SECTION II: BOS NARRATIVES
Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet comments in Section I. As appropriate, and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. The narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for reference.
TA.
5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
Strengths
* Land navigation/concealment (LRSD teams): Long range surveillance detachment (LRSD) team land navigation, camouflage and concealment skills are sharp. TECHNIQUES: 1) Teams rely heavily on their basic skills in azimuth and pace count to conduct movement in their areas of operation. RESULT: team members are always able to pinpoint their location within 100 meters. 2) Teams usually use GPS to verify their locations; however, they do not completely rely on it. 3) Teams maintain effective camouflage and concealment for long periods using camouflage nets along with natural vegetation to blend in with the surrounding area. 4) Weapons and individual load bearing equipment are camouflaged with tape and materials which break up the outlines of their equipment. 5) Individuals often reapply camouflage during the mission.
* Initial IPB process: Understanding the IPB process and effective initial preparation of IPB is continually a strong point in most intelligence sections. At home station, during the initial preparation for operations, data bases are developed. Collection of information and intelligence, analysis of terrain and weather, and situational templating are all areas demonstrating extensive preparation.
* Battle tracking: Intelligence sections are arriving ready to fight. Personnel are motivated and are trained in the fundamentals of TOC operations. They are proficient at map reading, posting the SITMAP and preparing IPB products. Sections are showing proficiency in tracking the enemy situation by analyzing and posting incoming reports. When given the opportunity, enlisted analysts are tracking the enemy situation with skill and motivation. Although many section SOPs do not clearly identify specifics on how to battle track, the skill of the analyst compensates for this shortcoming. S2 NCOICs are becoming more involved in the entire intel process, including battle tracking. Assistant S2s are clearly instrumental in successful battle tracking.
Needs Emphasis
* Asset utilization: Some intelligence BOS personnel do not fully understand intelligence doctrine, and the equipment available to execute that doctrine. RESULT: commanders often miss several opportunities to take greater initiatives that would not have been missed if intel assets were used doctrinally. EXAMPLES: 1) ineffective use of GSR to supplement call for fire during periods of limited visibility 2) unwillingness to effectively use the Portable Monitoring System of REMBASS. TECHNIQUES: 1) Asset managers must ensure that all planners and users are familiar with where intel asset employment would best support mission accomplishment. Each BOS leader needs to understand the capabilities and limitations of each particular asset and how each asset can be integrated to supplement battlefield intel operations. This can be trained at Home Station by having BOS leaders train each other under the intel asset managers lead. RESULT: a better understanding between asset users and asset managers on how the integration process should work.
* Journal and data base management: The quality of journal and data base management varies greatly between units, with too many elements not up to standard. Most units deploy with the necessary tools to adequately track and maintain information such as: order of battle (OB) data base; journals; battle damage assessment (BDA) lists; high priority target (HPT) lists; current priority intelligence requirements (PIR)/intelligence requirements (IR) status boards, but they are rarely used. When used, they are infrequently updated or improperly posted in adequate detail. Journals are not properly being posted with unit identifications, nor are the actions taken by the analyst and RTO clearly defined. RESULT: sporadic and insufficient updating of OB data bases, and untimely dissemination of PIR and IR information. PROCEDURES: 1) Standardize intelligence section operations starting with message flow and intelligence maintenance in accordance with the standards set in FM 34-3, chapter 2. DA Form 4004 should be used to help pass information from RTOs and analysts throughout the TOC and not used exclusively for data base maintenance. 2) Summarize the journal every 24 hours, using the summary for briefings or other intelligence support activities. TECHNIQUES: 1) Develop or use products that facilitate the battle tracking process. Make the products easy to understand, yet informative. 2) Focus training at the lowest level soldier and leader skills. EXAMPLE: Have a soldier, using DA Form 1594, record the events of a normal duty day. Check for completeness and accuracy, paying attention to the log of actions taken.
* Conducting a search: Units tend to search too rapidly and only briefly scan an area. There is often no plan to conduct a detailed, sequential search of the village. Once buried caches are found, units do not check for booby traps prior to opening them. TECHNIQUES: 1) Platoons need to train with grappling hooks to search for booby traps and to open caches. 2) Train soldiers to search above ground level, below the ground, in ceilings, etc. The enemy will not hide caches in obvious places.
5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports
* Completing the IPB process: While initial IPB products are satisfactory, many intelligence sections fail to continue and complete the process. EXAMPLES: 1) fail to update terrain by receiving, plotting, and disseminating LOCs or crossing points that were not initially identified on the maps. 2) failure to incorporate weather changes and their effects on terrain, as reflected in the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). 3) event templates are usually not developed. RESULT: intelligence BOS does not provide a basis for the development of the Decision Support Template (DST). Without a DST and the wargaming inherent in the military decision making process, S2s neglect to explore all of the courses of action available to the enemy. This causes reactive mission execution, rather than proactive execution.
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
TA.1
Maneuver BOS Narrative
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