TA.1
MANEUVER BOS
Strengths
1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)
* Advance party operations: Artillery battery advance party operations continue to be a strength. The advance parties are conducting good security sweeps and all personnel are aware of their assigned duties. Gunnery sergeants continue to do a good job of attaining accurate initial lay data and are using proper lay commands.
* Short notice missions: Aviation units continue to do an excellent job of reacting to short notice missions. The staffs provide the minimum necessary information to the company, while it conducts simultaneous aircrew planning and preparation.
* Night observation devices: Units have increased their use of NODs. Brigade task forces are currently mounting and using close to 50% of all their available PVS-7s on the head harness. This allows units to move better, identify the enemy sooner and return fire more accurately.
* Aircrew coordination and task execution: Aircrews are conducting thorough planning and executing their assigned tasks to standard.. Home station ATM training has developed highly proficient crews. Their capability to operate effectively at night has provided the infantry brigade commander a viable maneuver force. TECHNIQUES: 1) 24 hour operations requirements has resulted in the assignment of the most proficient crews to night operations, while accepting the inherent tactical risk during day operation. 2) Crews adapt to OPFOR daytime target acquisition by selecting higher energy movement techniques (ie., airspeed greater than ETL) while conducting tactical operations. This technique has been relatively successful, while increasing the cockpit workload for day crews.
* Maneuver (Mech/Armor): Vehicle maneuver at the section and platoon level has continued to improve over the last quarter. The use of terrain to mask movement and allow mutual support from wingmen vehicles has significantly increased. Vehicles use more off road movement/maneuver, rather than sole reliance on roads.
* Discriminate fire techniques: Employment of discriminate fire techniques during the execution of MOUT battle drill Enter building/clear room is a strength. TECHNIQUE: Soldiers precede their building entry with a concussion grenade. Upon entry they engage only enemy personnel and avoid civilian noncombatants.
* Battle drills: Platoons continue to execute the Knock out a bunker battle drill successfully as part of a movement to contact live-fire exercise. They also successfully execute the Enter and clear a trenchline battle drill during the deliberate attack of a trenchline live-fire exercise.
1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver
* Combined arms operations (Mech/Armor): Units are better at integrating the heavy team into offensive operations. More and more, the heavy team is being used in the main effort in the brigade's main attack. TECHNIQUE: As part of the brigade's plan, the heavy team is given the task of attacking through the main objective using its superior fire power, protection, and mobility to significantly reduce resistance on the objective and secure the far side. This technique reduces the friendly light infantry casualties on the objective. It also provides far side security against counterattack. This gives the light infantry protection while they reduce the objective in detail.
Needs Emphasis
1.1.1.4 Close into Tactical Position
* Air assault operations: Units are not conducting detailed planning for air assault operations. Generally, units do not plan all five phases of an air assault operation in reverse sequence. Deficiencies include: 1) poor coordination between infantry and aviation elements. 2) lack of a detailed signal plan that describes how every element of the task force will communicate during each phase of the operation. 3) lack of realistic communication exercises. 4) poor staging plans. 5) poor soldier awareness of flight routes, land headings, abort plans, and alternate LZs. 6) poor use of communications equipment on the helicopters to keep abreast of the situation. 7) poor use of pathfinders or other means of terminal guidance on LZs. RESULT: at the LZ various serials routinely land at different locations and on different land headings without the soldiers on board knowing. During night air assault operations, this results in confusion and delays as units attempt to assemble. TECHNIQUE: Soldiers must be prepared to fight during any phase of an air assault operation. PROCEDURE: Augment FM 90-4 with detailed SOPs describing the specifics of how the unit will normally conduct each phase of an air assault operation.
* Force protection: Leaders are not taking aggressive action to protect the force. Deficiencies include: 1) poor use of OPs 2) poor dispersion 3) lack of fortified positions 4) lack of R & S patrols 5) poor passive air defense measures 6) improper movement formations and techniques 7) remaining in the same position too long 8) poor noise and light discipline 8) inconsistent risk management procedures. RESULT: enemy soldiers often surprise rotational units and inflict many casualties.
