
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