SECTION
II
TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
Positive Performance
4. Command and Control
* Aviation battalion staff planning process: Staffs generally knowledgeable of staff procedures and their applications.
4.2.1.1 Analyze mission
* Fire Support Element (FSE) mission analysis: FSNCOs in particular are prepared to conduct mission analysis and demonstrating the ability to extract implied fire support tasks from the brigade order, The FSNCOs ability to do mission analysis ensures that the task can begin immediately, without waiting for the FSO. This facilitates the timely completion of other planning tasks, and coordination with other elements.
Need Emphasis
4.3 Determine Actions
* Brigade fire support planning: Various staff elements generally develop their plans in relative isolation. A lack of BOS synchronization results in the brigade targeting team failing to develop a meaningful high payoff target list; a wargame derived scheme of fires; a target list that supports the scheme of maneuver. R & S plans do not focus on generating targetable information for engagement by lethal and non-lethal means. RESULT: No plan to link lookers with shooters in order to synchronize fires with maneuver.
* Co/Tm fire planning: Fire planning does not take place below TF level. The top down/bottom up targeting process was developed to ensure that one consolidated fire plan would support the scheme of maneuver at all echelons. This process is not being utilized. Higher headquarters often limit lower echelon's target allocations and TF FSOs do not allocate any targets below TF level. RESULT: TF fire plans do not support the scheme of maneuver and duplications are not being resolved.
* Aviation engagement area analysis: Attack helicopter company commanders do not develop adequate direct fire planning schemes to destroy enemy forces in assigned engagement areas. TECHNIQUE: Direct fire plans must encompass the following seven items to ensure success: 1) massing of fires, both direct and indirect 2) leader control of all fires 3) fire plans understood by all soldiers 4) focusing of fires 5) distribution of direct fire 6) shifting of fires 7) rehearsal of fire plans
* Task force/squadron battle staff planning process: Battle staffs are not providing the commander a detailed mission analysis briefing and do not focus the wargaming effort on the critical points of the plan. Staffs consistently fail to brief assets available by platoon; amount of special equipment and munitions available; duration of combat multipliers (ie., minutes of mortar smoke, number of mines, wire available, etc.). RESULT: Lack of focus during wargaming because of an inadequate understanding of where and when these assets can be used to enhance maneuver elements ability to accomplish their mission.
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance
* Reconnaissance operations: Enemy recon elements too often make contact and then destroy TF scouts. TF scouts seldom use bounding overwatch to provide internal security. Scouts also do not coordinate with Co/Tms performing TF-level security operations. The 10-HMMWV equipped scout platoon increases the elements stealth, but reduces survivability compared to M2 equipped scouts. With OPFOR recon elements operating from more survivable platforms (BRDM, BMP, occasionally tanks), they often choose to engage and destroy TF scouts rather than observe and report. RESULT: Special emphasis must be placed on TF scout survivability and security techniques (see FM 17-98). TECHNIQUE: Closely integrate scouts executing R & S operations with TF security elements, and insure the availability of responsive indirect fire.
4.3.2 Develop courses of action
* Target Value Analysis (TVA): Typically brigades leave TVA to field artillery elements. Rarely do brigades establish a targeting team (multidisciplined team under brigade XO). No targeting team results in a failure to decide what targets must be attacked to ensure brigade mission accomplishment. When staffs fail to identify HPTs, the S2 may not acquire these targets through his R & S plan, and the FSO may not target them.
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces
* TOC operations timelines: TF staffs do not understand how to develop a timeline, refine it as necessary, and effectively track and adhere to the established timeline. TECHNIQUE: Time available should be analyzed to determine how much is available, how it should be allocated, and how it will affect the battle command cycle. The commander, using reverse planning, constructs a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Plan conservatively. Produce a schedule of activities that must occur. The approved schedule is incorporated into staff battle drill. Establish a tracking system to ensure critical task accomplishment IAW the schedule. Include the following events, at a minimum: 1) HHQ commitments by the command group 2) OPORD times 3) rehearsal times 4) CSS events . Schedule development should always be done in context of the 4 Ss, ie. sunlight, subordinates, supervise, simplicity.
* TOC operations decisionmaking process: Units significantly deviate from the doctrinal decisionmaking process. The wide range of techniques employed too often result in Tfs losing focus on designated objectives and failing to plan completely thorough the objective. EXAMPLES: mission analysis not being conducted as an integrated battle staff:; wargaming that never reaches action-reaction- counterreaction; combining wargaming and synchronization by simply filling out a synchronization matrix. TECHNIQUE: Regardless of the decisionmaking technique employed, detailed planning considerations, such as actions on contact and actions on the objective must not be short-circuited. See TOC operations timelines above: successful time analysis will allow the inclusion of critical planning tasks that will result in a more synchronized operation.
4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders
* Developing a scheme of maneuver: TF S3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and the refinement of a COA into a scheme of maneuver. TFs normally develop a movement order and general actions on contact or actions on the objective. However, they seldom specify in detail what they want their company/teams to accomplish. Task and purpose are rarely assigned to Co/Tms. See FM 7-20 for an excellent chapter on developing a COA and scheme of maneuver.
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders
* TF rehearsals: Actions on the objective is the critical part of a TF offensive scheme of maneuver. Units routinely lack the requisite level of detailed planning for these actions. End state is not routinely covered in the planning process. The lack of detailed planning is coupled with a failure to rehearse this part of the offensive mission. RESULT: A lack of synchronization on the objective area. Units must include detailed planning and subsequent rehearsal for these critical tasks.
Table
of Contents
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
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