* Force protection (aviation): Force protection of the tactical assembly area (TAA) is an overall weakness at individual and collective levels. Aviation units should be able to protect themselves from a Level I threat. Deficiencies: 1) too often soldiers are not trained in the common or individual skills, ie. construct an individual fighting position; move under indirect fire; range card preparation, etc., to execute this collective task. 2) the task force S2 does not provide a thorough IPB and R & S plan for the TAA. 3) No unity of command exists for assembly area defense. 4) emplacement of obstacles and use of Class IV materiels are minimal. PROCEDURES: 1) develop and rehearse detailed task force SOPs for assembly area operations. 2) concentrate on NCO leader tasks and individual soldier skills 3) standardize subordinate aviation battalion SOPs within the aviation brigade. Areas of emphasis: FARP security procedures; quartering party procedures; assembly area occupation; patrolling; CASEVAC procedures; reaction to sniper; actions when enemy is inside the perimeter.
* Security: Heavy teams typically are not adapting well to the close in terrain and the enemy dismounted threat. Terrain analysis, using OCOKA, tends to be a weakness at Co/Tm level. Establishing OPs and conducting local security are weaknesses. RESULT: large numbers of casualties from snipers and close in battle.
* Defensive preparation and execution: Major deficiencies occurring while preparing for and executing the defense include: 1) not tying obstacles to terrain 2) poor siting of defensive positions to cover obstacles and engagement areas 3) poor preparation of defensive positions 4) poor management of engineer assets 5) poor management of Class IV and V (mines) 6) poor positioning of weapons 7) failure of leaders to designate sectors of fire 8) little effort in clearing sectors of fire 9) inconsistently using range cards and sector sketches 10) lack of control measures, ie. TRPs; trigger lines; engagement priorities; engagement criteria; sector stakes. RESULT: units often have obstacles which are easily bypassed and positions which are overrun and/or bypassed. TECHNIQUES: 1) Leader's reconnaissance is key to successfully emplacing obstacles. Battalion commanders to squad leaders must decide where the most important points on the battlefield are, ie., decisive point; critical obstacles; main effort positions, etc. The leader should try and personally look at these points and ensure they will achieve the desired results. 2) Leaders should delegate specific reconnaissance tasks to staff officers and subordinate leaders for those key locations the leader cannot personally recon. Guidance for leaders' recon is in FM 7-20, p. 2-22 and FM 7-10, p. 2-12. 3) The S4 and support platoon leader must ensure they have a simple, efficient plan to distribute available Class IV and V (mines), in accordance with the commander's priorities. They must also ensure they control distribution since companies have a tendency to take everything they can at stockpiled locations. 4) The S4 and the engineer must work together to ensure that the engineer receives the materiels and mines necessary for tactical obstacles. 5) Leaders at all levels must develop a direct fire plan that will produce the desired effect on the enemy. The plan must provide coverage of the target area and provide positive control measures for maximum efficiency. Guidance for direct fire planning and control is in FM 7-8, sections 2-24, 2-59, and pages 5- 28 through 5-30. FM 7-10, p. 5-10 gives additional guidance on control measures.
* Breaching a mined, wire obstacle: Units are not properly obscuring themselves from enemy observation by putting smoke on the far side of the obstacle. Units do not provide adequate local security for the engineers during the breach. RESULT: high engineer casualties during the breach. TECHNIQUE: Provide suppressive fire from a base of fire position. Provide close-in security at the breach point. Use smoke to obscure the breach point.
1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver
* Air/Ground Integration: Aviation units do not effectively coordinate or integrate aviation unit fire and maneuver with those of the ground maneuver force. Maneuver, fire support, obstacle, CSS and A2C2 overlays are not received in a timely manner, or are not displayed for quick and easy access during mission planning and aircrew situational updates. RESULT: aircrews often operate in the brigade's forward areas with little knowledge of friendly unit disposition and no understanding of the ground maneuver plan. This lack of knowledge and coordination increases fratricide for both air and ground units. PROCEDURE: Write a detailed SOP on techniques and procedures for coordinating air and ground maneuver operations. Focus on: 1) communications procedures 2) A2C2 3) operational graphics 4) friendly identification techniques 5) how to mark threat positions TECHNIQUES: 1) Conduct task for FTXs and CPXs with the infantry brigade, concentrating on air/ground integration at staff through team leader level. 2) Aviation liaison officers should function as key members of the brigade staff, aggressively seeking all information and products relating to the commander's intent and the ground maneuver plan. The LNO should provide guidance to the brigade commander on best employment techniques and how aviation can contribute to the plan as part of the combined arms team. 3) Train company commanders, platoon leaders, and team leaders to communicate with each other, ensuring coordination takes place at the lowest possible level before an engagement is made.
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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