SECTION
II
TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
Positive Performance
5.1 Collect Information
* GSR teams were fully proficient on their equipment.
5.2.2 Process information: Evaluate Physical Environment Information
* Aviation Battalion/Squadron S2 Terrain Analysis: The S2s use of computer-aided terrain analysis programs, such as TERRA BASE, allow for the S2s to rapidly confirm the assessments made by employing his Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO).
5.2.4 Process information: Integrate Intelligence Information
* Platoon leader(s) role playing the enemy during Co/Tm planning and rehearsals: Company commanders regularly use a platoon leader to assist them with IPB. TECHNIQUE: The commander has the platoon leader play the role of an uncooperative enemy during planning and rehearsals.
5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports
* Task Force S2 knowledge of the Krasnovian threat: S2s arrive with a better, more detailed knowledge of Krasnovian doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment. PROCEDURE: S2s must sustain their knowledge, especially Krasnovian doctrinal evolution and equipment upgrades, which result in quality SITEMPS. TECHNIQUE: Home station battle staff training should ensure quality SITEMPS are produced and disseminated in a timely manner. Timely and accurate SITEMPS are useful throughout the planning process and are needed by both subordinate and slice commanders.
* GSR Team timely, accurate reporting positively impacting R & S plans: GSR teams have shown some improvement coordinating with S2s, keeping abreast of battlefield operations, briefing the current situation, and allowing time for team leaders to conduct a reconnaissance of the Area of Operations. In some cases, GSR input has added to the R & S plan, which triggers other systems in the unit.
Need Emphasis
5. Intelligence
* Too many Artillery Battalion S2s with less than 90 days in the slot prior to the rotation: The current trend shows that individuals have not been in position long and have not had much training. PROCEDURE: More emphasis needs to be placed on having trained S2s prior to arrival at the NTC. The S2s should have a minimum of 90 days in the job.
* Too many Artillery Battalion S2 sections arrive with obsolete doctrinal references, or no doctrinal references at all. PROCEDURE: All field artillery battalion S2s must, at the minimum, possess and use the following manuals:
5.1 Collect Information
* EW platoons dependent on data links and computers cannot "manually" perform basic direction-finding missions: Technology has made EW platoons dependent on data links and computers to gather lines of bearing and turn them into enemy location information. When these systems break down, the collectors and analysts do not have the requisite skills to perform basic direction-finding missions. TECHNIQUE: Get back to basics and train for the worst-case scenario so direction-finding operations can continue when any portion of the new technology fails.
* GSR Team weaknesses: PROCEDURE: Teams need to relook and beef-up unit SOPs that establish task, conditions, and standard to be performed, and also include who is responsible for what action as outlined in ARTEP 34-28810, MTP, Mission Training Plan for the GSR Platoon, and common task as outlined in STP 21-1-SMCT, Skill Level I, and STP 21-24-SMCT, Skill Level 2-4.
5.1.1 Collect information on situation
* Poor battle tracking by battalion S2s hinders predictive analysis: Effective battle tracking is the key to predictive analysis; it allows the S2 to confirm previously developed templates and then make an accurate assessment of the enemy's next action/reaction. TECHNIQUE: The use of different types of icons allows the S2 section to place the SITEMP and EVENTEMPs on the map and rapidly assess the actual tactical situation. The key to this rests with effective SOPs that are rehearsed on a frequent basis to ensure that the display presented allows for a common understanding of both the templated and actual situations.
5.1.2 Collect Target Information
* Brigade S2s are not identifying all High Value Targets (HVT), which leads to problems nominating high Payoff Targets (HPT): Brigade S2s are not identifying all HVTs associated with each mission and templating them as they would appear on the battlefield. TECHNIQUE: S2s need to evaluate each HVT to determine if it should be nominated as a potential HPT. This will allow the staff to determine if the targets can be ranged with friendly fire systems and in what priority they should be interdicted. PROCEDURE: HVTs should be listed on each SITEMP and discussed by system during course of action wargaming.
* SOP (high power) jamming inappropriately used, too often with negative friendly effects and minimal enemy effect: SOP jamming is simply directing the maximum power output of the jammer against an enemy receiver to overpower it. It is the easiest type of electronic attack to perform, but has several disadvantages. The amount of power produced makes this method easily recognizable to the target as jamming, and allows him to quickly enact an anti-jam plan to defeat it. High power jamming can have a negative effect on friendly communications on neighboring frequencies. SOP jamming also puts out a huge signature that can be exploited by enemy EW to locate the jammer.
5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports
* Brigade rear area IPB never fully developed by S2s: Brigade S2s never fully developed an IPB for the brigade's rear area. Brigade and FSB S2s do not template NAIs in the rear area. This results in an unfocused R & S effort by the MPs and no opportunities for the Mps to engage these threats prior to their objective. TECHNIQUE: MPs must be integrated into the R & S plan for the rear area, so they can focus their reconnaissance effort. The MPs must also be informed of any threat to the rear area.
* Brigade S2 sections not producing Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) for terrain analysis: Instead of a MCOO, brigade intelligence sections are producing a type of terrain analysis that focuses on topographical restriction only. This approach omits many critical aspects of the terrain that have a significant impact on military operations, ie., intervisibility lines, axis of advance, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, etc. PROCEDURE: S2s should incorporate in the IPB process sufficient time and analytical methods to produce a MCOO in a timely fashion.
* Brigade S2s produced Situation Templates (SITEMPS) are not timely; not in sufficient quantity and lack detail: Brigade S2s habitually enter the tactical decisionmaking process with only one SITEMP. By only submitting one to the staff planning process, S2s are not presenting the full range of enemy tactical options. The SITEMPS usually lack the necessary detail to portray the full spectrum of enemy BOSs. PROCEDURE: Brigade S2s should produce at least two SITEMPS which show all critical enemy BOSs for every staff planning effort.
* Brigade S2s rarely prepare Event Templates or an Event Matrix focused on critical enemy events: Failure to prepare these products results in inadequately focused reconnaissance and surveillance plans. PROCEDURE: The intelligence section should develop a separate overlay showing NAIs, TAIs and Time-Phased Lines (TPLs) to correctly produce an event template. TECHNIQUE: Associated with the event template is an event matrix, which ties timing, locations, critical enemy events, and NAIs together. TPLs should be 15 minutes apart instead of the typical interval of one hour. S2s should develop these products to allow the staff to build a decision-support template. They should also use the event template to track the enemy in zone and focus R & S on the NAIs where critical events are anticipated.
Table
of Contents
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
TA.6
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability BOS Narrative
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